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mWACM

Dui'lag th.® Siijrlng of lf40, tti® aml#s of ikdelpli
tet&i g»fejttgat®4 la

#u#e.«asl0n limw&rkf
aa4 F2pa»i5«»

f© many @bs«rv#rs the

Britlsb lsl®» w©ul<l ofevloasly b@ thm Fm#te®i'»s ii®xt target#
y@t, ia spit® of thm QmvmmhB hmla.g drawn up «Iab©j^at® pXsuns
for tb.® iavaiioii of Sigland <. tb® lasi ®Jaekb0#ts** umwer
®ro0s®d -feb® ebana©!*
in tarniog

Mmj faetori m.ppmispmd. t@ plsy • part

mw&j fit^m this p]p@e®rl©ms ®p#^atlonj a f^w

(1) tb® Bi'itisb fl@mt

of wbieb eaa b# «i@flait®ly

still ]ptil®d th® bigb sm& in spit^ ©f its hmwj l©as®s t©
S-afman u-'boats ®ai b©®b#r#, (t) tb®

wtf*® wia«ee»ssful

in winaing eoatf©! ©f tb« mir ov#r tb® i^itiab

(S) **th©

^glidb Cbami#l was a r^wf go©i untl^t-aate ©bstaelsj^J- (4) tbs
cJ®t#r»lnation of tb# si.giish p»©pl® pTOd4«4 oa by wi»st<jn
Chwrebill tc r®®lst th# lasi juggemattt to tb@ bittai" und,
aad {5) tb® SoYi®t
a-®!*®®!!

tbat l©oa@d mv@r lajs»g«i* aei»ot® tb®

h©ri®0a»

3-Tb® fbrasi® was iis#d by Oeaeyal Majsia® w«ygan«l abortly
aft®j» tb® fmll of Fr«©®. S®#| 0. 1# BXmk aad E* G«
H®lffir»iob, T»gatl@tb Qmtwj lurepe (if®w T©rki llfrsi Jk*
Knopf, 19iS77~pT"^^*
lil

lmpXm&ahl9 hatred t@ward th® Soiriat stata,
tti® Fu«hr»j* had ©they good r»as©ns to b®
"Russliua b#iu?«**

of thm

Ifell# th® Qftx-aan mraias had b««n ope^'atlng

la FP8a©#j. th« Soirl^t ©©l©»8iisi had %i«fuasf«i»i*®d th@ at&tus
©f

tithaaaia, aai ist^ula from '*8ph®r*#a of infitisae®*'

to st&t©s of th# Soviet uaion*

Btss&rabla aad Bmeavlaa w®r®

also liie&rp#rat®d lato ^«©tb@r SM»sia*®

Fat«i»« trad# b«tw®@a

Tago#ia¥ia and Rwssia wm pi^oiriiai for la an ttgr@«m@at:
tw® Slav stat»s at a tia® wti»a th» f©ra@r was already
^oa« Iiua4r#€ p®r«#at at tbt« ilspesal of th#

fli#

eom.tjnist parties mmm gaiaiag support In tli# Balkaas, raw
®®t«i*iaX ttalpatat® froa tfe® So^irltt ualm w#re slewing iewo#
ifell# a in»0r®-d new Imva^lsa of Finland was ®Gti«diil@d for
i^agiaat IS, 1940#^ l©r#©f@r# th® Ftt@lir#r se®®#a t© b® 0©nfia0#d that th® r^iolut® attltat# of th« Brltith vm |>artlally
basi^ ©B th& bap® that Imssia w®uli ©ater th# war ©n tiiair
.sl4t4

fhas tfct# Brltitb kal tt @lth«r b® iiploaatieally or

Militarily 4#priir®d ef their **last r®«ataittg hop# ®n th®
€©atin@at**4 whil® th# 0®raaii land ami#® «F@r® larg#ly intaet
^(l@ii®r«lob»rst Fraas Hali®!-, **fh@ F:riTat® far J'ejamal
©f G«®raliib©r»t
HaMsr {Ghiaf ©f th«- §«i#ral Staff of
th® Suprea# 0«i«a.ra,<l ©f th® 0«rsaa
lili-lt4i)*^ ,ie*»
l®;®»#d by th# Offle# of th@ Chief Hlsttrlan, H®ai«|iiart@ra
lur©p®-aa c©*aadi ualtai S%at.@a Ar«y* 19S0 (Mlaaographsd)•
¥ol* ?!•, 3©Ft@«b#r 3, 1940..

^irie ron Ra#i®r, ^ liif#> frans* H«ary w. Drexel
{4nnap©li®i tl#S* KaTal InsWHite, I960),, p, S38.
Iv

aad »tjp©iig»

Aft®r solviag th« luaslaua qu«stioG the Q^rmmxte

cseuld tbta aoav«rt mtaxj of thsir r#soup0«a used for tb«
m&toteaMie® ©f larg® gromi foj?e®.@ to th® isa^y and ^tr force—
pr«2»@^uisit@s for th® final

®f Britala aad possibly

th# UaltM States,S
fkm ©a Oetob®!* 28, 1940, Mass«jlini-» s amlat lo-^adsd
Qvmmm, msiettbta^li- against Hitl«r*s wi»li®s,^

Tti® Italian

aail®# w#i*@ mm halt»4 In tta® Qrt#k aoimtaia valleys said
mm barl^d bm©k iato Albaala mt s«v®ritl points#

fb®

British nskwj sad air foi»e® io4g#d th^ssel^#® ia tb.® strategic
islaa^E of hBm&m aM

%h.m ©©astitrntlmg a tbreat to

tb® isfflaaiaa ©11 fi#W® wbleb
tbe Q®»«®a

aait-s#

mmoh of the f»a«l for
M^3?@ov®r tb© ifitish

e^aiM p#«sSbly ttoow tfe© wh@l# Balkms iat© tn-woil hj
biiilding ttp m.tl»AXtM t@ati®«iits ia tht ar#ft aad poasiljly
©•ossfoals# Hitl#3r»# alanB towai'd the S©Ti®t ujiion,
tb# Fti.elir®J* f«lt sblig®d t© bail owt his Axil ps^tnmw-, fh©
iafes#tu®nt Bftlkan 5a»|iaiga® aud

ov«.r*»all eff«et on tb#

.Gemaa iavasioo of Hasiia .ecw».«n,eiag m Jim® 2t, 1941, i®
th.® sajer topi© ©f tliis tbissis-.
topis is ®®p®©ially ©hall®agiag b®©»as® ©f tli©
e©a.fliot h®tmm9n ¥a.jrio\is aathoi's*

Seas# ifielusiing

%ltl#i» was e©nsli«i'iftg tb,# cruit®<3 States
a p©#»lbl©
aad probttbl© mwy m mmtly as ^yuly 9, lt40, s®®i H«l<i#r,
Vol* ?I, #uly 9, imO»

Oet0b®r li, 1940, givsa Hitler»s desire of
*a.i5t wantlag aay n.®w tli®atr-@s of war»"
•

tinston Churchill aa4 B» H« L14<J«11

f®«l that th«

British d«t3i0lon to Interrsn,® in th® Bttljfcsns foreed a
*®®c6ad froat" ©a th® rnvmrntM

prior t© th«lr Invasion of

Hwitsia and pr-obmbXj pl®y@4 m dmiBire r©le In saving Hw®sla
fro» a poBMlhlm

ffe«j tak® th@ viiaw that mwa though

this British #ti'.at:«gla sot# w«# largely aborti-ro it had
d»l&js4 th» lavatiQn of lassia, eau»«4 an aM#d
©f ffi#n

et\aipa»Btjr

©nlargftd th® ar®a ®f responsibility

for th« Aatis#
C!inv#ra#iy, other auth^ra^ luftluding H#tM (luiarisa and
flaiyslaw AttdersjS O0ttt#a^i that the (!#»«.» div©^»loii Into

tii« Balkans had littl® appi»#eia'ol$ in.flm.#ae® m tb.® m^m
eaapalgft. in Hussia*

wrlt&m f>oia.t ©ut that th# mtmstxi

ea»ii&ltia« wer© rsl&tlTdly low in tti# Balkaa eaapaigns an4
th® tzpaniitm®© of

suppXim^ iasi^^ificaat.

l&Hf of tbi® lattfiF greup
w««th®r ia Poland an-d

1941, th® in^aslen ©f
mjv&jrn
Qmrmmn

si«s*ia# that da© t© fcai
Swasis i«ri»g th® spring ef

would his¥® hatf to b# p&stpoaeci

ffaest anthers teicid to bias# thm Pa®hr«r for tb®
in Huasim either through hi® p©liel®a on

%iast©xi s» Ctiurchill, lh.« 0gfta.d All:'^.mc# (Boatsat
Hetighton Mifflin C®», liiO). "HereWfer""cIfel^s pi# gtbsiA
Alli®3jsg| B# H* Lid4«l Hitrt,
a#'rsan 3-«a®mls fSIk
TSiW fiFki William Morrow ft '^Zp'T^Wf*
%®iaa ouiftjfiaa, Paaagr l»®ad#r» ^aas* by Coaitantin®
Piti^giteboa (I@w Xerkf 1# #*
& C@» lac## l®5i)| asad
WlfkdjBlm mA&TB, Hitl®r^i !>®f®at la ii^aia Cchieagei Hanry
Rtgrnerir Co»t 1
)T""'"^fl~l"if"tir"s©isre'e"'io@a not ©iaborat®
©a th# Balkan itaapaign hwfe flais ntaarou® ©th«r
for
Hitler*» «3«f®.ftt.

vi

oeeapatloa and subjiigation of the "Sla-r" araas, or beoaus®
of th® Fii«lir®r*8 eoMaand <J®cialon^'-"-0ft©n in conflict with
tb« strategic ooncapts of tis# Garsan High COK®and.,

Th« long

(j®r»an supply linaa and tba Hmasiaa weatber ar« al»© faotors

6oa»ld«r®d by tbis group but

to b# r«l©g&t#d to a rol®

of l#t»®r iaportaae#.
fhis study ©annot bop® to ®liminat@ all coafliet® ov@r
this pbasa of history.

lv«n tb# facts airail&bla »lgbt b«

subj@«t to variotas iatsrpretatioas, Fwrth#r®©r© th« imtoown
@l®a«iits of iiituitioa and duplielty t-bat oftan parmaatad tba
Faabrer'ts decisions eaimot b® maasurad with total aceuraoy.
However tbis author bop@s by close aacaain&tioa and ear® in
dstail, to aM dlmantloa to Oparatloa larita and its eoosaqusntial affect© oa Barbarosia#

vll

1HE OKHIM

OF fHl Bkt&Am

mm
11^ IFFlCf 0» BARBAHOSSA.

SMPf® I
IlffiODUGflOW
iulj 1940 t® AfMl 6, 1S415

In ordes'

to m4«»stsai€ tb« •ffaet ©f tb.# G«fwiw

Balkan easpal^sl ©n,

tmmlm @f Haa:sisk ©#«®&aei.n.g

on Jm® 3i| 1941| it Is nm9B^&3ej to pl*©« th<@ Fii«hip»i«<s
•fattful dsclsidns @f 1040*1941# i#altng with tta# ab0T®-a«nti©tt®d
allltaFy Qm&p&igm la n pi»0s»©j» {^«rspeotlT#.#

Whmn dii li%l#r

®i»a®3? th@ ©jEeeutlon of tb,# TStflOttS Balte®ii ©ampalgnsf

finally,

4ii tilt Q#»aii InT&sion in tfao Balkaai really bring atooul? a
postp©n#a@nt ef th®

Imritsioii @f li»«sla?

lw»»us aiitliops aalntala that Hitler's £fr@v0©abl«
d®©i^lon to lata4« Hmsiia wa® sM# within i®f#3pal w»eks aft®r
th® SttTf^ndt-r ©f

givm.

tfe®

t,aklsg this f®t®fal step at tbl® tlmm T&wy a«©ag thm «@v-®.ral
atttfa02»s»

Som@ a&latain that Hitl»F was ©Imply fulfilling his

^ftoi'© iriTasiona ©f Qmrn^, iv^mXmriA, anfi eF«t®.
%a®ng th® atttbeyt taklag thlu p^int ©f -yi®* ar®!
mmtikv Hilg®f rniA 4lfr#<i Mmfmr In ffe# la©0fl®@tlbl# Alll®®#
&#mfta'»3e'rl«t R«lati0a® l»lS«lt4l
' tWrfe ''ffei®'' KiiiMiilXim
O©'#., l9»$)} ^ «a€ • h7"• ^ itTlifXtti©i in
Siae® X4iS
(Mftw Xofk? lln^biart aai G©## Inc*# lM§&}m ' fhe
was
signed by tti® F^enefe ©a Jaa@ iS* 1940*

1

g
pi*eaia®s

In such

woi^ks as Mala Kmapf and.

HItier *8 ®last wlli md

%& proTide agrieulturally

spa©® to tb# mm&t^ £o^ tti« Qmrm&n

others

60n%ea4 tfa&t tfa@ fat#fal declsioa was .®ai# hj tb®
bteaus® h® j&ise«jp#3.y

tbat tb® A&tmt &f th«

©om.ld mij ba a®hl#T«d hj tllaiaatlag
tb« e®atin®nt#'* Sasst«»

last b®p® on

A f@w» eeuslds^ijag th® deeision of

3nlf SI, as i.i».r#v©0abl«, mm^t a littl® of ibotfe &f tli«.

previous ®]rs?M@nts a® playing a poi® la helping th« Fa®ty?®r
mmkm .up bit
Ite# tw«ttion, is a©% s© «ueb why a® It la
actually aaie «a iri»@voc.afel® decisien en Jmly SI, 1940»
thii m&f tti® r©«i©riii of Jttlj# l.i40,
©¥®iit.s rtlatiag to S#F»a»-8©fi@t
A®

Hitl©2»
f#

tti®
mmt hm

as 5'tilj" 1S| 1940, lltle^ t©li bis t & p gta©ral.»

la a ooaf#r#B0® at fcfci# B@rgh9f th&t '*®iglaa4 it b®a:t®a^'
tkat fe®.r ®p®r#lst©at «aiw.i.lliagii®ss t© mmkm pmmQ& was oaly to
b# «xpla.iii#d hj h«r feep.# ©f wtaalag lasila to la@f
On ^tily If, 1940, ilalinr iiot®d la his war Joiimitl that
*»lu#sia*s lat®i»«st mot t© l@t us grow big 1®
^I.s©u@d ©n
S# 19S7# iti® fmll t®xt ©f thla
doe«at®iit ©an be feim4 $a% U#S», W«r D«p«i»tafflBtt, S&si
C^aspiracy and Ag;ag®»iiiga {t6Sbiin|^t@iii !J»S* 0©v#fj«®nfc
Prlii'llag off1o®, lt4l*l#48), ?©!• Ill#, pp# S@6»30S,
H#r#aft®F ©lt®4 a® lagl CoaspiraQy ».ad Agip#i«i©a.»
%ald@3?, ?ol» ¥1# #m.l7 IS, 1940,

3
fbl0 is followed up on July SI with Hitl«r*s r«qa®«tlng
Fisld Marsbal Wnlth#r tea Bramobitssb t© study th® "Hussisa
probl®®** aad smbmit jplfta# for » p.©»»lbl# osraaa #aap®igo
agalast tb@ Soviet ual©a«®

Oo Jutly St, Hltl#jp Infomad

Fi®li Marsfcial Wilh«l* lalt®! aai Otntrsl Alfred ^@41 of Ills
t© Invsi® Rmsaia m
Kelt®!

m th® e©miag fall.

Joill, recording to th« ttrntimony of tb# latt«r,

coBTi!ae#d Bitlei» tiiat m Inrmtmi ©f itJissia la tbs fall ©f
thmt y#®tr was aot ©aly ispraotieal l>mt iap©sslbl#»

Hitl@i»

th®n ae©@pt®<i tk® i^@a ©f m imwmlm ®f Bussla in th® spring
of lt41«'^

&m ^Jmly 2®t #©41 ©ri@r©cl tli@ High

C«Baad. op#pa%ioag Staff to
against lu#.aia»

©«tlia@s fer an op®ratlon

fbat si» d&y*, Hitl#!* tQl<S thm thm coIomI

WmltBT WarllsoBt tbat

it w®i aot tela d»oi»lon It mm kils

lat®Btl©a t© wag® war em laitia#"®
SI, toward til.®

fw© days latar, ©ri July

©f a e©af©.r®Be© oa ®p#pati#a Soa Lton#®

Hitler l»f®.!rssi lilt- top mtlltia'y ©oiaaa4®rs ©f hi.® d@o.lsioEi
t@ 3jiir*40 th# E®Tri«t Uai.®a, e#a#lmii»g tliatt
&f tli®
g®r».i^ 0.««palgn iia
tb# mXkmw CswiM If41)
th®
drtt®'(WMhlngton i
W«i«
frlallSg ©ffie#, ifss), p* i« Hir®aft®r
#it@€ m flit mxrnm CutmpaigR ia t.fai# Baikms#
ysfweigg*

rii'iitwWiiiiiiri.'iLiii.iW.IIIIMI' Iimtfrrj

iinnwuiyinii.iieigMMWjm

ifcmiLiU'UMHiiwi

imruiTu —wi,-.

iHitiHmwuii*

^ann*),*

icii iiimnii«^«i#i>i*

^

%»S##
ci«a#ral*» P®pttr6m#ttt, frlale ©f Wsr
Crlmiaals btfer# tfe® lw«ffibsrg Milltmry fribSSili'"mEer^be
6»»ir©i' G®mmr^m^&rW^t'swm^m^ • April" imt- —
tWHHglmr^,S7"o^mE@Br7HErifl^ffle^^sirags®),
¥©1, X# pp. 9&S*9i®# l#r««s.ft®r ett#d as grl&la ©f war
Cri%l.aala»
p# 05i» L®t@r WarliMoxit It pro»©t®4 to general.
®G@i« naa® for th» Q»i«an imraston of ^gland#

4
Russia i« thm factor on wbicb Britain Is
relying tb« m^st • • . with R«»sla saaah«4,
BritftliJ'a last hep® will b® iibatt®ap@i.» G@imaxij
tb#a will b# ®&#t«jr of Sur©p® smd tk® Balk.iuQ«»
D«ci8l©ii,i Rii«si«*s ^#®t3?tieti#a mast tb®;?@foi»® b® ffi&d# a part #f this stwiggl«» Spring 1941«
Th» Mm&rnr ilus®i& li
tfe® better* » • #
If wa atart ia May^*41,j w® would liav© five nonthB
t© finish tli# Job*3.0
Caa@ Otto was tb® eod® nam® ansi^ed t® this project
during its @arly stag«s, JJitriag th» remainder of th« @uffl®#r
aiMl, fall two different teams of staff offleers worked aat
geaepal pla^s f©r mi In^mloa of Smssia. Aee^ordilng to th®
testiaoKif of ?i@14 Maribal Friedrieii Paaltis# both g®a®rml
©utlln«3 w®re C0apl#t9<3 in Sef«»b©r., It40>^-^
fhm It ftpp«&rsi tbat Hltl#r li«d flralf i»ai® up his aiad
to inv&d® tb® Soviet Wniea ia Jttl|^, 19i0»

Or

it?

So»®

iiisteriaaa# ®v®]a *ft®r r«¥l©«lag tb# ©wots during July# aight
not to« io hast:^ with their fiaal

Tfa«y aigfat argu#

that Hitl®r aetded troops in tk& east to prot#et tiis dgstgriorating froati»rs fr©a a

Soviet seaaee#

fliis would

©nabl® th® Pu.#lar®r te d@al witb tb# S©vl@ta fro® m po'sitloa
l%lfeM#r., ?el# fl, iulj SI# 1940.,
War D«parta@iitt, Ma&l CQtispiraey tad &ggres£lms
Qpinlort and J'ttdgement (Wasb-ingloEi '"oWlo®""of 'I'S® ofilta-d'f^itaa
Ctoi®f of C©ms®l fr©-a P3r©s®©utioii of Axla Griffiinalitf, ir»S*
aoT®rimeat Friatiag Offie®# 194?), p»
H®r@aft«r eit®d as
Wagj Congplraey and AgKrasaiont OplQieci. and Jud^eg@nt«

s

of p®w»r* possibly th® only way Stalin w@uld listen,^ If tb.®
UmBlmm atill y®fus®4 t© bask doiws in th® fmc« ©f feh® rapid
mrmmi Walldup, Hitl#jp «o^ald thm. fall bacfe ©n his iri«» pl&as#
ffat®

of ui»s«i#y, ®f iedur"®®, hM t© b® plm,t«4 ia tb«

aiads ©f th® Fii®lir@jP»s g®a©*'al®,

mmmn g©al ©f &

witb

mmy

*@fklng t©ws3?^

iaTt^si^a ©f iii8«la., tb® d#»iF@€

r«attlts wetiM wmrm llk&Xj b# f@rtb®®Eiiig|-

th« Fti@fer®r«a

i@«isJ.©a ©f I'mly iln 1®40# wm a©t irr®ir@ei.bl®*
is miQh t© b» taid la t&r&r of tbia lint at
rmmmMg^

fb# Russiaasi. i# it appasrs* wsr® massing tm.epa

t©T m inwmlon of ilaM®ia.i «i. ^lusslm t&mm w#r® i«®p«)rt@d
to b® all®tt#4 for ©p«rittioii» .ftgainiit Finlaad m

IS Hmg-

In tb® Fa#lir@r*t opiaioii tb# Sovitts w«r® rtaiy to
^g@ wltb Balg&ffia imi yugeil^vta to tti« Straits^ tli® A#g®ito,
aij4 th® Mflstie#®^4

wm aet pi'#p.«»®.€ t©

tli«

S©fi®t» grew Mtmng9P at tb® ®»:p®os® ©f the iiit@f«sts
©f til® flili*4. S#i©h#,

Fu@fe3?®r a&i® tMs el®mr wb.®a fat© laidi

'It is im #mj? iat@r#®t fe© MtintAin th®
BtAtm qmo In the S«ltea».8« I0 tb® B^tle tee it
ia <to) ©mf
t® kedp m sitmatien wfeieti
i%et« Hilbl@Jp«s l®tt#F to Mmt#-©liiii ©a
3, 1^40,
i»plyiiag that Hitl®r iid net
from Stalls m
long AS 0@i%any I'eaaloedi ttroiig In th® ®ast# Exess^pts 0«i h@
f@md in Jeba A#
(l«w T&rkt 4«®2'l@t,a

ffe® -5r««% Pswsrs. sua4 |aist-®p» Iw^pep®

B®©k' &'•# l5^3)# i# "S3t#

^%ftlA®i?-t ?6l* fl, Augmst IB, 1940»
^%iikit©s# p# Sil#

6
might not 9®ljar2*msai
arsia*^®

sty&tsgle potitioa In th®

fh.« "i«e4«tarf* ©f J'mly th^x-tfefe by©ugtit a®ra^ tro©pa
to th« <Set®Pioratiiig ©astern fi»©ntieri, posftbly savsd Finland,
Mid «£it:bl#d

t#

tli® t®r]plt©ipi«l. iat®grlty of

wbat wm- Imtt ©f lamaala aft®!* th.®
mmw9 tb.« fcf«jop» h®ip®d to

piirtliai'*
tfe® ii®a that

f@lt

that th# pi»©p@r plae« f©r tb® Bmsslaas ms ®a®t of tli« Danmbe
&M out of tfal# Ealiciyas.
m am iadlsatioa that- tli.® Fa#lir#y bai not
y#t

a

wiky ati'stt" us

©one#j*ii#d# oa® a@#is only to

a» tfe@ iiasili©..® w«3P®
bis aetl®as mtt®w tli«

^lpa3E*tit« P®tt was- sign#i b»tw@®.n. mwmmkjj,. lapsn, and Italy*
Hitltr w&# ^iaiek to f©iat ©at that tbis *pmet*' wa.® mot aia«d
at tta.« ,S©¥le-t Uaita mi in¥it@i Emssla t© J0li^ th® Axis in
"4ivlSlng up thm 0stut# ©f
It was,

Brltala.,.^^^

^©»tlau®# tbkls lla© ©f r»a®o»iiig, only aft@s*

tlis fu#li2*«r b®e&a@ eoa.¥lne®i tkst StaliJi would .a«itb«i' 1«&¥«
tb@ Bfttk&ai a©,^ fe#®o«# «agag#d .In tiie waf againit th® B^itlsb
tli&t

4s«si4«d mm «a4 f&w all that tfa# .Sovi@t Union

h.ftd t© hm ®lialn&tt<i#

fhis s^gui'ime® wat

during

?©1. ?I> Stptsab#!* S4^ 1940*
Axis r@prmmt&tlv0» mmmtisig In Ti@ima towaf^
th© ®aiS &t A-ugust, 1940# agr#«€ to gl¥« I-ei»th«3*a $i?aiisylvaiiia
to Hmgary and Seuthera Debruja t© Balgarla# Beth of th®s®
eomtriei th#if©by
liid#bt®d t© tb« Asis*
i%ald«r. Vol, VI, Septambsr 30, 1940.
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I@T«HabeJ?is 1940^ by tli#

It atartsd with Hl%l®r»s

with M©lotoT» tb® Ruasiao foraign miniattJ?, on
W&v<mh9r it (tfe® »a®® 4«y tb,# FuetotF bad isi«#d m, '^<lii*«cti'^#®

til# slaultaB®©ma irtvmtloa of §i»0#e« aad aiteraltai*)

aa4 cttnsluded witti Stmlln-'i fl»a.l

oa SewQabejp g?, i®40#

Buyiag thii s&m# p®i«io4 tfei®

t© luseellai plef«d*

lag with til® latt«p to d© ®-^®rythiag In his power" to 4iT#i»t
Emssia*! att^aties fmu th« Balkan® to tfa« I®ai:* aad M144.1&

®Oas® Otto® bad i»#©-«t¥0i littia' is«r«©aal att^iitioa f^oa
ta@ Fu#ti.r@r up to. tbit pelat, aeeordiag to tb.# t@®tl»oay of
§®a@rai PaoiuSi mn€ «as ©aiy r«irlfa4 m a aaj^-i* t®pi0 ©f
dissttsalon &t tli» PM®to#r's mlHt&j e©a.f#rtn©#s aft#jp th®
att®apt©€ a.@goti«tiori:S with tb# S9¥i#t® hat pF#f#4 .fruitlass*^®

Mmn after, ©n P«e#®b®j» S, 1940,

«ilit«|- eoaaand®?® tbafei

i»few®4 hi®

"F^^apwutioni a«8t g«t

aeeor^ane# with ©tir Mfl® plasi*

ia.

Pr©fes-®fi imt® (fof tli«

invasioa ©f 8tttiia)j 'jrAd ®f
Til#

foll0w#d till® up OB l>®s®Bb»i' IS, 1940, with

bis "irreToeabl®" iii'©etlv#i m »oa® iiav# elmla©<a» fer th®
laTasion of losaia in &M»t to "fr@vfat it# b»©©Bing m
^%i*kaes» p.» 336•
^%asl ceaspimoy gad Agg3*»i«loa» Opinion and Jia4g@agat
^%lald«r.# ?©I# fl# D»e@»b#i» §, 1940* (italles, ai.n«*)

8
pmslhl» i«ng#r oa th« ^^ntinrnt
"Dir^otlv# Mo*

Aeco^iing to this

wiiish was issued to all top e©«»itiider»,

All '*prepa?«ti©af'* w®!*© t©. b« ®eapl0t®4 "as .Qf May 15»
1941
d©«bt® as t© irtiatb^a? this was tla#..

S?«B so
Fudhfer's final d©«liloa#

ffe# diFtestlve gosa on to »aji

1% ittuat b® 0l«&rly uG4#r®to®i that mil
oM^rs t© 1>@ gl¥«a by tbif
la ®bi©f
om th® busis ©£ -fetels
m» prmnmnt-ttmmj
to m»& Rimtla
elimgt b©i' fr®a»nt
towajpd ua«®®
III tpit#

th#

wm^r-w&tlonB f it Is pmmthl®

to QmxeluA.® tb&t tti® d#eiiioa of Bte#iil3#:r .13jr 1040, wss
Irrtwaabl©# 4 d^tlalm tim& liiait was tstafellsfafs^ in aplt®
©f tha tmtlm&ay ©f

Admii'al grl© R«i«d®i» to th« Hon**

ests® Bai*to«.rofsa# aa tb# ppojo-et#^ Q«r®an ir^Tiision
S:a»gi« mm nm sailedj was b-©i».g 0l0i#lf followed by %h%
top cismma ooOTaa^Strt#
0a,

Pt#l<S larsiial ilili®l» litt#r

Ii#®^

Bf 1941, iaftJfiadi hti top tuboi'dlii&t^i that all

pi*eliiita»fff woFfe mift b© aoapl®t®d "a# tbat ao attack &n
Im®sla is p©S0ibl# f3*©« Majf 16,
^%tt®ll®y-iillltfel*^<l,
Eew# 19iS-1946 (OaiWiltaitt
E* S^,
& Soto# 1054), f®l# il# |?« 86-.
eit#i aa Da§ H®#r-» 'CltaliSi# ®in®»)
^^fgialt of Waf Ojpialn&l»» ?ol, X, pp, 98®«960»
0lmt»td in Ky Ll£«# that th@ 18 D»©®ato#r
^ir®0tiT® ^©©atala®€ a© iuSa lelsfllne 4at# ©*» j>ro®p#.©tlv«
ti®,® tor tile opsratioii to begin. It was Juit a pr@©atutio.nii'
AT J
P-, 3S7#
^^Tri&la of War Crimiaals, Vol. X, pp. 971-970*
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In the meantime, on October 2^, 1940, Mussolini had
thrust his blunt sword into Greece#

Hitler at first had been

so angry at this Fascist move that he threatened to "let the
Italians do it themselves" in spite of the fact that the
25
Italian drives bogged down in the Greek mountain valleys.
By November 4, the Fuehrer had become far more realistic.
The British had already established themselves on Crete and
l^Msnos while further threatening to establish bases at
Salonika.

Churchill was pleading for an anti-Axis coalition
26
in the area at the same time.
It was rumored also that

the Russians were offering the Greeks aid.^*^

The whole

affair threatened to throw the Balkans into a flux which
could only brew an ill wind for the Axis and possibly force
the Fuehrer to compromise his plans for an^";"eastern settle
ment."
Hitler's first counter stroke was to move his air

defense service to southern Bulgaria throur,h an agreement with
the Bulgar state.

He then contemplated sending three

German divisions to Albania but dismissed the idea for fear
the move might cause the Greeks to ally themselves completely
^^Halder, Vol. VI, November 1, 1940.

26

Ulrich von Hassel, The von Hassel Diaries, 193^-1944.
(Garden City, Nev? York: Doufcle^ay
Co. Inc., 1947), November
11, 1940; Haider, Vol. VI, November 4, 1940.
27
Lukacs, p. 34S.
^%alder. Vol. VI, November 4, 1940.
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with tb.® British,^®

%h® Pa®hr«»r d®®ldt#d to bring

tb# pp©-Axis a©uatrl®» of Himgsupy* Hy»anla, and Slovakia into
tb® frlpitrtit® Paet m Axi» Jimler partner® $^s »®.ob m poa»lbl#« (toe® tfois was aeeosplisb.#?!, Hitlei' weuld th«n atttJipt
t© wia eT®r Bulgaria mi4 T«gosl«Yl& to th.® &&&.& *'Paet'*
through r®l©ntl®ss ^iplemati© an«l Military presnur®*
«©lai@f8a@nt of thisi goal would giY« tfci#

favorabl«

frontiers for lat@r ©ptratioa® in Gr««e@ and touM
t®na t© lc6®p thmm ©©mtrift® @mt mt m%j p3?®p©s#d .auati-Axia
eoalitloa#

in tb#

weiiM

up dipl®*'

aatic relatienB witb Qvmm» ©©attau® bis buiWap in E«a»ia,
wliieh. had b®«a going ©b ainc@ tb.® ?l#Ema jlward et S®pt®»bar
S7, aafi sttk« pl®ya« t© a®«t th.« new Brltiiia eliall«g0 1» th@
ledit^rrsneam.
In r@g&rd t© tb» l«tt«r. Hitler or WoT«ab®r' ii, 1940,
issii©i

IS'®!

**^If

a »3@:rmaii &»or®a

diirisioa wottld b« stat t© I@rtla. Afriea
w«ak#a®d ixis position in tte® ar®a..^*

btl®t®r th,®

Also "Gibraltar will

b@ tak#n and th& Straits el&»m4^ with th® aid of Praneisc©
Fraae©.

fb® Q^.rmm troeps in th# east w®r» to eentiau© to b©

r»iafare®4 aceoriing to plaa and "an amy as®#«bi®d to Mareh
into {Jr@«k Tlira®# by Jaattary if tb® n®®^ should arisa#**^®
Whil® hm was fmitlssaly tryiag t© eon^liaoa tb® Jioviats

^%arisaa Campaigct in tfa® Balteaaa, pp.
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that tb#lr natur«l.

®xpao«i©n'^ ahouM b« out of

th« Bmlkmne and toward th« Persian aulf, th« Puebrer on
No'¥®ffib®r 10#

to t«lk ling Berls of Bulgaria into Joia*

ttig thm 4xis»^^

At tb.« saa« tlm® mor©

troopa wm@

s@at iato Imioala '*in ©rd®!* t© buiXi & jp®e#rToir of fore®s
tbtre#**

On ^&rm^h@x' SO Himgajpy aninL©mc#d Its adhsrme® to

th# Trlpaftlt# Paet} Rimml&

signal ©Ji Ho'r^b»r t3|

ani Slo-^'&kla beeaa® am M.xl« partson "Mowmmhmr S5,
la th® first 4myM &t

aft@2» «on©l«{llng that

Stalin ^wm & ©©li-feloodtd blacksimil®!','* Hltl»r steppM all
pr^p&fatiea# t&r ea iBTasioa. ©f B3?itMln until

Russia

liM be® erw.sbted*'*^®
fb,®a on D-mmmhtr &, 1940, s-ft®i» a rmim of caa® Ott©,
th# Fudto®** eall»d f©r dttalXs on th# »ajpll®r p.i*©po®@d optratlott® ®gaia»t OP#@s®»

H® was ii2f0j?»«4 t'a&t the ©oaipleted

plan« f©:p th® G®r«a» invasion ®f Qitmm, ustag Bmlgarx* a® a
bas», w0uM B©t b@ j?»«dy mttl tli# *l€dil@ @,f D#e#»fe«i»s but
tbat wa Invasion ©f sr#### eoiiM not pesiibly tak® plaee
tb« to#gtanlag

larela '*siaa® th® as«#abl^ woyl€i

r«tml3p« s#v®atf ©2* slgbty

It was

as®w#d by

tha a@3mm Oaiaaral Staff tbat tfcta eaapaigtt wftwli last approxlsatsly fcmi* weak®.,
would

Hia fereaa «»«€ la %hm cmmk eaapalpi

at least ai»tk#i* foiw waakt foi* apa-fltting ani
®%ttk»es, p# 349«
^%aMer, ?©1. ?I, Bacambei* 8, 1940,
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v&dmplQjm&nt befor tiisy would b® «Tatlabl« for an Invasion
of Rusaia.®^ Ilitlar conceded, ®o It »««»», mxiA, &a mentiontd
pi»®vioiiSly, flxad tha time for th®, invasion ®f Russia foi»

the **#nd of Maj, 1941•"
tills waa followed oa D®©#«b®P 1$# 1940, jast fi¥® ipiys
pricr to nitl«r»s "E^rbarossa dlp»etl¥«»® with. "Direetlv© Ho*
£.0^* ®st®ibli«h.lag Operation. K«i»lta ep the 0«i»miua prop©«@4

iavasloti. of Sr®©c®#

Aecoi»ding to th® outlla® of M»ritaj a

G®i*man task force Wfts to be foms-fl la liamanla

to

tbrui^t soros® Bulgaria and oecupy *cir««k l&r&ee* ®a soon .as
weata®.r aM political conclitioaa wouM allow#

A aaxisua of

tiftntj-fQur diTislons wms t© lb© e<j®»ittedj and

w#i*@

to b« r«aiy t© use .tii a n«w m<S®FtalEiisg m Bo&n m th#
op-ai'atio.a w&s co».pl#t#d.^^^ lo sp##lfio d«t® was *#0tioa«d
la tia@ ®dir®-cti¥s#** but on Dmrnmh^v tO, 1940, Hitl®r fixed
the protvEblt liifaiioa ©.f Cif@0O®

eauaad Haider to ri.ote that

Mftreli 6, 1941j wblsh
hav# five «i&y« i«laj s© f.«r.*''S§

Aa tfci® nm ya&i? opened# Bulga^iaa PF«®l®y Bogian Plloir
Tisltad B»riln arid was off®3?»d

and th@ Gr@®k

port of Saloaika if tb® Bulg*fS wott.W Jeiri th® Tripartita
Pact#

on jiLTiuarj S, 1941, Fllof agi»««d tbst his country

^%itld4r,, Vol» VI, D^eeaibos' 5, 1940| GM»g»iQ Caapalgn in
Balkans» p* 6# Als® »®«f All« Bulloei*s'^tltXirV 'i
MadJ ''In"""fyrimay (¥®w YoFki Harper
Brotherss~XWWT» P»
^%8ild6r, ?ol. ?I, D®e^to@r 13j, 1940f Qmrnum. Campaign.
In th« Dalkaag» p« 6j and Bull©ek, p. 574.
^%*ld«tr. Vol. VI, December 20, 1940.
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would b®e0m« an Axis partner ®but mly after Germaa t^ops
antsr th® coun-try,"

Almost at tho sgraa

the Russians

wamad *^that It would consider th© apiseaFaace of foralgn.
arsad for*c«s in the tsirrltor-y of Bulgaria «id th« Tlcinlty
of th« Straits as a ?loiation. of tfa® 8#eurltj- lateresta of
the

?o ©mphasise th,® point, Soviet troops w#r®

reported moring into

Hitler reacted on January

8-9, at & oonferene# 8,t tli® Bergfeef, bj

lashing

th# Imsfiaris tad prosla^d to "settl# tbs oontintntal is8u@

as aoon m patslbX®***

E@ thm ordered two and one-lmlf

divisions to be r-mAj t^r smrwiem in Albmia if neeessas^j#®*^
Britala, &a aaticipatad# now m&red t® eount«r tb# Fueb.r«r*s
plass, Cliur«bill again approaobad the 3-Fa®ks for acre joint
co»-©paratloa mad Brltisa partialpation sn tb® mainlaad^
Or»®ks w®re c&atious.,

®a®

still r®t«iatd hope that Hitler

wouM not tat®rf©r« ia t!a#ir

private war-^

the Italians#

TugsalAiria and fmtkaj at th© tase tiK« spimi.#d all offers of
a Britisii alliane® ccaplsi with. Britisfa aisistsae#.®®
*Si@ Fuehrer «®aawl:iil#j> oa J&nu&pj 19, fix«d th® date
for th# '3«r®-&n ©atrj inte Bulgaria for F#brw.ar|' i8 m4 th#
Jeining of that country t© the A:sis on Marcb 1, in spit# of
B®pitrtiE®nt &f Stat®, ^&fi«»3oirl«t Salationss,
lt59-4i, Doeuffi«Hats frcw the Ar©hlf®s" of
•ijirSw*'WriIg?i
BT-ffei'^CWai'liiagl'onj
Qwerrimsnl Winfing Wf?foi,'"'ISt3),
WTsm,
^•^Bullecfe, p. §75*
Tbi® Grand Allianc®, p» 17$.
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th® tmt that t'a® h®ad of tfcit Marlta task f©rc@, Fi@l<!
Marshal Sigffiimd List, did not tfeink his air mm could a««t
But th® o&man aof©a«n,t of troops for ®aa®ably

th#

b#gim durlii.3 tli« first wsek In Fabi'uary, and on Pebraary 8,
a ®0C]p@t agreement wa® .F»&oh.®^ b«tw««ri. Fi»14 Karshal List
and tb.9 Bulgarian G«n«ral Staff for th® ©ntranc# of the
G«man tr00ps Into Bulgftyia l»t«r In th« month
fb« QwmkSp pmMlhXy Bming tb®. Iiiaiiwl^wi'itlnig on thm
wall, new wm% «or® agrseabl® to tti# idea ©f Britiah troops
partleipatlag on ta» aaiaXatnd, bmt **01311^ &itmr G#rs®n tjroop®
tm TvPkB aM th« jugo&Xmn w©i».#

bad

again approaebtd fey tb« Britisti# and again proved
Hltl®i» n9w decided that it was tia# to ©liainat®
ysigoslavia m a potential

to tli® Qmrm&n plan.® an tha

gj*omd:g that h®!' offtesr co3?p aafl aray ware ** totally urii?®!!abl®*® ia<3

ppof«»ssi aaiityallty was not to hm. trttstad^^g

Sfeii.y$by am. Fmhru^wj 14# th# fagoslaf pi»ia« iaiiii«t#i:» aa-d
foy#iga minist®3? an»w@p«d a auroont t© a#tt with tb# f'umhr^r
at Bmrohtm&g&d&n*
Dicing tb# c0wr®t of th@ conversations tbat followed#
Hitl®r ©ff@p®a t'm YugmXms, in tb@ @v®at of q®w«3ei opiifatloii® against (»»©®e®, a prowls® ttiat Axis soldiara would not

(Mm fo^kt

ShireTf Th® 'Hii® and Fall of th# Itolrd R®iefe,»
SiKoa aad SeluftiFriTO)TTr
—

^^Liikaes, p# S«8.
4%J&ld®3?, ¥ol. ¥1, March 5, 1941.
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C2 *o»»

t'a® Yugoslav

sllsw th« G#m&ris

Tugosla^^iB in r#tiii»n would
U3» of oertato railjpoads foa? supply

p'jTpoBm and weald Join th® Tylpartlt® ?®et»

Th® Fuehrer

also left th« liEpr#»sion that h9 fully ®3cpe?itod th« Tngoslaves to eomply to thaa® damandl®, Hassan motorized mit®
at the saa® time s«at 3p#®ding toward th« Yugoalsir
frontier

'#lill« XugealftTla

l@ft to poad«i' be? fat#, th®

Fu«hr®i? MOTsd to »tr«n,gth@n bis #a®t#ra fpontisra fi»#» possi
ble S©vl@t in,t#r^®»tioa ©a b@half of its little sla^lf
brotfe#^., Eltl«r# on F®bru«ry 2t,
Wsrasi' ¥sa Sefaul«ib-tti'g ami h.l®

C^unt FM#dMefe
la Moteew to l«t it hm

Wkaewtt la ao laprsssiT® Bmner** tli&t "th®^ w®i*« SSO^OOO
tpoopt la Rttsiala** ipsi b®.ljiad

troop® *'in©xhau«t ibl@

rea^rvc-s^ In

Hltlar*® Marita

wss meanwliil® ©acountartog

dlf.fie«ltles. Originally in 'Dae^ab^r^ the {lemms had-

planned to ci'os# tli« BttlgJtriart
20^«4i

^*110% befor# Janmry

d&tB now wa» established for PebJfua^y 28«

The

C5®n«ral Staff had ®8tl«at«d tbat aft«r th« Qormm.
«ntr«n«© into Bulgaria th® furttex* d0pl&ymmt of the grgmid

troops would tftk# approxlwately a w«®k and th® buildup ef
arstad Alllmc«i, p« 15©•
^%hirer, p, Sg2| hukMOSi, p# S60«
^%«ld®r, Vol, ¥1, Beo9mb@r BO, 1940•
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thm air foi*©® and ®uppli®s a llttl# loag®p. Untfer tbds®
clrcuffistiiutices th.® dftftdllia® of Mmr^h 6, for Msplta eoald net
possibly bm

R«gar^lgss, th# Barbaros®® tla^table

'*fi'oai lay IS, onward** was a<Sli«,r#€ to- by tlm G-wrmaa military,47
fb# «uc<j@tsfttl a-«rmaa ©ufci'mc® into Bulgaf'lii took plae®
a« s©li®<ial®d, «ad, on Mare-h

th« Bulgars joined th«

tripartita Paet. Hitl®r now mov®d. one® again to bping I'tagotlavia iat© tb® Asia ©aaip#
B@g©nt fiiul was

fiils tia®# oa K«i»«h 4, pi»laca

to- Bspclattsga^eii*

former Q^imsxi

deawadf wt-i*® f®p®at®d and, m aa a4df4 ln4utmmnt for &
eoaMitfflest* Hltl#r off ©red tla« riigo§lairs th» 3r««k port of
Salonika,'^®

O-q Mar-cb S, Prtnc® Pmiil ®air«i to and v^pbally

pi»0Mi«0d tia® Pii«hr©r t'aat Xugosla.fia ws&ald. coMplj with tb®
Axis d«B«nis»
It B&mi beesa# otoviatis that th© R«g$Qt could not
deliver, Wimton. C-hurchiXl had ppomistd t© s-©nd & »peelfi#d

€'f British troop# tbat began arriving on tti« 6-ifeelt,
la&inlmd y.ercb

Tbis gx^«atly bstrt«@d th# antl-^Axia

fefttliaoritg in yttToslafia acd the •mllltarj, rftllyirsg arouafi

lnt@rpr»tatloa 1« »«bitKitlat®4a hj lft®i Conspjgaef mi j^g^m&iont ¥ol» ?I, p» S78|
,
^iSuiry IST X'S'll'
February 17, 1041*
^%ot® footnote namb@r twsntyfo'UJ?.
^®fhls is not naw* Salaaika was off^-fed to th« T^igosla¥s ft® ®arly as Mov©job«y 18, 1940, It w« also p^o«ls&d
to Bttlgarlat M©ith«r got It#
Graad Alliancg, p» 74 and p, 2S0.
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ths leader of. th® ©ppos.ltIon, Dulan Slasvlc, flatly refuMed
to conced© to th® Fu®h3?@r«s d®maads.
PrlnG& Paul was. egmia .s.iasmGned by

on Mareh. 15,

1941# ano. was »®rve<S with the f\i»hi?3r*3 .f.Ui«l lenient off®!*.
ITugoslavlft was dith»r expected to oowply with Hitler's wi»h,es

03P be wiped out»

Paul ^fa^ k@pt a virtual pi^ison^.r- tor fowp

days. H« was alloweci to ratam horn® on March 19.

Tha a&xt

iay th® Tugoilftf goT^rnmdnt iacided, to Join tlia Tx'ipa.ptit®
Paet*

Itanwhils tfe@ oeraafi military l®ad#:rsliip was oomplainlag about tb® d#laj App&rmtlj oaus^d by tha Fuebr^p't
niaohiaat.lonis#

®is Bm^b&rosim tiaa sobedul# appeared vn-rj

umGh in dangtr in spita of tli® fact that as emrly as Maroli 7,
ha4 tl^slidd to kosp six Infantry .divi»io,iis in laiaanla
out of the twsaty-thra# #&i'Biap,lta-d for Rulgas-la and tha
Invaalori o.f
Fiaally oa lai?o-h 17^ th@ Fuahi'^^r ».add s> mm&mtouM

declslcn.

fogees to ba

In th& operation (Wmrltm)

w%y« to be written off .fpoia tha buildup for> Paj^baroosa.
Also, ''all n®w panstrs now b«ing pz*odue«d in (Jsmany w»ra
not to b© u®#d in the Initial o.ff®nsiv« against th® Soviet
Union.''

Th®n aftftr allay.lng .fears of possibl® Russian int.^j?-

•?®ntion, he ordered th« mfmsa 0«n«i»al Staff to ba

,

CaMpaigp ia tha .B&lk.aa^a

®%al4«p, ¥ol» ¥1# iareh 17, 1941#author.)

p. tO#
(Italic% by th«
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op»i»s&tton mm t© hm

to drlv® th# Britisla ®ut of

out with fcli« *obJ«etiva of gulning mix' dosairmtl^n
mmw t'ii® mmtmm

€isi *oaX4 *p®rfctaps #T®n

tfe« P®lopeiis#,»«»'* ftttmete
^mam

was to b» Xmmmh^O.

Yugetlavim Joluod tba Axlt»^

pise# pi*##«03i«fely ftroijyn^ MAToii tS»

t«k«

1%«

wms, »f

mam&0 t© *b# @««rl«d out with »iJEtaw«
C^a M®s»eb §4, two jp»pi»«««atiitlf«» «>f tli» T'u®»sl«w
goir«jmii®iit ilipptd ©at of B»lgriitf» through ft &uhm%m rail
way statiosa misS hom4%d « tr«la

for

ffe« ii»3tt

day. Is tb# pmo-mmm ©f Hltltr aiit4 ioimh%m ¥©a liefeoufcrop,

Yttg©»lftvi«.

thm TfipaFtit#,

p3^ig®i#4 nnd

at ttoai tiia®

litgtily
tlxts w©aM fnollitrnt®

isis mMtmU m
'Bim

*lai:iit#r®. toai a© mmmit mtxsjmm tw

B#Igrai# whm til#J, til# gmrnmmmtg

tfe« wri&m urngmt

w#-ip« mmrtb^mm ©a tfa# nigbt ©f lareh SH-II'I, hf » populm

upfltiag l®i by ft m^mhm of top tugmlmw air fmea
sufipmtmd hj th# mmy*
wmB

youthful rmir to thm thronm$

klug*

Di*®!©. stoofl®

flt« n«« r®gi«# ©f Prim®
off«f»«d to iiipi « aona^r«««i©n

It mpp&mm4 %uit,.® obvim» to B«flia

pant witij

2«s if##rp Vol. IIp* ft#,
4k.w«Hi'M*

sraad Mllimm, p* 160,

KiinWjWi I

nWi«»iWj|im»i-i«Wi l«ilitJiim»»f <>•

p# QgS*
Ibid.
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that the n®m govt-frimmt was net going to ace^pt tl»«
Tripartite Pact.

Hitler- was. in a rags. H«

cal?i.0d hie ujtli-

t&py leaders to a cort.fareuc« In Berlin on Hai'oli 27.

The

Belgrade c0up^ ha said, ''had #ndang©i'©d both M&rita and
B&rbaFos«a,**

"ttitrefer© h© waa d^t^rralia^d to '*d#atroy Yugo

slavia inilitsrlly luid sis % nation."

Th« blow «g«ln«t th®

»t«.t® would b# "car^ldcl oat witli »llitapy harahnoss** In a
*'lightiilng-ltk® imd^Ptaking***

(}o®x»lng was oi'd,«rod

**to d®»ti»of B#lg*'acis la attaoks by

At ths soja®

<3onf«»'®n.0© th.« Fiialirtr Issued "Dlraetl*® H©. 85'* for the
Kmltsl sxid Jodl wer©

Invasion, of

liiatruetsdi to worfc sut th& pla»,s that sara® #¥#alog#
omm hi« .f®t®ful

flien

"fb# bagi.nplng of th#

Bar'bai:»0as«. oimration will hm^ to hm post^oa^d up to foiar
wm'ks

lithln twsnti'-f014.1'' hsur® "Aetlon, Panl-gliK^Bt" (as tfe©
Pashr#!* GaH.®d tb® pr©J#et«4 Inmsloa of Yugmlmist.) and
^Op«?fttlon Mitrlta** war® put in a closer working r«latioasliip
with ona anoth®j?«5d

fh@ final i»®flae<5 High c©iaa«uid AiTmntir®

mm amit t© th# vcpIous o«man i#r¥ie@s mn Marets. SO,

fh.®

mijautM of this ®@«tlog earn b@ f©ur«l In Ifagl
CoQgpirmej atad Aggressl^# ?©1# IV, pp» S7S«»878.
^%&sl Censpigftey aad Ag.gi*«8.»ioR, ?ol. ?I, pp, 9S8«9S9,
(fb# im€@a?lining is eontain®d la the ainutea.)

so
(}®i»aan mllltarj was allowsd approxiasately fiva dmjs to
prepAr# It»elf fop th® n«w task.®^
Tb« qumtX&n to b« answ®r%d fro® th« pr»c«ding «vld@no©,
and without ijiirolving otb®r factorS;, Is wliether tb® Balkan
©mspaigo® m plaon®d by tb.© •cl@i»aaa.® up to lpi»il 6, caused a
dal&f in tb« «3iteuti®n &£ Barb&rossa#.

1# na dotibt

tbat tb®j did#
S0B@ aay

that at successful C}©ra®a iavasloa of

liassla was <i«p«Gd®iit on a »#eur« Balkan, flaak aai that ther®for® tb® Balkan ©aapalgn aust b© e©asid«r@d as & part of th®
largsr Barbarosta plan.*

Aaid® fros a look at tb© sap, the

eles# r®latl©nsbip of tb® *'ilr@0tiir®®** tstabllabiag botri
loTasions in D®»mb#r, 1940, ean b» off«r®i m
fbli would b@ f®rj dlffieiilt to (4isput@| but it ausst b®
r®a@sb®r»d that tb» Ftt®br®r '*wr©t®

tb® forcss to b@

us«d in Op®ratloa larita trom Optratioa Barbarossa on Mmrcb
17, lf41«

flj«raf©re It e&n b® e.mtmm4, tbat it was not Marita

that ©ttua@d tb® postpoa«s®nt but Hitler's dtcisioa to iavad®
Yugoilafia*

fh® Gtraaa, wilitary, trem all aeeimiilat®d

@¥id®iic», was, up to tb® Ftt®br®r's d®®laion of Marcb 88,
still following tb« tia®tabl® for tb@ invasion of Russia "a®
of U&j IS, onward t**

fb® ^'crmsblBg" of Yugosla-rla may bav®

b««tt n«c»s®ary for Axis ®ecurltj o» tb® southern flaiik but
®%om® (Jarsam eontlng»nt® wer® allowed ?sor» tipi® bow9ir«r. S®fi chapter on ®R®"alloeation of CJarman Forces for
tb® Invasion of '"^'rasc® an^ Yu^yoalairia,*' %l8o s»®i Trials
of war Crlminala, Vol# X¥, p* 307.
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it is dstoatable. It oan «lso b« argued that th« YugoilaY
problem was created by Hitler himself trying to force th«
Yugoslavs into th« 4xia caap.
Pro® all ®vid®no8, th© Naai army was pois«d to strike
into Clr®0c® anytim© after March 10.

As»Uiaing that th®

@atimat®« of th« Q^rmm planning uaitg w®r@ aceurata, four
w#ek« w®r® n«ed@d by the Qerm-aums in order to bring the Qr#©j£
©.aapaign to a 8uec#®sfiil conelusion and an. aidltional four
w@®ka w®r# to b# allotted in order to r«-4#ploy the Geraan
divisions from Operation Marlta i»to. Op«ratio!a Barbarossa*
fhus if th@ (i®rman attaek mi (}r@«e® ha^ takea plae® by aidMareh# th® a#r*an attack oa Russia cottld h&v® tak«a place
toytim© aft«r ai<i»May, 1941.

sm,f«a ii
m*^LLQGkTWS op mmMM pohcis
AND fHB Tiiiosi:A¥--0HiSMaifiSH pe/SitioM III THE mtmm

to

Fti@iar®i»*0 aseiaion ddflnit«ly to Ineliide

Yugoslavia Irs his

of eon(|u@st@, ttoi® Qtraan fwalfth

in Bulgaria, coisi«n4®4 hj Pi®ld Maratoal
or fiv® paM©r di^isiont

tist, eowsiiit®^

Sth, ani

o»@ sdtorii#d

iofantry diTlsien {60th), ©igbt int&ntrj ii-risioos (46tlij
SOtb, 64th, 7Sa,

?Stli, ISStli, aod t94th), on® rmintormd

SS r®gi»»»t iMolph Hitl®r)^, and on# F #giii®pt ©f iofatitry
{Iggth), for a total of

^ivlsioBiS ana two r#giia©rits#^

fh® primary piirpot© of tfeea® Cfersau for®#a wm to iiivt..a©
Grs©o« ani to #liminet@ a pot®ibl« Britisti threat on tb® Balkara
flank*

In rsgard to th© latt@r, the troops w®r@ also ©xpt^ted

to act as a military l@"r®r ois. fiark®y atii Tii^oslavia-i-to k##p
th©Ei out of &nf posslbl# anti-Axi® eoalitiois.

By M&r^h 17.,

th® fwkisia tbrsat had diisi^attd and Ttagoslavia was prepar
ing to sign the Tripartlt® fm.ct«

How^trtr th# Barbarossa

dtadlin® of mi^-'iaj was drawing n®ar»

On that day, th®r«for®,

Hitl®r i@0id©d that all Straan troops prtparing to @ngRg« in
^fbe SS Adolph Hitltr was also r«f®rr»d to as a light
di'^ision, iimviug a ooBjpltment of OT®r 8,000 mn* The ttuits
ean b« found in P&g l^«r« Vol. II, p» 1S6,
gt

2.S
would
»oto«dwl®«®

to b® witMpawn fro® th® Barbarosaa
At fch« St®.® tia«, th# Gmrmmm forces in Bwlgaj?la

w©r>« to b© r®duo0d, fhrm iafaqtry 4i¥i«iotJ3 (46th, "TStli,
msd 198th,) w#!*# ord0i»#d to aiatraln foi» Sisaanla as soon aa
possible. Tl^s® diviiioas were to b« followed by

panser

di-riaioisa (5th and 11th), ©nd on® motorized division t@0th)
for r««-d#plo7®®Bt in folasd,^ Q#!}#***! Iwali voia El«ist, who
wm® origin-allj aahedMlsd to lead th» Q^mim Armored ilvlsi©fj.swas al«o oritrsd to mpox't t© Feland aa toon a®

ia

th© &rp*.ngmm@ntM for th.® jps-d^ploiw'snt of th® units undar hi®,
©©anaiid wmm &empl9%m4*'^ Om paisisr division wsa to remain
on the Btilgarian-farkisli b©i»d®r dtiplng th®

optratlons

against Gr®@©«, but ms to hm p®-int®gr4t®i tut© Barbaromsa
Si Bom. as posslbl®, 411 otlitr Q^rmm aiTislots s assigned to
th® twelfth Axmy wsf® to ba ttssd to driv® feh.« British fres
•(|p®80#»
b®

Upon #oapl«tiori of this task, the dl¥lsiea@ w®f® to
and available a# r®a-®rir®t for othsr

of wmr,®®

The Qitraau. troop® in Gr«®'©e w®r« to b« ttipportetf

®Hali#i?, ¥ol, ¥1, Marsh 17.^ 1941.
H##r,. ¥ol# II, pp» 84*8S|. also Q^gmaii gftstpmiga in
IM
Ifttttr satire® ©nly wntl^siS"
Sliriiniiag' of ths intmtry divl®l©i5s,
%#rjBan Safflpai^o in tb® Balkans, p. it.
^D&8 Haier, Vol, 11# pp. 8-1-©®, WMvm tti®g© oth«r
theatres of war w®r® to b® ioeatsd ©an ©nly b« eott
Bwt wlfcb fcb® Bmlkan
®till T®rf •mmrtB.in b« was d«fi«
i3lt«lf not ©©eaaitting th®M to th® pending luisiais eaffip&igis
at this time.
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by pleads of the Fourth Air Form consisting of &t least 15S
flghtaya and rooonnalasano® planes stationed chiefly In
Hiiraania and 355 boabsi*# and di¥® bombars available Ir aiimsBia
and Bulgaria.®
**Aotion 2 5 o r t l m aiditional in^atlon of Yugosla\»'ia>^
I'dqialrod a numbs? of obang®3 not pysviouslj oonsidtred, f'b®
Fwhi'SP hmd ordered Yiagoslaviii "to b® ernnhad with all pos
sible »p©@<i,*

Also "@11 fchs foj*o©s awllabld® under List

w©r« to b® iit#a ©xcspt ®approximately on® dl-rislon fenfl 8uf«
fici®nt aiiti^-alroraft ®l#a®«its.,''*

fh« Lwftwaffe was to destroy

B«lgrad,» witb "wAVe «ft@r wair®'* of bow;b«j»a^, l®nd taotio&l
Buppoiyt fov the grewnd troops^ aud "destroy all grouni instal

lations of th© Yiigoslftv alf foro®»* To fu:rth®.i? iapl^iaant th#
di2»0otl¥«, a strong feroa mm to bo ats®Bbl@d "Iwsdlataly*
in «ith®r Austria of Huagapj.#®
Rdioha Mftrth«.l Ii@r»a«n Gotriag, the h®aci of tli« tuftwaff®
(who was prasent whan the directlv@ was Issued) a^t otso® b#ga«

making prepsratlons to oarry out hi®. broad#n®a aseigtiatnt,.
For th® mxt tan daj® app3?©xlmat®lj 600 addltioml figbt#rs,
boffib«r»,, <3ive-boffib«rs, and reeonnalasane# 0mmB mmre trans
ferred to th® ji«w ©psy&tiQYi.

fh« ground oi*«ws and aircraft

Oftia# from th® Luftwaff® \inlta statiomd in So-rth Afriea,
%ai*i5an GaaipaigR in thQ: Balkan# p«
Inoluderl in Operation larita,
^l&zi Conepiraoy and Aggrassj^, Vol, !¥, pp. S75-078.-

m

Frano®^ Siolly, O-araany, and th« build-up R2*@as lu East
Prusaia and Poland,®

fbm bcsmbeps began converging on fieias

aaitily in Atattrift. mn& Bulgaria, wMl* most of th« flgbtsra ;
fowid tataporary hoa#® sit Arm^^ De-fa, ftarim^ an4 30v«i»«n in
w«staj?r4 Htaanla.

In addition, Qmring had C}#B®^iil Wolfrap

won Hl0htliof»B tr«ts0f®i*i*««3 to tb.# proj^ot#^^

Hiohthofta,

wbsos# lighth Air Corp® had Bupport^d the ga»ound troopa with
auo-h suo0®si in Frsns® was »xp«otdd to 2*®p#at tla# pefforfflsmoe
In Gi»#»o® and Ytigoala"^!®.

Tt» genftfal irould b# s-ub©r«linftt»

to dsneral Al#2Ea»d«y L,©«hr^ ee®s«n<lfir of tbe Wem^th Air "Fore®#.
Gotrlng,

pi*#pap®d to ®©f® to. a motaitmin h«ai»
a f«w wiles soiithw.^»t of

S#wsteftdt,

li«

to.® would b® ta b®ttar petition t@ ¥l®w au^ ad'ri#® th#
#Qtir® air
The Cl-®riaati plsaning laBlt, i.lr#ot#4 by Fi#ld *arsi»l
'ron Brauohitsoh,"^'^ agraslng with
that «p0«i 8.13d

yi«w# r»alii«a

w®i*e ef' th© uts©«t iaport-an-o# la

Stt0O®s®fully ©aFpying out ths o©»bin«4 op®ratlon*

fbs

F».p©2»ts ffoa Yugosla'via iiidieated ttot a gr«at d®iil of eottfusion @jeist«d following Si®©irl©«B suse#ssfiil

Th$

®Pi««®4 t©g»t1a#i' frea varl0«® sowe®s, mmt Hald«r,
¥©1* ¥1,, May It^ 19411 fhfe Q-raed AlHsme, p, 174| and g«yia*P
C&ap&i^tt In tM'Balkftnjs, p*"'S'C
¥o1, ¥I, May IS, 19411 and May IS, 1941.
^^{J^raan S®.»psi.an in the Balkan** p. 18*

^%offl®and«i*-in«ohi0f of th« OsBsan Army,
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Yugoslav go¥®rniB«nt was .hesitating to tak® d^oiaiv® aetion
suoh fis mor® oo-opupation with ti^ Grdsks and British for
fear of antagooisiug Hill©r| iattr-fsriric® rivalry wm st
th.« ®am« tim« disrupting th® -high ommmdt ana » f«w Oroat
•units mr@ near rebellion. Il©r©©v## th® Tttgoslav sr»f was
deployed disaavant©g®ously for the defenss of th« eotiatry—'
a fact th»t eould etily b« corr«ot®d or^r & long p«ri©d ©f
tiffi# bsoftiaa# of th# g0n®2?al laek of traasportatien ,fa©iliti®i
(roads, railroads., and motor v©hlcl#s) within th© stat®*^'^
BOg aerlom

aouXd traniplr® for th© Axi,® if

th« Yugoslavs took it on th^wsslw.® to §.ttmk th® Italiaia
i®«ar in Albania, as ali*#ad'y stiggsatsd hj linston GhwroMll,^'^
as4,/oi» it th® Yugoslaf mrmy would b@ able to ti# yp with
the An§lo-Ore#k toipmB thretagh th® BitolJ Q-ap of tha fa,i»<3ar
liw ?Bll®y.
In ortfer to ai@®t th» n©w 0ontling@nei@»^ Ll.it's forees
in Bulgaria war® t© h® divid^i into thr@e main groups for
the aeiiblfi©d attaek,

Thm left w.ing would b* d«ploy«d

soiithirai»d aloKg th« #outhw«fflt«» Bulgarian bord#]? teward'
th® A@g®)iiTs

fhis wing was to dii»««tlf #n,gftg« the

^%ald@r, ¥q1,
%'ril 4, 1©41, pr@ilets « rapid
€sollapa# ©f th® Yugosls'^? state* Though th® Xtigoslav third
mnd fifth srwias gtiarded oTer 100 miles of border ai*«a
opposite Bulgaria and Or«eo©, ottlj on« Int&ntrj division
was h®ld in res#rvs at Skoplj®# fh® rest w«r© coaaaitted
almost ©xelusivoly to th» border ©nviroiaa*

^^Tha Grand Allianee, p, 172-173, in a not® from
ehurshill 'to' Cjeneral"'Sir "John Pill in Belgrade on April 1,.
1941.
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Aiiglo«Gp0®k armlas, 1'b® ©etir© fore® t© b@ Qoia®itt®(S in this
&p«« eoi3®lst»d of one panser dixrlsion (id), two mowitaln
dlvislont# (ith awd

thr®# iRfanfcry ^.iirlelows (SOth,

and 164thsni om Infmtry r^glm^nt
would •-Ifegalii b« S'u1b-di'rld®d Into thm& @o2»p«»

The grotip
Onm corps of

infantry would attack th« iiyi-t&xls Lin# la 0re®k Tlsrst©##

fw#

oth®^ eorp® would driv® on Salonika bj diT«rg«nt rout®®,
1.0ftditig the pmmTB and wotoflMd tinit® on th« dFif© to
Fraai Bmm»,

StlonlJm. would be .Ll®ut«nant
corps w#i»« S0li#dul@d to *' jw®p

All thr®®

#n tlm moving of

April 6, 1941»
List's QwtmT w©«ld b® d®pl0y«i faolng S&oplJ® on the
TitRl Vardajp

and Pi^slip^ th# iaportftRt failroad Juos--

tioe juat soyih ot S&oplJ®.*

fMs f&rm wms to b# ®&d# np ©f

on# pmns»r division (fth), on® s»®iEi.f©re®d SS r«gi»®iit (Ad®lph
fiitlej?)^ mnA ©»« infantry dl¥l®i©B C?5d), Ttiii singl# cerps
ms to l>« 0cwiitnd«d fey Li0«t#nRnt Q®B«rsl §#oi?g it-uai®*
SS r»gim®iJt was

driv# o«

fh®

tb® elty, ®,nd

tfa»n pro©©©<i t© lomstip opposit® th@ Bitolj Clap, fh® 9tii
pa«t®r dlTiglsn waa to oaptur.® S1c©pXj®i then aplit iat® two
©©l»ia8. ?li« smaller eoltasn weuld ii®®d for th® Alfeani&o
bord®s» a«d ti@ in witli th® Italian ar®y. fb,# l®rg«P wewld
wh®«l and li®td foi* th# filtolj Gap t# aid tfe@ Adolpii Hitler
r#gi»«nt»

fh« infantry division would «®«nwhil© @©our@ th#

^^Dag He«r, ¥ol. II, p, 165,

m

ground in th» faay*

SiB«® 8p#ed was ao

ttm corps

wfts soh#disl®d to mov® out on » "fXying start® «t 0S30 on th«
worqlng of April §, 1041,^®
fb» flgiat wing, to b« deployed @mt ot Sofia, Bulgaria,

wo-uld to® pois0d to amilillat® tli« strong Iftigoslaf fcF««s ©one«'atrat«d In th® Plrot»I«®kov«,« - s«stor^ aftpttsra SlSji timn
moTO up th® Moravft falley tom&Ti. B«lg3»ad#^ thii Ytigoalftf
capitml* li:0«ptloml iialtial ®s®sy »ail®tsm©« tos «:sp®ot«d
by this gfoupi thus to Insitt*# aueesis tb® for«# had to to#
stTongt

Tilt rlglit wing was m&&% up of or® ©#ffi aBd on#

pmrnr gtonp*

fh® fer#® wai to mnBlnt

two i)ai3»r dlri-»

slGiiB (Bth and 11th), ©«« a©iaQt«ltt dtvtsl«
motorls#d
Ct94tla)#^'^

€tYl«lori

&m

&M on® %nt&ntrj iivlaloB

Q#i3#pftl Iwald rm

against th® Tiag©«la¥ eoiietotTatiens*

wa» t© l»ma th# pmm9,%Ti$
fb# ©©Iwsm was ©reSefed

to limit itself to d#0«|>tiv® p^«b®a mid

ebjeotiv®

Attmka -OBtil .t^ril 8^ in ord#!* t© allow tiae t© 0o»pl#tt tli©

To eompl#t® the r«-allo«atl©ia of ttie tmit-s of th@
Twelfth kmf In Bulgaria,, ©a© p«ss#r division (16th) was
as«igB«d tbd task of giuttrdlng th« Btilg«i»i»-fiii*ki«h Isertfari
and thr©« infantry ai'^-isionsi C46tlij 76th, and I98th), that
^%bia*. p. 15S| and 0®ra®ia Ca®pai«o in thm Balkans* p
?®1. II, p« iss#
^®a«r®ftn Sai^ES.s:E!1 in th@ Balkans, p. 3®.

tt
now onSsrad to

train, wmm to

its aalgaria

itit

F«3?tb®r aorth, i« %l» vieinltf of fi»l»ofer«, Bttsntiia,
a 8»P«,r«te psnitr growp was to b@

SS, wtr® fcO' l»

fh« mits, all

fw&m s©'iitli#t«

fli@ Gorps

woijld eonalsfc of on# ilvlslon 0«s Mmluh) ^ ani iiif«ritrj

rmgSmint (0ro«» Dswtelilari^), «ni • brigmdi# {¥j»rmmn 0©#riag)#
fM# group, i» th» ©rlfiual pies, was ^©t

ts t«k«

in tb» linv«»toii of Yugoslavia #3c6«p% ©irotigh %fe«
©©Rita©tirig of ItmltmA

op®f»Rti0n« sgmiasfc

road#,. r»llr©®d«|j asi «Hroiid

fbs- atjor %««k ©f

til® mi%M would fe« to guard thm '^tjasniaa^-Yvgotlav
aoi thm iBipor%ar,t

fi#W8 !«• tla®

le »©ytlJw®#tts*Ei Bmngmwy aloog tte» I^a'ra Rl¥#r, and la

tis# Bry'ek*0r.tt8 a.r«« of Au#trl»# th« Gi».i«aa Sseood Awj w&s
to &#
Tim mwmj wouM toosisfc of two
iiiriiietj# COtto

llSth), ©R®
iliriiil®r!

ISSi,

mm aoterim«<a' lufaiitrj- itvlsl^a

dti?i#l©n (lut), or*# light iefftstrf
fotir iofsatrf #i'?l«loiis

«ncl ©aa frmtimr gw«rd iffilt

li©%h,

for ®.

^%a» g»#r. Vol. ir, p. ISS*.
p» 1S@»
FSj»iit ^mmr Gtronpm

^^SSSSE

Originally tb«y w#r« pmrt of Ii®iat»s

IB th# MIkawa» pm 35#
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total of nine divisions and one laiit,^^

Th® force, to be

commanded by Q«o®ral Maximilian von W«iohs, would b© divided

into fotar corps uiaits end thr@® oolijffins for tli© Yugoslav
invasion#

Two ooabiB^d coltams, to b« led Im th@ initial

attack by the two panzer division#, w®re to b© poiaed to
strike aeross th® Brava Rlv®r from Hungnry#

Aft#? th«

Drava had b®«n Bueoesafully forded and tta® Yugoslav defense
in th® ar®a n®utralia®d, th® panKsrs, assisted bj the motor-

iisad infantry division would driv© on 2agr «b, th® old
Croatian capital*

Th© seeond ©oluranj consisting aiainly of

Infantry^ would split from th© firat and wh®®l to th® south
striking toward B®lgrada by way of the Drava and th® Daniib®»
A third col«®n|. eonaiatlng of on® »oiint«in division and tha

frontier guard unit would hold th@ Auatrian frontier until
th# pans®rg were well on th,®ir way to Zagr®b,

Th®n If the

Yugoslav d®f®n.8e lines along th® Austrian frontier ahow®d.
®lgns of disintegratingJ this celuan too would move on th©
Croatian capital*®®
Xn the original nlan, the 3®oond Army was ordered to

withhold Ita major attack ijntll April IE, a full six days
after operations war® to beprin in th® south,Ifels would
5SH»

P*

^^C5ained- froa various soxiroes. Not© ©speciallys
Garraan Cempelgn in th® Balkans, pp, 31-3i»
^^Ibid.. p, 32,

SI
allow time for the buildup to be co»pl®t«d in th® north,
stretch th® Yugoslav narvsa as tbey watoh«d th«ir rear

dlsintegrat®, and pdinslt ao ®rttioip«t®d Croat r®b«lllon to
take place anong the Yugoslav military units.®®
A Gemi&n r®icforc«<3 «iigln®ei »lnK battalion sttmohed to
the Gemamn mllitSLrj mlsalon in Bulgaria was to be asaigned
the task of oaptts'lng «o«S holding the Iron Oates on th®

Danub® Sivtr neap the Yugoalav-Hiwani&n bor'tf«r»^®

fh»

Yugoslavs w®re to b» prevented trmi blasting and filling the
narrow gorge ®.t all co^ts.
Ihil® fflost of l<ist*s f©rG«« preparing t© strike into
Or«®o© were in th# vloiuitj' of their deplo^fsent areas, those
daaignated to ®ttaolc Yugoslavia were not, Stuwe's oorps,
preparing to »,ov« into southtm Ytagoilavia aeress th® fardar
Hlver, h&d to b® moved fro® fifty to on® hundred wiles to
tfaoir i3«w deplojiaent area#. In aost ofties thej were able to
provide their own transportatiori to the "juwp off" area, but,
because of their diffloult taslc^ every preoaution was taken
not to tire out this corps bsfore th® Invasion,

A shuttling

^^Halier, ¥©1« ¥1, Maroh tO, 1941, ^isuuaaea th©
Groat*8 pro-Geiman a«iiti.merjt»t
^%emap Campaign in the Balkaas, p. 44, Th@ Iron Q-ates
are a narrow gor^wE6Fe~^e^#nuSe~euts its waj betweea the
Balkan Mountain® and the Transylvanlan Alps, Here a series of
rapida stretching fcr two iclles formerly pr«v®iit®{3 navigation^
This w«® remedied bj blasting during th® iecad® 18i0-1900»

m
ssr^le® ffiad® up of a fflinlmiaa of motor v©hiel©s appeared to
be used whtrjevep possiblefh« G»rmm divisions preparing
to adyanc® in th® direction of Belgrade fro® th» south were

Hjueh harder pr«»s»d.

In order to is®at their d@«dlin#, thay

w®r© foreed to us® every availabl® vsMole in th® area
including those of the 16th PawEer dtv^ision stationed on th#
furklsh border and others borrowed from units in Huaania*®®
Th® 60th lotoris®d Infantry di¥ision was so exhausted fro®
oarryiug men ani supplies to the new deployment area that the-

Cleraiin High e€«a®«n<l d«ei^«d to hold th® division In reser-r®.,®®
Tim Second Army, being formed in Austria and Hungary,
also had nvmSfTOua transportation probl®®s,

the Fuehrer wanted

to keep th« buildup as quiet as possible so, therefor#, no
aarslmua perforBianoe sehedul® was t© b© u©@«3 outald® Austria,-^®
Yet, every on® of the nine divisions in the Seeond Armj had
to b@ transferred fro» other areas or detoured from other
destinations*

Th® 8th Pan^er;^ 16th lotorlsed, &n& 79th Infan

try dlvlsiona were to b@ shipped by rail froa Fr«ne® to Austria|
the 14th Panaer was to arrive in Austria by rail froas Poland!
th® 185th, 132^, ani 1834 infantry divisions were t© b®
detoured from their journey to last Prussia and, brought by
^(le«B,«.n gampRign in the Balfeana, p. 3i*
^%erman Gampaij^n in the Balkana , p, 38.
^%bid.. p. S9.
^%bid., p. 43.
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retX to Austria? the lOlat Light and lat Mouatain division a
were to be furnished motcr transportation from Ca«oho»lovakia
and Frane® rQspactlv®l7#®^

obita«l«a ©ould hav® b®©rj

®r®n gre&tmr if tb.® 0@maug did not hav# a ©o«pr®h«ngiT® end
e«,r«fullj worked oiat railroad and aotor transport soh^dulei
for the Barbarosaa bulldap,^®

Th® postipon«®©nt of tb® imrasion

of Russia by th« Gerwans allowed readily aT«ilatel« vehiclds
an<3 train a to b® transferred for service in th« Balkan
ofiffipaign on wry short nctio««

Only th® various o®rps head

quarter units w®i»® »xp®oted to furnlgb, thsir own tran ® porta % ion
to th® Second Artsy d®plofaisnt areas*

Os tha oth»r hand., th®

6-«rffl&n buildup n@«r ri»l®o»ra would- b@ f®r Isss oo®pli©4t©4*

aeleoted partially ou the .grownda that th«y
eo«.ld fwrnisb their own trmiasportation*®®
Th® Luftwftff© pilots also, in most os8.®a, provided th®ir
own tran«portation, wtill© laany of th@ bomb«r® brought a f«w
ground or#w psrsonn®! with them. Many oth®ra attach®d t© th©
gr©\ihd orew® had to b# pro'rided transportation, sa did s ^parat©
fh® SS units wer©

«ngln««rinp: battaliona and quart«rwftst®r mits.
^^Ibid< t p. 48, charts the origin, type of transportation,
and destination of tash division. Also 8®« th# testiaony of
R«inhardtj Trials of War GriMinala, ?ol. X, p. 1047.
®%|i\jrahill Mentions upsetting this German transportation
soh®dul® in
Qrand AXltane®« p« 356.
Group,

^^Also beoauas they war® attached to List's First P®ni«r
Not® th®ir vehicle components in Daa H@®r, p« 77,

M
Th® problem of aupplying th® ©stir# operation also had
to bo oonaidered#

The Gremans previously had us^jd th© Danub®

as an avanu# of supply for th®lr forest in Rtwanift and Bwlgaria
and further w«r© counting on tii® us® of the B®lgrad»«Sis*
Salonika

railroad

to

supply their arffliss

duritj^ th« Invasion

of <lr«®oe»®^ How the Geraana w«r® about to deprive theajs ®lv«s
of both th# rlv®r and the rftilroad for whiit th«y hoped would
b« a w&rj short ti!»®«

Fortunately th® CJermao® h«.d bxjilt up

several larg® supply bases
'*e©iip>"

in

Hwroanla

prior

to th« Yugoslaf

fruek 0©lnMiss betw®®ii th«s® siipplg; b«««s and Mat's

fw®lfth M..rmf In Bulgaria had also b»en tstablishtd but bot on
aa larg« a s#al« as would b« nm^oi to support a«sh a major
optrafcion ms tbst p®ns3iag,®^ in spits of th® faat that th®
B-ttohar«.i3t--3©fi:& rallresd h«lp®'^ ,shar« tli® bard«a« As m&m
mhlcleg- w«r© asslgotd to the trwek ooavoys la tta® south,
th® Q«»aas In the northj, in antioip«,tl©n of ®v®nts to eomsj^
asa®wbl«i t Biiiaber of barg®s at. ¥l©rma «®eh loaded with
10^000 ton® of supplies and fuel# %#y wer® de»tin®<3 for
B«lgj*8d® #i®r© a supply bas.t was to b« ©etsbllahed as soon
as the 0#r«an araies aade it poaaible*^®

Several ships wer«

also lo«d«d at R«;Mnle,a Blaek S«a porta seh®dul®d

to

sail for

^%^i®iith6r Bl «a®ntritt, Von Rundatedt, fhe S©l{jier and
th« Man (London J O^haffls Pr®§s"tWS,'XiSt),
^%«rffiaa GftapRluB In the Balkans, p# 46*
^®Ibid.
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Sslonlka as #oon as It fell Into Gmrmmxi iiands.^*^

Bailfoad

englnettrlng troops and construction crewa were reserved at

th.® aam« tlae to restore the B«lgrad©-Mls-S«lor3lka rallroac!
at th« «arll0st possible tim##®®
With s'iippli®s somewhat limitsd, the trcopa of
army wer« given orders not to wast® or l®atr« behind any
asm-unit Ion.

Each rifle-bearing soldier wb ,0 to b© given owly

£ basio load for Ms -weapon*

The oouaerTation of fu#l waa

also stressed to th© tmik coHaaanders*®®

Ha,© Twelfth .Army

©rganlzed mobil® supply tinits along th# (Jretk bordar that
w#ra to emrrj only the barest of #ss«ritial8»

Th# trttekp.

w©re t© b@ pr«p«r®d to siov« right b«bina tha G-^rinai-j Rr«'j?
as soon ass tb© pass#® w«r® seoursd#^®
Supplying th«- S#©ond A.r®y was not eorii.it!®r©(S a grav#
probl0w»

A iiajor supply base hadi b«#ti #.stabliahed at Viarasi®

ia 1940 in aiitteipatioii of posalbl® troubl® in tha j0a.lk&r«
dua to Soviet latarfsreno# at th« tia®,"^^

Also gosd railroad

oenneotion.® and- good road oonditioas existed In Aystrla aod
wssteiTi Hiingarj. Th® onlj raajor probl®TM aeewed to b© how to
te«»p

th® nupplies lap to th#
^'^Ibid>. p, 44,

"%bld,. p. 45,

^^ibid>, p, 46,.
%bld.

aft»r th.» BIltikri#g ha<3

eown®no®d,^®
The Garman mits operating out of fiiMaula

weir® not

eonsidered to hav® e.nj major supply probler,s due to
liiait#^ isartlclpatlon,

liow ®¥er, the Luftwaff# units her®

as w®li- as on all

eoyld eottoti^ebly x'^uo »faort on

fuelj, not b0eaiia«:l''feh# fuel was not avallabi® but beoaus® of
a general ahox'tag® of tanker trueks*"^®

Er&n s©^ tb@r© can b# no doubt that tb.® Fu®i:trsr*g

established tlfti®t®bla -fcp the simultansouB inTftalcn of G'r«®o«
and Yugoftl&via plmead sevnrm pressure on (}^rm&nj*a Rvgllsbl®
tran»poptation f&«lliti«s; and in som® G»8«S th® straia on
the faolliti«a sad® theis wi&vallsbl# for both M&rlta and
Barbaroas®*
As th® 5#i?a«f3 unit* war® trying to ra«at thsir new fit ad*
lint® in spit© of the difficulties iavoli-ad, th® •Fii®hr®r,.
after bding Asaumi that th# liusgarlans would at l®ast ti»
cSoTO & ntaab«r ©f

TwgoslaT

troops

alosg ^thsir

fyen tiers,

lnfom«d th® Due® of the ®xp«ct«d rol« of th® It&liaH ar»i«s
la ,£h® o^bitt«d .operation,

13a® ia.tt@r» w®r® to held their front

itj llbsnia^ pyotact thtir '"riiar® at all cost®, and coiaia^ns#
^^Haldei'.j ¥ol. VI, May 8, 1941, sJiaowssQo this diffi
culty with Wagner.
^^Thia was one of their insjor problems diaring the ©ntir®
Balkan ©asrpiiigtj Including the invasion of Gr#t®. Qeraan

>«ign in th» Balkans, p. IS©
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a drlv® down the Dftlrnatla,n coast oolnciding with, tha drives
of the Gex^an Second Ariry,^^
M(tanwhll@ Field Marshal BrauohJT&eh and Ms st.aff war®
making aiPPangeTnenta to move to Wi#n«r Heustadt to take personal
eosiaand of tli® O-erasaB-./apisiaa involved In ths entii»0 op@ratio-rj,
fh® Fufthr#}? and his entourage W0re proparlBg to do t'no same
with similar thoughts in
Opposed to this Axis plan of opare.tion would be s^Yoral
fortnidabl© arraias—*at le;n.3t on pap®r.
The yy-joslav army, after cosnpl»t» mobilization, wo'uld

nisbsr thirty infantry divisional t«ii reinforced brigades of
almost di^ialor} strength, and thr«« eavalry regiments.

In

addition ths lugoglav Air 2%rot sonaistsd of w®ll oirer- 400

plsnda of all typ@a«^®

Ifeen Hitler's dir«otiir« was issiied t©

th« 0«mais military sarvices en Btu?eh S0, at least twentyfotir eoaplet© Yugoslav divisions wera already wobiliised as

wall -ag saay of this s8j&ll®r «Blts»..^'^
raoMllxed

Almost ».ll of tii©s«

foroaa were stationed along the Iberder areas

«<IJ&c0nt to Btilgaria, Riimania, HungaryAustria, Italy^ and
letter from Hitler to the IJuce eoneeming the
®xp«0t®d Italian task
be found ini Lmkaoa, p. S7B*
^^Brawohltsoh arrived at Wiener Heuatadt on April 5,
Bitler on April 6# Gerg&n Ca«pftii;n in tbe Balkan a, p. 38.

Ancles of the World,** B^eyclopaedia Britannica Book
of the Year» 1942, p* 68.
^"^Qeraaan Campaif';n In the Balkans, p» 37.

m
hl'bmin*

Tfm fronti»r ar#«

Oi*s®o« ftnd lugoalavla

was only lig!itly guapdtd bs«mu»« of the appamnt fi*l®iKlahlp
t>stw»an tM ttwo ooimfcxHcia*

TIm» Yiigoalaf Air Popovs saa juafc

in fcb# pro'^sas of i30d«Kil«l'0||, ^ariks to th® pleaa of ©ylan

but -maMj of ths Ttiijofjla'# plmimn itl'll <3at«d b5'«3k te
pp«"dapmsalon days,
'ft» Orflfik Bvmj aoT5!ii«t.«d of
alenif.

o'o««htXf dlvl».

divislfxis «F0 In Urn Bplrim

Of fctila tetftl

saotion faelug fclsa Italinn anslas!, 'Rid Blm and mm-4mlf
jllvia-liOiis ft-failobls In %h€» »satfc »gmln§t tba Cl#i»fflan fhr#afc
somalstad oT on# mm^md cllvlsion (IStla), fiv# Itifantx'y
dlvlalo-nt f?th, IStfe,, I-itlij 18fh, «ii«!
1>«11

«si sl;s a#|»ratis

Ion#•
fliese Orf.»& 30i?.tlrig©H'5» fet

by Brltith

feroQps mn% -to C}»®©® bj- Wlyjstofi Oia,ijFolJill ea l6j»s.li 5, ISil#
Thrnm foys#» tnclecied
l5tpii»#

infsiiferf c!l%*l«i©at of tli« Irifclito
Stli «fid fltli AMstrallais}, o«® Britiafe

«.rsa©F«d b;i*igiis3»

snd a P©li#li infatjtff brtg9#€»»'^®

fti® Grsok araj units •mm 'poorly equipped with th# If-tsti
®iwor«d

a«^ii np mminly of Q«pttJS«#d Xtallsu tankt,

Til® Britith trodpt, m tlm othor harnS, wmtm sli»©st ftilly
bwt thisir »fMi|w«nt was sor« «uitafel» for- ci#sg©..rtp. 15,
Qrrnm klli&nm,

iSO,

$9
warf&r® than tlm st®®p mountairj r©«d« of

Pwther-

Eior®, there was an eout® shortag® of taisks and antl-aiForaft
g'aas fiffiong th« British aa w®IX aa th# G2»«#k. units.Tls»
Qvmek. aiif f©2»e« w«3 naarlj non-oislstent, whll® th« .Sritlsh

all*

power In

G-r®#©®

e©i3slst«d of about

100

planes,®®

Probably tk« greatest fault among th#«« »111#«
that w®r« about to ©ppos® Hlti®r*s Blitzkrl^ii: wa« t^ sad
l®ok of defensive ©©-©paratioc and so-oritflnatierj.

To ba

almost a ®onth before tii® fugeslaT "ooup,** tb« Anglo*
CJr@#k war l«aders®^ «rork®d oat a plan baa#^ on th® stratsgie
eon0«pt of th# tetal d®f®os® ©f G«©©®, biat itJ the ©ncl mnoh
of til® pla» was «baii€©»®<S, Aoeordlag to this plan tbr#«
Gp#«k dlTlslons w@r® to bold tb® !«taxis Lin® is c}r@@k fbrae®
and Ba®t«rii ila<§®dl©nia wltb thm largest fore# atatl©n«d w®«t
of tm strliBt0« Miv«r. Wtmn and if tli«lr p©»iti©n beoaa®
ante»abl®, tb«s@ Gr««k diirliions w®r® to fall ba©k In tii®
getitjpal area of Salonika and th« ¥ardai* li¥®r, l@airi*ig amall
garrison® to oh©ek th® Q-®r».an advance*

Vhmj w»m th«n t®

ti@'-in with tfe® Anglo-Qr®»k d«fen®» posltiena ejctending fro®
®^2SSSS.

la tb« Balkans« p» IS#

Grapd Allianoap, 2il, says 80 planes, rainforcad
in Apr1
« ®th »di». Vol, MIX# p, SST,
maintains th^r# war® over'
Also mmt W-amer Batifflbash,
Mf« a»d Baath of th® I.«ftwaff« (Maw Yorki Coward-McGann, In©*,
®%r«ak: Ctanaral P«pa<?os an<l Eft'itlsb Sanarala Dill
and Wavall,
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til® Verfflion mountRin rang® to the Allatel®on (¥l&trifcsa) Ri'rer,
then along the Allakbmon Bl^sr to tb« YugofiXa^ bord®r«
<l0f®n8® Una was fco h® Msaraaad by at l«a.»t

This

good (Jr«®k

^iTlslon®** en<S th» fore#® of tfe« British laplra#

At least

of tl» flv® Grdek divisions w©r® to be ms«ignad to ths
®xtr«®« British l®ft flank.

In th« «#iiintiffi», th® Gr#®k

Iplrus army waa «xjp«et«d stratsgic&lly to wlthdrftw fro®
Albania to

posltioBs to their r®ar*.

Th® breaoh b®tir®®n

ttm Gr©«lc Ipirus aray and th® Arsglo-CJreek ¥«rmlQn-AXiatel»i6ii
pegitlons would then b® flll®<3- by the tbr«« &r#®k dlvliions
situated o» th® l#ft flatilc,

this latter fore« was ejcpeoted

to protect the Xiig0slav-0r®»k frontier Its th® dlr®0ti®n of
th® BitolJ 0&P, and, thereby, pr®"f@nt B.nj hoatll® »ov® through
the ••'"^Gap^ that sight ©ndangar th# flanks of tba Anglo«*C3-r«®k
positions ©r the rtar of th® Spiru® Array,®^

tli#® this joint

pl&n was worked out th» British mod the cir«®k8 had to consider
Yvgoslavla as a possibl# Axis partner..
Howdwr^ aa it beoaa® ®or® r®»®©nabl« to assisae that
Yi^eslairia. ws» not going to p^jwlt

troops to erosi

their S'Oil, and as th© Qr@®k armies b©oaia® harder pressed In
Albania, th© Anglo-Graek pl®o und@rw«nt a f®w deelslT® ohang#®,
lv«n before th® foroea of th® British laplra began arriving

in ar@«<s«^ Alexaoder Papago®, th® Or««lc g«ii»ral, lfifor»@i
th®lr GOffliaander,, G«H«ral Maitland Wilson, that h» eoi^ld oaly
^%or parts of this rlan see: Yhe drand Alliegice>
pp. 99-101, and pp. 220-221; and German Caap&iptn In th»
Balkftns, pp. 15-16.
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afford to glv® th@ British thre® G-re©k divisiona (inoluding
the 19th armored) and savsml unattaoh,®^ battallons,^^
A^papantly Pmpagos alao r «Tis«d th® d®f®r3S@ of Greek
and Mm.Mt9r-ri Sftosdonla#

(^re%k dlviflena would d®f«nd

tlm ar«& as pra-riously agr®«d, but iw© of tlmm divisions
would b« locat®d east of the Strtmson

fli® gemtpal

fuythsr spoks of th« .Iwpossibilltj of a gtr«t«glc withdi»awal
fro®

tted®!' th®i« n®w oiroiims'tan®®® ©alj two

Gi»®®k divisione snd s@v#.r«l battallona would hav# t© gas,rd
th« long bip^aoh b@fcw«®ii th® Iplrus Aray tn -d th# Brltith

d®f@D®iv« positions#

fha -British also, p».i^tiallj to plscat®

th® Grtefc general, agFsad that th« Greek 19th Awmom^. di^lslonj
although tectonleall'j under British cosraand, would hm plaG@d

In ri!S©rv« south' of likk# Dojraak

S@r» It would b@ abl® «ith ®r

to QOB« to tba asslstam# of th@ Qre^k mrmlma felong

th«

l0taxis lln®, or h® prepared to ,|©ln th# British d®f®«s® foroes
Although th® British, war# n.ot pl «a®®d with th® new
alloeatlon of th© Greek tmltSj^ th®r0 w®r« r@aaoiis for g»n®ral
optliBliEi among th® Angle»Or®®k fore®a aftar th® TiigoalaT
'*G©tip,^

It was f®lt by me^nj that if Yiigoslavla w#r® attacked
CmWtV^l^Ts in th# Balkans, p« IB*

®'^?ap-®.j03 Glsl»®d that th® Greek Army did not
th®
ability for sueh a Rmwttsvsr and th® moral® probl®» might er««it«
s. di sag tar, Tht Gratid Allisr'^oe, pp* 100-101*

^®2S£E22 Ca'qpelgrn in the rialkaris> p« 15,
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sh» would fe® abl# to hold Yugeilsv
difficult t#,riNiln «¥®n If

b#aiiy».» of Its
fore«<3 to aoaiiden mu«h

tL« TiigQMtBV

a Yugcsttlair Mtri'm at th«.

lfcal.taQ m&r In #.lb«Bia might hyln$ about the ^ntlm ttollmpa#
sf tti®

a»i#s ia tbafc oeisjtrj aaij, ©f momm, fr#«

th# O»%0k Ipiru# mimf for duty"
In .r©tro»p«at, it Is

b©p#®

thmt If mj of th® 3i»itl«li

a# ®

tim

#»y w»«
or tugmlmrim^ B«i*»

for m |»r©l..eQgffl^ p©rt©i In

iu ttm tprS-Hg ©r »«a#r of 1941^ w@al.tf b*ir# hmmn
a^pi&aglj $mpmrdlm^m

fhu ©#»*«» aet ©nly h»4 «l»Fttptsd

tb® &ar^«jpoii»a %la# »sh#atil# bf tlm shyffXtog ©f dt^i«lon»
0a,fpli®f for tim aosbiiwd iritftigioii of ttd
hut biki
ftni ©vif^r se#

©s»

YmfO'**
SlwlMlms

aix

plt]ri«s t© b# ysiftf ia %im ope-r®tior.«#

jef sua pyti® bfti t'lsrcatf t©- fs-» and li5#rtiii
ia

aai- strleti#

t#

iisautaleo# wltii tls#
thm sffltltnt Ots^smn way

tmr rnQtlon*

Oriiin€ £lM£2e«# P» PS1»

In^©

snd tti®
gti^#d

chapter iii

iHs OERMM immion op -msics and WQoshkiZA

At 5i30 on tbe monilng of April 6, 1941, tbio Balkan ©ampalgn
began with a violent air beabardment of Bslgrade, eoinel^lng
with Luftwaffe strikes on fflsny of tia« aajo3E» air fields ia
Qr®©e© and yugoslav-la.

At th@ same tia® Sttame's corps was

©XQCttting Its "fljing start" with the 9th Pana®r fliirlsiori
driviag toward skopl|« and tfe® Molph Hltl©r reioforetd
p®glffi®at acting ©n Stip, Yttgotlafla#

Both dlTlsions

encountered stiff r^slstane# aloag the bor4®r ar®a l« apit©
of th© Burpris© achieved.

How#v®r, with th« temporary aid

of th« 2d Paniar and 125th H#gia«rit, the bori#r ©avlroas
w#re soon p®a ®trat ®ci «3.
sporaii© defsna®#^

vti® "fugeslaf# then ©ffarad only a

B©th primary obJ®ctlTe§ w#r# attained.

tfa« folloufing day (April 7)»

On April 8, th® Molph Hitler

regiment captured tha Important rail csfiter at Frellp*
Meanwhil®, the 9th P«ns«r, aft«r lea'ririg a a®Ottrltj- for©©
^P©r sor® absut thin division and regiment, s«@ page S
of this chapter,
^B#blni the border d®f®ns®s in southern lugoslaTia at
th® time th®r« waa onlj oa@ division in reserve, that at
Skoplje, G®man Caaip&ign in th# Balkans, p# 37.
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at Skoplj© and sending several of its battalions toward tb«
Albanian border to tia-in with th® Italian army, began a
piyot toward Menaatlr, oppoiit.® th« invaluabl® Eitolj Gap.
Unit© of both a»r«a» columns @ntsr«d this Yugoslav city
almost at th« ssme tiai# on April 9, 1941«

fh® C}«ns.att 73d

Infantry division was still far to tb® rear rounding up
Yugoslav priaonsrs.^

probably th« greatest fear of tb«

British army in Gr«#c« bad matarialisad*

In Just tfar®® days

tb® Gsraans had «ffe©tlv@iy 8«v«r®d 3r«#e® from Yugoslavia
aad 'W^r# in a position to driv® dom th® flanks of th«
Britlab d#f»ni# p^sitioiis b®bi»d tb# ?®rmton-Aliakhmoii lin®.*
Li»t*» rigbt wing, meajawbil## was directly attaeking
C3r®»ce#

fw© s©rman iafautrj divisioas (SOth sta«i' I64tb) w@r#

driving in tli@ <!ir @etion -of tba n»stc>s Riv ®r toward tb®
A®g#Mi S@«#

4t tb® sm@ tim#, tb® 2d ?a»s@r division, sup-

port®<a by Mi infantry r®gltt«nt C12§tb),. wa® crossing Yugoslav
t®rritory in order ta giv« t #apopary r@li@f to St»ia®»» oorps*.
During tb@ first two days of tb@ Invasion, this panzer dlvi**
aion ramainad on Yugeslav soil diaorganiaiag tb# d#fan»®s and
even b«lng t&rmd t© r ®p ®l a olaor XBgoslav counter at taek
oil April 7.*

Early in th@ aoraing of April 8, the pansar

®Du« to tb@ liffiitad material availabl®, iaformatioa on
this pbas® of tb© Balkan casapaigo w&a gainad from many
varying soureas# Ov«r 90,000 Yugoslav priaoner# w#ra taken
by tb» Qemana ia tbis area of Yugoslavia, bowavar, md thm
7M Infaatry division wa$ lat® arriving at Monastir. Saas
Sarman Campaign in the Balkana, p. 112.
%bid,, p. 87, speaks of r«peiling tbe counterattack.
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di-rlsloa cfoased th® Cir@®k-Yugoslav border through th®
treaeherous mountain passes west of Lak® Dojran.

Jreek

ISth Ar«or«jd division, already being "blasted** eenst&ntly by
tfa® Luftwaff«, was taken coffiplet®ly by surprise and in th«
ensuing struggle was annihilated by th© }®rmu.n division. 5
fh® panssr division, .hardly waiting to eatoh its br«ath,
wheeled aad he&d«<3 for th« Greek port of Salonika, with
a4vanc»i #l®®®nta of tb« ^Iviaioa «ateriiig th® eity larg«ly
unopposed th@ n#xt day (April 9)»
remainder of Bo®m®*s foresa (5th and Sth Mountain
&»d 72d, lafantry) wmr@ at ths sam® tisa#, coaverging oa
8iip«l's Gorg«, a d®f©nsl¥« position on th@ M«taxis Lia®,
Motorl8#d uttits of th© Sth and 6tb Mountain dlvlalouB r®aohedi
Dojran on April 7, th@n wh «®llB.g asuthward h@aa»d toward th«
pass in hopss of forcing it,

Oa th®ir arrival, they found

th® pass h®avlly d®f®a<i®ia and d®eii®d to wait for roinforc®««nts,

Wbon, nm eomtingsnts arrlf@i, am attsmpt wa© sad© to

fore@ th« gorg®, but it was r»pul80«l by btavy @n®ay fir®.
During th® afternoon of April 8, th® 6tb Mountain di'^ision
b#g.an aa as0»nt of on« of th® high mountains rising &4J«Q«nt
to th@ gerg@»

Sarly the next morning th@y w«r® on tho other

aid® and to th« r®ar of th® Aiiglo-Or®©k positions*

Ha®

d®f®n<i®rs w®r# takaa oo«pl®t®iy by «urpria«, and th® airman

%bl4.
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foye® soon aft®r mofed through th® pass without any undu©
interferenee.®

!ttii« colum too mov#^ towapd Salonika,

p#aehing th@ city ©arly ia thm aoraiag of ipril 10,

ffe&t

s««® day to® Oemans seoiip@d th® l.®ft bank &t tb® Tartar
River.

Already qu April 8, tfat# Gr»«k Bmond Army, holding

th® Mst&xis Lin® in (lr®«k ftese® and Mmt^rn M&o®donia# aftsr
a viili«tat »t.pi;^gle, but with th® airanues of supply sad
cut off |jy tb@ Semfta®, had
fhil# tb®

8trai«@ were attaekiag froa bases in

sfiiatbera Bulga3?ia, th® Yugealii-rs wex*© suffering fyoa a **war

©f n®r¥®s** as tla «y s«iis»d tia® attaek froa north^wn Bulgaria,
(J«man. probes bad already proved th® w«akn«ss of s®v@ral of
thtir d®f0ttsiv«. positions, aad th@ tmw Xttgo®lav rsserv®®
tfeat w#r® av&iimbl# ww® pull®d «p tmm th« r®.ar araa® to
®tor@ up tb® lin®.''

Groat R«gia®iits, at th# saa® ti©® w®r«

a®ar lautiny,® aai th.® Luftwaff® w«» "blasting** all C0no«n-taxations.®

On ApJ^il 8# foll ©wlfig a t#rrifie artillery

b^arrag®, tb® G®r®«a pan,stri riabled forward.

Picking sdfsr&l

w®ak points in. th® Ymgo®l»v lin®, th@ G#m«m tanks "pimohtd
defftjadsrs coasidertd tli# s^wntaia, n»arly 9,000
fast high, to b® impmssabl® so it was aet d®f«nid«d, Q#rsan
OftBpftiga in tfa» Balkans, p» 88.
appears to b® exactly wtiat th« a#r»ans wantftd
th®a to do, Haild«r, Vol. ?I» April 4, 1941.
%©r th® Croat g®E#rftl attitwd#, se@j
20, 1941.

H««s®l» Maroh

®Bai-i®ba©h, p. 74j Qarmftti Campaign in th« Balkaiaa, p. 29.
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tiarought** as th® XugGSia^s sourried for covei*.

Behind the tanks

caa® th:« 4th, Mountain and S94t!:). Infantry divleioiis.

4s th®

paas ®FS yoapsd on iu th® «3ir#etioa of Mis,, th® Bioimtain and
i»fantx»y dlvislona b@gaa steiirifig th® roads and bpidg®s to th®
raar of th^ Yugoslav i©f«ns« positloii®,

iiaportaat supply

G0ntw of Pirot fell to Kl«ist«is ijariz^rs in th© #ar'ly after
noon of tha first day.

lb® following day Nls f®ll to th®

as did L®sko-^ae»10

i;l®ist r«port©d on th® saiaa day

(April 9) that all ©ntay resistanc© on th® His front bad
collapsed, whil® th® a@mans hai oapturtd thua far "on@

hundred guns, ineludlng tw®n.ty*«9lght antiaircraft and aattt&nk
gims, ©n# him^ired thirty»on® b®w Dorai«r aircraft «ngine®,
1,500 tosa of ga^olin®, 8®¥#rAl ratioa depots, ®par® parts

dapot-i, and ration trains#!
Seen aft«r this fairorabl® r»port, Pi®l<i Marshal

Brauahit©0li dgoidtd to d®taeb th® ©th ?aaz ®r division fz>om
Sl®iist*a ©©rp© and ^©nd it to th« BitolJ Gap by way of
L®akoTa©-SkoplJ@ in ©rd®r to proTid® mor# pmchlng powar in
that s»oti0a.»!^

At th® t&m® tim®, th®. 60th Motorii-ed Infantry

di-rision, th#n in r®s»rv© in Bulgaria, was eallad up to replae®
^%al<S@r, V©1. VI, April 9, 1941.

^®S$£B£B

in the Balkan®, p. 91,
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tb@ dspartljftg paai#r>

In th®

Kl«i®t's

rmsAlxklng pmnners ©ontinued to proceed to

the dii*®©ticm of

B®lgjrai@*
th®

Advane® Qmrmm s,p@®^&»a€s i*®a0li®4 Kr®gmJ@vae OB

BT&nln^ ©t

April 10#

lb® next d«ty tti«

la.tm.%ry iiTlaion fti'rlvtd fFom 3mlgai»la^

eoth

Motorized

fb# division was

pppmptlj nrd^rmd t© telT« from |[r&gwj®ir8© tawarot SaraJeTO,
while Klelat »u»t«in«€ bis drive ©a BelgFrnde.'^"^

til© 4ay b#.f©r@ (Api^ll 10)* tha Otrman S«-60iid
Ajtw hai mmmmmmA It® ttose-pFoag## attitisk ia mortbwestejm
'£ttgo®lairl*»

QtJT'man High Oeaaasi ba4

t© laoT® «p

th® Steoa^ i,»y»s aotaedul® two days ia ori#!' to @©-orMaat®
its plmn®^. iriv«s with Klftist*®

r«pli a-iTaa«®,

la »pit® of tb# fmt tbat two ©f its infantry divisions
(79tfci and itSth), s©b#'i«l®d to iriT© on B#lgymi®# w#i»e not
£nl%j {i#ploy@d»l®

Aft®af the msual artillery barrage, eoin-

eidlag with a beavy beabiag
l>©sltJ.on«,

stjpmfing &i tb® ©ftnay

Heiarioli Ton ?i®tiag.|i©f»8

itrwek

aer©#s tbe Drav-a oa b^idgfts l©ng stoee s®e«r.t4 bj tfee aemans#
0f this iiTl3l©a was l«fit ia Bmlgaria.
?®n ThosA r«:p©irt«fd ©a April
that two weeks w©uld be «uffioieot to rehabilitate thlB divisions
?©!• ?1»|,
4prll ®Sj 19411 but Haider says, the i l T i s i o n eaanQt pos^iblj
be r©..fitted an tlae just five Says laten HaW®2*, Vol* ¥1",
Api-il 30, 1941.
or tbi® is. a guess basei ©n ©Tiiea©# UTailable.
1S.5, places the sllTisloii on reserve at the start
of the eampaigns* On ApvlX 11# tfa® dlirisioa wm advancing
fi»&® Kfitgujeirae,
Qag#aJ,.gQ in tb© Balks^, p» 92.
were kept in reserfe and not used, Gem&n
Caaapaiipi in tbe Balkans, p. St.

49
then wfeteled bli paaaers la th® g©a@ral dir®ction of
iiagreb#

At the same tim®, tbr®® German; divinlofis, led by th®

lOlst Ligbt, a<!vsai<3@d along tia# right bank of the E'rava and
Sa^® Hiv®rs toward B®lgr«id®«

with th# aermas. pagiser® adiraaoing

on their 3P©ar, tb® Yugoslav army, opp^slt® th@ Aust3?l«a and
Italian frentisrs, appeersd to panic as they abandoned tb©ii»
posltiotts in di*ov«#»

ZMgr9h fell on April 11, to Vistingbtof•#

pan»®rs, and at tin® ssm© tiai# uaits of tlx# 1st Mountain
dlvisioa w«i*® Just w^st of tli.® city in •§'tg©rou» pursttit of
th© rstraating Tugosla^s#

Yoa w^ic'as s®®ing th® dangei" that

aJ.ght apis« if th® Tug6»l«v« w#rs abl® to «at®bllsb a Fsds-abt
ill th@ ®earitaiii» arowBi Saraj®¥0, ordered Viatingliof * a
paBS©rs to

wb@el

ia»®4lAt®ly, pursu® r»l«ritl®sslj, and round

up tb® fl®»iBg yagoslavs with all possible ap®#d«

fb« Yugo

slav ©oluiBiij wtiioi?. mm deserlbed m h^ing 160 miles l©ng,
was &t tb® «@ja@ tia« **bo,»b«d| 8traf#dj aiii blaat#^" by tb#
Luftwaff®.^®
la th® m9aritim@4, both. 0@rman iL4vaitc@8 on B®lgrii<i® w®r«
il©w®d Aorni by th® bomb«4 out bridges and oth®r.s blown up by
th@ yugoslair d«®.olltlon s%ii&dis»

ASolph Hltltr, on April 11,

took a parsonal haad in facilitating th,® Y«g©si&v campaign
by ordering til® G -erajati 3®oon .d SS Motorls®d Inf&atry division
t© driv® on fi®lgrad@ from Tlmisoura, apparently without
^®fbi@ panic and r©tr«at is w®ll {i«®GrlbQd In a Brltisb
War Office r«port after th& ci®rmfii» »ttaek« Tb« report can b»
found la: gncyolop@dia Affl@rlcan.a, 9th sd.. Vol, XTIX, p, 5S6^2.
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consulting th# Otman High Comaad,.!'^ 4ltb©ugh th® Fuehrer
consented to turn ov®r th« operational control cf the

dlvialon to th© Gmrmmi High Ceiaaand, h®
tlie diirlfiion m It wished*

to w.lthciraw

Tlius, this force formal the

third prgng In tb® I'aa® for th® Yugosl&'j capital.^®
Ku«b to th® joy of tfee Ptt®hr«r# tta© rao® t&r Belgrade
was won. by tbe SS division..

First Ll»ttt@nant Kllng«ab®rg,

finding .all tb® Banub# Bri%#s i«8tr©y®«l, t.ook aa SS plato©n
aoroiis th® ri¥«!r on pasumatle rafts la th« aft-amoon of

April 12»

Hia patrol tbea sarohed l-sto th® city urmol®st#d

aafi raised tli# swastika mmv tbo Qm*mmk legation 1st® that
»am,@ aft«rneon»

Two iiottrs later (7 p»«.) tb© mayor of

B#lgr&d# ©ffleliilly

©v#r tb» oity to llirig«iib@rg, mho

wm seaoisp&aiei by a pr#flo«§ly .lattmsd rtpressatative. of
th# German. For®igG Ministry*.^®

Il«i«t*# prnxz^rs, m well as

uatts dri^tag fr©® th§ north,. @at®r«<3 tlia elty t'ae following
aoraiag#

fh# SS iiflsioa'® only c&aiialty r®port«d on th«

uneventful trip fro® Tiai«oura w&m mi officsr klH®<J by «.
elirillaa sniper's bull#t#^^

J-'^Por praastig® reasons and proi>«.gan<aa purpo.fi«!i, lot#
til® r®s#Qtm©33t, obvlotisly oT©r this met, by Haider, Vol,VI#
April 11, 1941,
Campa.lga in tfae Salkms, p, 53,
^%btd., p. s4.
p. 64*

il
Ti&tingliof»® pangere w©r® sosewhat han.dlcapp»<3
by th© fleeing yugosla^s coagestin^ tb.« roadways. Thouaiaads
of prls9ti«r'a w«i«© founded up during th@ si#xt sarar&l dai-g as
thm paa»@rs by»p&is®d mmij fXming Yugoslavs in trjlng to

reach SaX'aJ^TO. On

16# ?i@tingb.of«ii piJiasps, aftss?

J©inlng with th® ©ijltjjm advancing fyos KriRguj®Tac, were on
th« outskirt® of th# old Bosnian capital, Tfa® following iay,
Gtaeral K®.l&f8,toyic B®gotiat«d tlis sufrtafiar of th® #atir#
Yugoslav army, on pap«r tw«rity'*®ight divisions strong,, in,
psalitf aoae ©f tb« difialoiis ai«rely represented by a .»te®l«A f@w troops, led bj a Serblii'i eolon®! nmwd

ton foras,-^^

Mihallovitch, dis&ppsaj?@i ia th® m©untaias«
Klag
of

fhat a&m® day

.&iid bis ge¥«mment 1'1«4 to lth«as fpom th© s«ap©rt
Tl:i® mnintim

«ff«etiv» at aoon on April

18, 1041. In jast twslv# days from th# tia«

c©rp

h&cl ero®«»d ths border, tli@ yugoilair phaa® of tb® Balkaii
eajap&iga wm o¥«r#
fb# Gei^isma rletorj or&s' Yugoilafia mm. mhi&wmA at a.
vsrj low eost.

Tb® total Gemaa caaualtles for tii® matlre

eampaign @®si® to just i-S8
aad IS missing in aetion.^®

with 151 kill«4j 392 wouuded,
fli® Q-©raan loss©s In taaka md

^^Lukac®, p, 375#
^%bid.
Campalgo. in th@ Balka/ia» p, 64.

s2

motor T»bicl®s were, froim ail intieatIons, almost negligible j
while the uarsiaa Laftwaffs reported Its loss«3 aa "excsptioaally lo'«*'*^'^

A axajoi* loss for tb.® a@maas s#®Bied to be thm

tuXX ua» of th© B«mb« Elvar for ntarly a. Moath.

®i9 Gariaaa

©ngiriserlng batfelion bad suoc©«sfully tliwart0d th# Jagozlm
plana to destroy th© Iron Gates, bat th» ratra&tiag Yugosla¥s bad fill®a th© »ain channel in tti® -riGixiity of Belgrad®
with hiXKJi'ods of "bags of asaont#®^

Iti®''a-araaa®" oij "th® other "haad' took 344,000 'yiigoislav
prl0©.n«rs, "not ceuntl'ng a aiiafedr df Cfoata* Gtrffi«D.i,
Bmlgaipiaaa, and Hmgsrlaaa that ware ®sori r«i@assa aftar
being
fti® Oeraans eapturati "seir^i^al tiuudr#<i*Tugoslay tanks and t9i?®iity-flir@ lagosla^ airplanes left
intact OQ tli«
fti# mtim Yagoslat aavy ^xe®pt for
two submarines and a f«w aiaaT craft also fell into Axis
hands *28 feaa of strategic »at©rlal, oa a paj? wltb ICl«ist*s
bag. iftt lis, f ®ll to tb« G®riaaii» at »#v®riil of th# ailitmry

^Ha9S#l4>

5, lt41| Bepartaest of tti®

Gmvmm.

fi5pHIiTVi7~8ll»llS~lWshlHglms"'~WIEril@vernBsnt fminting
Offlcft), p, 6»
cited as gea-maai Aatigu^rpiXla
0©®Mti©o..t•
I

-i*' - |- I

II

I im

III 1II iiiiiii f

^%®rmaB
la tfe# Balkanatj p, 64 and 112, Tb«
a«Mb@? was 'giTn^dl by ii'ilHg'fEt'lO*
oaptmreci In th© s©uth
t® th® t84jf00§ pflaensFs eaptwr®^: 6ls@wfe.«P@* Thm torn G«»an
me&ni ®timi® a®n»mn8 fi»©m Sl©v®aia, Baaat, ©te» that w@£»a part
of th.® T«.g®@l»T army*
g^iMd.
^%uka©«, p» 375.
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fronts.

The Belgradd^Sis-Salonllm railroad ws.s uow also

completely at the disposal of th© Germane, although roiioh of
th« track and aany trtlns had been destroyed ohiefly by tba
Ltiftwaff»»

But supplies by way of th® rtllroad b«gan. arriving

at Salorsika trom Belgrade as @arly a® Apr^il 20.^®
OB April 14, Jusst two dajs

th® fall of BeXgrad®

and eight days after the baginning of the csrapaign, ths
Otmans ordeysd th® transfer of tbra© corps h«a€lq«s2ptars «nd
s«tr@n infantry divisions out of the Balkan theatr# of war In
ord«r to glv@ th® Men rest and prepare th® ®q[uipia®nt for th®
iapsndl'ttg invasion of Runsia*®®

QonM^qmntlj m April SI,

four day® aft»i» the siari»®nd«r of YiigoslsTia, two motorized

divisions C60th and 16th) were wlthdrairo fro® Yugoslairie.,
flmn on April SS„ th« 8thj 14th., and 11th Panzer «3iirialon-s
•m.TB order®d to

to G-erawi',*®'^

Upon inspecting th© tw'o

raotorised and tttree panzer alvlslonn on April S5^ GtneFal iron
Sfeoma reported I

®I,ittle w®&r RRd tear on -rehlol#® ® ars«l "low

e:Kp@ndlt«r® of aranranitiony" but •*rubb«i* traok blocks badly
wora by ao\»teiD ro«,di^ (on® di'o'lsion needed 1,900 rubto«T
^^WkmthmT th@s» siippXl®® sm® frm B«lgr«td# sll th» way
on tlm taiB® train, thi® »uthor do«s not know,
war©
»any railroad bridg®® destroyed m&r Bslgrad®, Tt@j ©o«ld
h«vo bean r®paired or th« loads oouXd hmvm b»©n trarjsf«rr®d
from river traffio.
^%@raai3 CftffipaiRn in the Balkan a, p, 151.
^3-Ibid.
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traek blocks).

"Tbree weeks will be g-uffiei©nt for r®h&blli-

tation of all units.
It Gotild have b®®ii soiie®ivably reported »t th» ®aia©
tiK© that there w®r® only four e€M:pl«t« Osraian division a
CiiaQludiiig on® laountftin, on® SS,, and two infantry) and several
lesa«r units still Itj Yugoslavia.
By this tlffi®, it was nearly all over in Or®®©® also,
dm to a a@ri©s of catastrophes siiff®r®d by the Anglo-Or® ©k
forces.

As ©arly as April 10, th® Oeraians w®r« In a position

to assax^lt th@ ferffllon-Allakliaon def^ns®®.

Aecsording to th®

G®r0®i3 plan at tnat time, two attack group® would b©

for

th® duration of the ©aapalgn involving alght G®r»«n divialons.^
fh® Artglo«^r«®k position froii th® test would b« as ®ault ®d by
th# Sd Pani®r, th© 5th sisd «th Mouatain,
divisions.

724 Infantry

Th© attaek from th® vloinity of th« BitolJ

would inslud® th« l«t SS r®lnforo@d r@gi««at (light iivislon),
fhe 73d Itaf&ntry, most of th® 9th fuBier,

th« Sth Pmn»#r

(du® to arrlv® or April 11).^^
Oa April 10, an a«!van©®d patrol, attaeh®d toth® Adolph
Hltl®r SS, disoov®r«d to its eoaplete aiaaaemsnt that the
BitolJ Gap was only lightly guarded,

Sttwe, without waiting

for th@ 5th Panzer division, imn®dlat®ly aeted.

That aaaia

day th© Garmana forced tha Gap, and that ensuing ©a|5ti!ir«d th«
3iHald«r, Vol. VI, April aS, 1941.
^^Ibld.. p. 91,

®^Ibid.
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strategic Greek eity of Florin*,^®

British arfflor«d

BRIGADE and th® two Greek divisions in the AREA ROW r&th«r

b®lst®aiy ru«h@dl «p to »s®t th® G^raaii sdir&tie®.

A two day

battl# in m snowstorm follow#d (April ll-li), fhs #®rm®ria.
Minus th©ir

aav«ne«d only slowly., Th.« Gtrmanji

lost four tanks dm'lQg th® battl#,. Th# British lossdi sr®
tmraeorded, but they probably wer@ hlgh«r.^®

On th®

of April IS, th® British and. their 0r®®k allies "strat#gie&lly
withdrtw** to shortsr dtfens® linsa anatior®«i at Graven® and
logaisl on ths l@ft flank. fh@ m,3st day fentad th® British
Ar»©r®d Brigade prot#0tlng th® flatsk near .Kosani, holding
a f&'fforabl® i«f®nslir# po«itiQiii ©n a hill ov@rl©©klng a
broad stream.*

the only way th® G®r»«n@ eeuld rsaoh th®

stmmm fit waa thought) wa.s by way of a .narrow gorg®*

fii®

firat two Q#rsiftn tanks ccaing through th# gorg# w®r® d®stroy«dl
by th« British guns* Finally, in a tr®.aoii#rows sroasing
dowastrean, th® Q-eraaas flanked th® British positisn, fh#
British, iu abaiDdonlng th® hill, left thirty«two tank® tntaet,
a number of antitrak guns, as well as a few trucks*^*^ 411
^%h« BitolJ Gap wfts d0f«nid®d by ©aly 2,0-00 fronti«r
guards,. Baeyolo.pedia 4»e-rio«nat ®th @d., fol, .IIIX., p. 55'?',
It apptara feai r«porFs'TroS'''''1!'iugosla'trla w@r© not cl«ar and
th© British and O-rsaks did not empsct aueh a rapid Gersan
advana# to the 0&p« Gergstti Q&mp&i^n in the Balkans-pp. ®2-93,
^%@riaaa Gampaign in the Balkana, p# 94«
^'^Ibid.
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r®»lstano@ befor® Kozani ooll«ps®c3.

On th« wornlng of April 14,

an advftaced sp«arh#ad of tha 9th Panz»r division r®aehed the

on April 13-'l4, tha 0r«#k Ipirus Army

&tt®mpt«c! a withdraw®,! '«xt®ndirig along ita ©ntlr® Albaaian
front,

Th® Seraan 73d Infantry division «n^ the Adolph

Hitler SS w®re .sl3«o««sf«l in blookirjg th« withdrawal in th«

north end, so It sat®®, only th® h®slt«,nt pursuit of th®
Italians »av0(3 the situation from shs«r fSisastaf, &b it waa
r#ported that eonfusion and paaic among th® Grtak soldiers •
was widesprtad,®^ How@i?«r, th« withdrawal dicl #B®bl# th®
Gr»ak S^trus Armj to fmll hmk on G-r^renA,

fb,i« ©ould hav®

©otiosivably halpei th« Bi'ltlsh 1« abortenirig thoir d«f«ns®
lines if it had not been tor -th® British disaatoi' at, logani,.
Isanwhil©, tdfraridlRg .from Salonika, the 0@ra5«ns: bad
forded th® Vardar on April 11, Two ooli®ri@ b«gai3 asssulting
tha Aagl.o-Ch*®©l£ positions#

Th® ®t2»ong@3t of th©a« &®m«a

eoluans began advaooing along th® aouutainous coastal ar®a
adjaeont to th® Gulf of Salonika, 'ftoa objaotivts of thi®
driv® wtre Kateiririi and Olyiapus Pass,

The oth#!* Geria&a eoliMn

fliGWd Inland toward 3»i»vla, » oity 'Just touth of th« Aliaktoaon
SlT«r*

Katerlni f«ll to th# O^rm&n 26 fimzmr division on

April 14, Just thre« hours after Kozani had f®ll«n to the

^^Ibld,. p. 95.
^Ibid,, p. 97.
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9th Panz®r division,^®

Dlsastftr now

th@ British and

tholr Gx'eak allies. If th® Gerwanis w«3?« abl# to s^eur®
Ol5®.pus P«.as and tha Gswiian di»l-r« In tbt dirftCtlon of Sarfla
linkad yp with th« German driv® from Koaanl, the Anglo-Qrectk
amy would be effeotlTOls' trapped*

Th® British therefor®

Infomed G«n«ral Papagos that they wer® preparing a **strat«gio
withdrawal'* throiagh Olympus Pass and f«iRp« Gorg® to Larlssfij
thmn fro» thlu

oity to batter d«f«ttsiw positions in

tli® Ti*isl«lty Qf t!» passes at %®mopyla« and Brado®,

Cf«u#r®l

P&pagos, at tb® sbms tiae^ sus^^gfistsd that in llgbt of tb»
olro-osstanoiss th« British should ©vaemte th.® ®!itti?© country,
ThQ Bi'itlsh uavj had already b#©n al^rtstf bj th# British
go-v&rmmnt of tli« J3®®d fox* s«@h a p0»sibl@ evaamtion, tenta
tively #©hedul®d to taks place aroimd Api»il
Under" th® cover of ^arkaess on the night of April 15,
Sroek and Bi'lttali troops fe®gan witMrawing tlu»ougii the motantalQ' pasat®*

Tba. r®treat waa covered by oa# M®w Zealand

brlgad© at Motast Oljmpus, on® Maw Z^alaxid battalion and an
Augtralian Brigade at Tewp# Gorge, and a for©# of aewral
mixed battalions near Kalsbaka to desl with th® threat oomlng
from th© dlreotlen of lto«s.ni.

For th© ratat foia* day® the

Bx'ltish retreated soiithward, harassed sll th® w&j by th®
^%bid., p. 97.
*^SE.

Alliane®« p, 286.

^^Ibld., p. 2g6.
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Luftwaffe*

On April 16, tb« Q-emana maaaultad Platanion 81dg©>

at the Mount Olympus Pass, with on® hundred tanks and finally
brofe® through,At tla® s®ia« tisia th® Q®i«aan8 ad^*no®d on
Temp# Qorg®, a

whore all th® roads In th® area ooav®Tg«d

leading to Larl-asa.

^'or two

the O-erBian adirano© wa»

h«ld lip by tha jfeustraliarj and New Zealand t^oopt*

^'iti&lly,

on April 18, tli® Gorge was .forced snd th« dftfenders smillil**

On April 19, Larlssa fellj wltb th« British laairllli
teia truckloads of r&tlous and fu«l b«hiad for th# oonquarors,^
fh® next ffionilag, th© Gerraatis er.tered Yolos and oaptxired ^ir@ry
larg#" quantities of ©rude and dies#! oil left by th® fleeing

A.nglo-Greak astrayBy April 20, the C1-er«sn« nmve in sight
of TlMinsopyla® Pass,

flie British were safalj "behind th© p&as,

however,- Tharaepyla# Psss was, at th® tl®®, b®l*3g h»ld by
rmsmBXits of th© Mew Zsaland dl^'/islon, whil«i .fSrados Pass,

furthdr Inlar^d, ®»s being defended by tb® 6th Australian.
dl^lsloB,.'^'^

Th® Oeraans <Sld not wish to t®st th#s© Anglo-

G:e#«k positions, not yet anyway.^®

For, in th® meantim#

^%»raap CampaiRR in the Balkana, p» 98*.

p. 107.
^^Ibid>
Qraad Alllattoe* p, 2i8i,

^^Ibldt, mention# that the Oermans did not severely
test the new positic«s»

§9
another danger had transpired for th® British—a possible
flanking movement by tht Ad^ibph Hltl»r S3*

On April 19, th# Adolph Hitltr r»glB?©nt| protecting the
paasts! against » possible Graak withdrawal fro® th® Albanian
frost in the vicinity of Qravens, now ree«lTr«d orsaera to prooeed to YannAna in order to present a poisible Grtak withdrawal
in the south. Late in tha day of April SO, th« mission was
ec«pl@t®<3 following a pltah«d battle with th® Or#®ka in the
high M»tsoon Pass of th« Plndus Mountains#^^ No®, with
almost all th® aiajor pasaea held by th® O-srBiaias, hia
soldier®' aorftl© at a low point, and «v@n th® hesitant Italian
erisy prssslng forward, Qeneral fg©l«koglan 'urgad tha Clr®®lc
g©i?-®rnm®nt to capitulate, That saa® day ffsolakoglau
surr®nd®r«d th# »ntir® G-r®<sk Ipiriw Ar«y to the S-sraans.®®
Th# Molph Hitler SS was now fr®® for ® <3riT® down th€> l®ft
flank of th® inglo-ffr©«k position® at fh©«aopyla@, Thi®
thr®®t was still four or five d«ys away, but with no hop® of
aid from th® breaks only on® deelslon oould b@ made, and this
had t© b® don© In a hurry-'-to evaouate, Th© ©vaouatlon
tentatlwly sohoduled for l^prll S8, was now definitely s#t
to ooffijsftnc® on April S4, 1941
^%®rffi«n Caapaig^n in the BalkaoB, p. 95.
Q«rfflians ©ff®r®d honorable t«rms to th« Qr®©"tes «v«n
allowing th® offio^rs to keep their side arms. Mussolini was
not congulted before the aurrtnder, and th® Itmllant reaalnedS
tecimlcally at war with (Jreeoe until April 2S, Ibid.
®^The Grand Alli^anpe, p» 2B9,
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to the be«oh«® began on th® night

Th« i»«ar«rard

of April 22"i3, and wm® eftrrl#d out for th« ns,xt fiv«
sonseeutiv® nights*

Nin® pelnti of ©sibarteatieti w«r» s®l®ot@4

along th# eoaitlln® b«tween lar»th©Q to th® north and Kalamati,
in the Paloponnsaua, to th® south,®®

Th® Luftwaff#, eoffipl©t ®ly

«OMol«sted iw th« air after destroying th® jla at reraaiaing
British planes at Argus, eontinually attacked th© Anglo-Greek

movsments and all th© ©vaouatlng had to b® aon® at sight*
To ooapound tb® A^gie-Oreek ®l®®rl»s, th® Gaman® f©re#d th«
pass®® at Thermopylae on April 85. On th® follawlng day
G#rattn parashut® troop® captured th® Geriuth Ca»»l and aeslsd
of th® ?®lop©nn@aus frea th© Ore®k aainland,"®®

fhat sa»« day

tb® Adolph Hitler SS eapt«r®d Patros ani als© ®Qt ®r®d th®
Ptloponnesus.

Bi.« following day (April f?), Ath«aa f«ll t©

ths O-erman M Panz#r division,. a« it was trying to ©mtflaak
a British petition,British for©«s now fought a d»laying
aetion wh@B®¥©r po®sibl® In ©rder t© g@t th«lp Istt remaining
troops ®Ttoiiat®i.

Thm final evsewation was co®pl®t®d on the

night of April

Gr«#e® had already s«rr©nd®r«<3 on

April 24*
^%bid.. p. §89-230,
^%h® Garmans wanted to captur# ths canal istaet, Thmj
•mrm aueosssful in doing this, but ttj »oeid®ntal hit by a
British artillery ifh«ll struek th® pow<S®r eharg# before th®
Germans oould r«aio^e it and th® oaoal was destroyed after all.
^%bid«» p. 108.
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¥h®

vloto3?7 over th« Anglo-Grsek fore®® on

aalnlfind Oreeo®, In a sense, only appears » little luss

8p«et&o®lar' thftn tbt 0«iwa« oonqmst of Tt^oslavia, B'wx*i«g
th® twenty'-thrftft days of fighting on th# Gr»®k Biaiiilft, nd tlm
Q«i»a6i58 sttffe'rad only 5,100 oaaiialti®8,'with 1,100 of tbes#
liitad as klll«d»^®

fh® British mlon# lost 11^040, ®lth«r

icillsd OP captia'#^, o«t of their lxp#dltioeary Pore® of
55,051

liiffi#ro'ua oth®r arltl-sb »ail0j»g l©ft th«lr lif®#

on th® «©!'» than twtnty ships of tb® British Empir® swnk by
th® Luftwfiff®»Also, th® Germans took sos® 270,000 CIr«®k
priaoneri dwrittg th# 0«Mp0.i.g«,»®®

the

p«ns»r

division® «agag«d in tli« eanjpaign lost b«tw##n tMrty a.nd
forty tanks,®® but tht Britisli eon^^ijisntli* aa4t Mp this
leal by laaving thirty-two tanks for tli# QmrmAtm ±n one
«ng«g««#«t»

fhe only serious los®@i war® staff«r@d by tli®

Luftwaffe, as ovmr om hundred of tbsir pinnas w«r® aitbsr
Caapttign in, tha Balksni« p* llSj Tlpptlsklreh,
p. 161, eiaiaa tlerswere ©sly W5*"li¥d and ©iaslng in both
Yiigoalairla an«2 §rt®o«| Adolph Hitler &tmommd th® easualties
amovnted to l«®s tb«n S.j,500. in both oampaign®^ Liakaas, p« 584*
klllmm , pp. 23g-.2S5.
, pp, gfiS,. gSO, aad 232-g3S.
^®2g£S®E, CaapaigR in the Balkana, p, IIS.

S%hlt appears to b© nearly e©rrs©t, but coi3.calTably
of tfcfi ooneliaaion of th« <s«Bp®iRii. Ibid*. pl 941
Haltf®r, May 8, 1941.

6t
shot down or had orashsd during the earapalgsQ,®®

But b©sid®s

sinking a acor# of British ships, at least thirty Gr««k ships

were sunk by th« (rtman aii'

aad the British loa«»s in

plan«a aoemed almoat a® high as that auf?er«d by ths
On tha oth®i* hand th«

vietory had its dr^wh&ok$,

lh.0 British gain»€3 control of alaoat th© entii^ Or«®k navy
including s emaissr, alx dBstroj&r's, and fo\:r s.ub®ariri«a,®^
Th# Oy@«k raoyntainoua ro&di and rough terrmin had a gmmt
effect on th© ©emmn raotorizgd equipffisnt, as ln^ieat#d by th®
G-«rs!®Ji supply htadqwrters at tarlss®. Mfyeetiirsg 1,.500 tmw
tii»«8 at QR» point In tim omnp&ign,^^

M&mor^r^ th# a-^riaaRs

had at l©0st t«ri divisions s.nd m@ Mgimtnt still in Ofs#©©*®®
Sight of thas© aivlfiotss, incluijlag all thre# pftngar, war®
sohtd-ul^d to tak# part In the launehing of Bairhftrosts.®®
®%au®ba®h, p. 75. Ghurehill*§^ fh# Qgftwd Alliance,
p» S3$^ elaima cseiaflrm®d en«®y log®«a
"pi!tan#a
'
M&r9mb»r to th« ©wd of th® Grassk ea»pis.ign. This *ay b@ ®©,
tout probmhlf ti«|ry of th# plaR«« w»m Itallaa or shot dom

b®for®--th® •oaiK.paign hegao.
Grand Alliftpo®, pp. ffS;„aQi gSi«
least th« 100 planas th« British had in Oi*e®c«

wer® d#stpoy«d hafor# t}3« caapaigs ®iid«4,
®^fh« Oraad Alllans#, p» 835,
gampgiiga in th« S&ltops, p, lO"?,
®®Ineludlisg th® eight mentioned d\w»ling th» final phaa®
of the ©ajspaign and th« 164th and 50th lofmntry diiriaions and
th« Igith r®giiai(nt eooupying Eastern Maosdonia, Thrace, and
Salonika,
SSfh® 5th and 6th MowntAin di-^isiona ar© the exo«ptiois8.
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Rlchtfeof«i3 * s Eighth Air Corps and units of Loeiir's Pourth
Air Force wer® scftttared throughout tha Balkans.

Moat of

Hlehtho.fsfifa plane® w«f'ra achsdulati to launoh tb» Rtasslfta
inif«aloQ from basts in Poland ao«3 last Fruffisla, whil« most

of ILiO«hz'*a OB&ft wer® assignad to support Fi®la. Marshal
Otrd voa Hyn<a8t«dt*s thrusts froii Rtimanlgi,®'^
To make »«tt«rs 9vmn more diffioult, OD April S5, th@
F-a«lirar ©xtarai®^ Opsration -Marita to InoltMS# th® A#g®an
**&pp«:od«geg" arid atrateglo Iv^lend of Cr©te, The new cod®
naraa of Operation Msreury was assignad tlie lattsr project,®®
flitg caiis® iMl&er to appro-xiisimte t'm date for th® (Jtrmftn
ismsioii of th«
April 20f
beg^in on

titotoii as

12, 1941»*'^®

But on

-aoBo-uBG®^ tbat '^Operation BarbarO'Sga. will
SE» 1941.«Tiie rsilit&ry w&s at the aarii@ ti®@

ordered to follow-- a ^msiximxxm ptrforaaBc® tlafttabl®" fro®
May 23 to tlie titial <3at« of axeautlon.'^®Aeoc5rd3.iig

Bltler'a new «s:t©a^®d plaa for ©p#-ratloa

In th© Bfclk&ua, the A.@g«an Itlands would b# oc©«pi#d hj th«
164th Infantry division whleh wa«' at that tim® oootipylisg
latterw M.aoedonim. ^all boats would l>© wsod fer th« projdot,
fi^^lalddr. Vol. VI, Imy 12, 1941.
^Qpas Hear. VqI,

p, 84.

®®Hald®r, Vol,
April S8, 1941, Tlie probabl® date
of Jyn# 18 is also w«ntio«©d in a r®p©rt of April SB, 1941,
In Trials of War Griffllnala. Vol. X, p. 983.
of War Grlialmls. Vol, X, p. 984.

Cltalios, mine,)
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most of which would, come from the

bootf*

The aatu task

of ts.klng Cr®t0 would bs assigned to the 7th Airborne division
then stationed in R'ama.iiia»

fha divisioa would b® ti^anepoi'ttd

fro® Bucharest -to C-r«@oe B3R the KS« of 4,9.00

The

origiBal plan calltd ©n this psraehtAt® dlvisloa to h® ®8siit®d
on the groiTDfi by th« 2fd Airborne division wbiob waa apscif-

l0®lly traimd for mn op®rttlors of this sort*
t©G,jj waa in Huwa-Gi®.*

"Kil® ^Hvtaion,.

The Bsrharossa plffl-unimg wcit obj#ct«i

to th® ii®e of this division eti the greonda that tt w©«ld ^roh^
Barbapossa of ir&liaabls trs.'c^tportstion*'^^' fhMS^ it ira» dseld®^
fchst one of t-li® mountala dlvisieiis in ths

would assist

tb® 7th Airtjorn® division diaring thm 0r®t® opspatlotu
Bj sftrly Kajj th®

Seneral Staff wag ©xpFesstBg

®.D attitude of diB'Cpttreguffie-tit ot®p the ?l#velepicg sltiaatien
Ir* the sei$th©s#t, tnd th© forty^-two days allowed on ley 50
by t}» Fiathrer to pr®par«i for BarbRri5»s& Bstist haw ®eeni©i
lik« a T»rj short tism iadeed*

fh® SsrwanB still hmi to acY®

better than thirty flitrislous from th© w®at plug thos« In
•6r®ec© and yugoslavla, and th® Oemana w©r# suffering fro»
an &«mt© shortag® of sjotcr v®hial®8 wow lr5t*a®lfi®<3 by th©

decision," Thm 300 trucks and 400 autoffloblles agalgnad
to th# ®ast@ra buildup ar@®» from th® Ore^k and Ywgoala'r
"^^aXder, ^oU ?I, May 8^ 1941.
28, 1941,
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booty aidsd very Ilttl# when coiap«p«4 to th®

Ba®ds,^^

Also roads, bridges, rails, «nd trains wer® in bad *i®«d of

r«palr in both Yugoslavia and Graeee, Haider frankly admitted
that beeatis® of transportation diffieultits, th® tlm» n0«d#d
for the r#*fitting of all tmits, and tha p®ndij3g Sr@t@
eauipaign, it was likely that two p«tnz «r divisions (24 and Sth),
and OR® mot©ris#d diirlaion (60th) could not be ready for th®

laiinohing of Barbaroasa.*^^

fo ooiapo'Uttd th® diffle«lti®a,

Riehthof®n was d#ma.iiding rail tranaportation to the Polish

and East Prussian build««p ar®«s for Ms #ntir« oorps#

Tb$s

f®at would hav® required th« ui® ©f «ppr©xliaat@ly fowr 'hundred
isftt»ri«l train®. Hmldtr oowitered that thi« could only b©
don® if Barbarossa wars postpo»«d froa seven to nln® dsys.*^®
Fortunately, soon aft©r, Hitl®r a#o.id«4 that »o®t of th© greuiid
p@rson»«l attached to th© ligbth Air Corp® would b® s^Bt to
their deploymsot srtas In Poland and last Prussia a® a &m am
posaibl®, but with om hwiidr«»d Material tr«lns b«irig provided
for shlpB®nt only as far as {)d ®rbsrg.

Th® flying xmits would

r ®«aln,, bow ©v #r, uotil they eould b@ rel«as®d from th® Cr ®t®
campaign.^®

fh® Pt3@hr«r @as#d th® trans port®,tiou probl®®

further by deeidiag to keap th« Ed and fth Panstr diviaioBis
'^%bid... May 6, 1941, and May 8, 1941.
'^^Ibid.. April 30, 1941.

Mey 13, 1941.
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In G-ra©o» until aft«r the sxioeessful coiaolusion of Oparation
Meroury.

Th« 3th and 6th Mountain divisions, that were to

assist In taking Orets, w&r% also ordered tc remain in
as wer# the 164th Infantry, then oeeupi'lng the Aegean Islands,
the 50th Infantry, o©o«pying thusi ¥ardar River Valley ®nd
Salonika^ and the ISSth Regiment, etationed at Siilonlka#
Exoept for the niaaber of antiaircraft wnits, all other Oerasn

troopK and their equipment w®r® expected to re-deploj a® so©n
as possible,
booking baek, th© Tyge^slav Military ©aapalgn was eaty
and seemed to eause n© further del&y In Operation Barhasossa#
Moreover, there o.ftn be no doubt that the Geraan invasion of

Yugoslavia contributed to the jaore rapid defeat of the Greeks
and their .British allieg*

fh%B could mean that th® Pwhrer

had been seereMng for an exews® to attaek fugotlavla all
along end that hi® apparent anger at the yugeslav
alightly ,felgn®d»

was

evtdenee points to tbst contrary, sine®

Field Marshal leltel and General Jodl testified that they hft,d
drawn up the new invasion plans within f©rtj«elght houra after
and most of the division® used in nortl^rn

the

fugoalavla had been transferred fro® other areaf,'^®

On th#

was gained fro® several ao«rees notably Haider,
May 13, 1©41| and U.S., Department of Amy, Qeraan An tinnerrllla Operations in the -.Balkani •(1941*1944)'p.' l6.
"^^Seei

"Chapter I,** page 18,
"Chapter ii," p. si.
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other hand, th© Fuehrer raust have been aware of th® YugoslavGreek-British position, H&lier realized th# weakness of
Yugoslavia and it was apparent that General Pap®gos w&a not
withdrawing from Albania, fh® foreea in Bulgaria were,
ffloreover, tailor-siad® for th# task.
Meanwhile, poor Haider, Hitler had postponed Bftrbarossa
*'up to four weeks*'®^ in ifarahi the Germans had allowed four

weeks for the re-deplojraent of German division fro® Oreeee
after **driving out the British"}®^ th© Greek oempsign had
ended on April 30, while on the sa»e date only four diviaions
assigned to Barbaroasa were left in Yugoalavia. ^ut th©
invasion of Crete was to eoaplioate everything.
«ChEpfcer I,® p, 18.
®^a®«s ''Chapter I,® p. 11.

amrmn iv
fig imkBim OF cmm

In the spfiwg of 1941, Mtlsr appeared to hava llttl#
d©ubt about th® strategic valu® of Oret®, ®v«« though his

iwaedlat® plans for eowfTitst at th® time only liii?©lir@<S th©
Bum Gftisal an-d the liddl© last as a saaeniary theatre of war<i
H# f®ar0d that as long as th® British po®s®»®®d th® island,
thAj «ould probably aaiatain n&TAl and air s«p@rlorlty in th@
©asttris M#ait®rrao®ai*j whila th# bulk of th© tuftwaff© was
mgmgfid in lusaia#

Srst© eoiili also

«« » iritiah sprlBg*

board to th® Balkan eoast or »erT® as a potential air baa®
whieh th# limaaiaia ©il fitlis oottld b« attacked..

On the

oth #r hand, with Orat® in Axis hauia, British thrtats ta th®
ttr®e. would hm eliBinatsii and th© got langa in th® A®g@aa
wooia b® safe,

Cr®t« eo-ald also strw a® a potfttitial Axis

juMp-off bas# for uavftl stntf air operation® in the ««.st®rri
ll.@dit®rran®a,R»^

Mor® imp©rt®i3t still, with the Impending

^Thare ean b® little doubt that th®,s® wer@ th« vi^wa ©f
Hitl«r sino® almost all are ®xpr@sa«d at one tiia® or «o©th®r,
3»®l Hmlder, Vol. ?1, Oetob«r t4, 1940i Hitler's letter to
iMsaolini on lov««b®r 19, 1940, Lukaos, p. 547«
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invasion of Rwasia., it aould b® tjs©d to support a ground
©ffensiv® against Egypt and th® Sues Cftiial by the Italiftni
and th® meager German fore®3 undei' th® eoaM-Ud of Q-®ii«ral

Srwin
l¥»n so, Hitl®^, after annoiaicing Operation lereury,
was t«mpt«d several ti®®a to postpon® th® proJest indefinitely
and did «ot »ak@ his final ©oamitmeut for th® iiivasio® ©f
0r®t« tintil lay IS*^

Fossibly h® wmm weighing a f«-w of th#

argtjiaents against th® inir«®ion of Crete Toieed by 8o»t of hii

generals.

Soa# felt that too Many firat-olast troop® aisd

©tpeei&lly planes wer® btiiig diverted to a «®0ond*ry theatre
©f war.

Also transportation that alght otherwise b® wsed

for Btrbarosift would isstead be utilissd for Operatiou
M «re«ry»'^

In the ®nd^ apparently .Hitler felt -aiat to© naiiy

division® would b# weeded in the Balkan* with Crete In Britiih
hands# '%MS, it would b# better to ellMinat® thla potential
soF# spot while the planes were available rather tliau having
to do it later wlmn mmh of th® Q-^rmmn Air Fore# would b©
oosmitted in Bueaia#®
^See ^iew of Haider, Vol. VI, April 24, 1941,
^Haider, ¥ol. ¥1, Mny IS, 1941, statesf "fhey will
have to aeke up their wind whether or not they want to do.
'Merkur' (lerswry).'* Haider, ¥©l» ?I, May 13, 1941, indieates
that they finally deeided to do the operittion..
%alder, ¥ol, ¥1, May 12, 1941.
^This is indioated by the uiaEber of troops he ordered
to remain in Greece uatil after Operation Mereijry.
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Tb« German invasion of Gret® wa* t@ntativ®ly ®oh@dul®d
to 0OBMa«iio« on May 18, 1941.®

Slno« this w®s to be Go«ring*s

show, thm entlr® Gaffflajj invasion fore®® ir®re to b© ©0«a«nd-@d
hj G»n®ral R$ohthof@n of th® Stghth A.ty Corps and O-entraX
Iwrt Studtnt of th© llev®nth Air Corps-, "Shm latt®F aorps
wowld eonaist of th® 7th Airborn# divialois and the 5th
M©wntain <Sivi8ion.
in

Hi# 6th Mountaiti ^iviaioti would be kept

fh© plan worlcsd ©wt by the aly foro® -eallti f©r

16,000 wen to b® droppod or land«d frosi the air ®n^. a. furthei'
7,000 to b« landed fro® the sea#"^

Exmpt for a

feetarity

plati®s- to prot@c3t th® ^ujaauian oil fl«lds, all th® planes of
th# Fom*Mi Air Fore® &Bd Eighth Air Corps wer« to b® trans*
ferred as mmi m possibl® to aipfl^lds at We'mMl^ El®«gls,
AygoSj, Attiea, th» FslepoouMtis,, Italian Shod®®, sni th#
4«g#ais Island.®. In ©11^^ 650 elriraft wer® to siipport t|a§ &ii*
m€ s®a IsRdlng®,®

In ord@r t© f®rrj th« troop® to Cr«t« fe-r

tha operation, 530 ti-ftusport air-eritft and 100 glidart w®r® t©
be brought in from «s far away m Iforway,®

Th# r«lnfor€®®®ttts

from th® s#a mr® tQ bo brought in by 63 stptur-®<3 aot©r-sall#rs
®l®l«l®r, ¥ol. ¥1, Maj 17, 1941.
'^Hart, p. 160,
®SS.
kll±m&e, p. 27© I Cl#ra&n SsMpftlCT in the
Balkans > p^TMT
^yhe draiad Alli«.ne». p. 279, corresponds to Haider,
Vol. VI, lay 2S', 1941. ^
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(oaiquea) aad &®mn oaptured freighter's #&ch with a 300~ton

capacity,^®

Several Italian destroyers war® expeeted to

pro-rid© th# asQcrt, as waa thm L'uftwaff®.

Whil# tfela fewlldtip

was taking plao®, th© 164th Iwf&ntry division was ®xp®0t@d
to O00UP7 th® Aegean Islands in small boats ecMmeneing Mmy 1,
and conoludlng their operation around May 11#
The carrying out of these plans hj th« Germans was suah
more diffleult than it alght &.ppmskT*

Mvmn thowgh most of th®

plams war® expaeted. to flj t© thtir new aaaigned fldlds and
fiissf of tb® trstiaports wmm l©fi4©i with suppllss ®® w#ll, th®
QnTmmi transportation »jst«m in Or««s® m ©Isewhsr® was

s«¥eralj taxed#

In Ure^ce, th® road# becais# badly ooug@st#d

with troops trjlng to leave ani others @nt«ri!jg at th® saa®
tlm®|'th® makeshift road repftira w®r« falling t© hold up at

orueisl Bjoiiwat®! mtieh of th® railroad trtek in Qrm&& mnd
'fugoslavift hadf not

r@pair®<l| and the Qretk harbors had

i3©©n w#li aiii®<3 hy the British. A Greraaa Twelfth krwtj r#fert
OB Ms:j 8, frankly stst@d that it was w©rs® than dijrltig allitiiry

oparatiofts,^"^

Then, aa iiior# plEH®a b»gan arrivlijg In

it waa di«co-r@r®d that th® Gsraans W6r@ «uff®ring ao acuta
shortage of tankar trucksfh« trucks war® requiaitionad
from areas aa far away as Fraoe®#
^^5S£2SH PMpaiKn in tha Balkans. p, li4.
lbid4, p. 129*
^^Ihid,
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After the Pwiirtr had d@eid«d that th® €r@t@ operation
would ts.k® place, he poatpoded th® project for two days in
ord®r to allow the oocupation of Antikyther®,

Haider and

others protested to this on th® groimdi that all poast.i)|liti«s
of surprise in th© iri-vaslon of Crete would b« loat and it
would probably oftua® a delay in Barbarossa,^^

But th® Ft>jfiihr®r

had his way and the Crete invasion was p®stpoi50d 'oatil May gO,
How®v»r, th#r® woi..;:ld have

no surprlsa achle-r^d in

thi# Orete iB'rsslon;, A»tikyth©ra or not».

British agfttits in

0r#6e® tr«ssaiitted aocurat® information on the OerKari buildup
and. laft llttl® doubt as to th® n«tw Garffi&n objective,^'*

Chiarchill al«o had f«w doubts as to t'hs strategic Talus of
Crot®. "kh# British were prep«r«d to stop the Gmrmm tide h«r«
and BOW and possibly fthangt th® Goi®pi®si-«.« of th® was%

fh®

strength of the l.sland was iiicr#as«d fro® S4,00C to 98^600 ia®n.
Additional tanks, «Bti®ircraft aad fl®ld guria were brought
from Iforth Africa, and even from tli© British horaslands in order
to bolst&r th® defisng® of Grot®, fhe British would alec coasit
almost their entird MediterraneaB fleet to th© Qxpected fray^,

includiog at L»asti

OB® airoraft oarrisr, thre® hattl@»hipa,

nine cruisers, a^d tw®nty-four d.0stroy«ri«^^

Only in th# air

l®Hald«r, Vol, VI, May 17, 1941.
^%h® O-r&Bd Allianeo, p» B71»
^^Th®r® w®r® probably mor®. This «®ny ar® mentionfid by
Churchill In various p»ges throughout Ihe Grand Alliftno®.
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wer® thffi British

waak, but

willing to do tfc« b«8t th«y ooiilfi.

her® tliey were
fhe islands' air defcirjas®

were Inortesed from tw#nty«t;wo to slmoat

plarmg by the

addition of n®w l^lessters to th® Qrmt® i<|iiadr©s®«^®

A®

Cmmr&l Wa-f®ll stated it, the Germans would prcbably find their

^ao0rob©-r,^ es the laip#T3<31r»g Oermn Ixjvaston of Creta was
call#d,""a r»6 hot proposifciors.'*^^
I#».]Qirhil® th# Otrroans wp® ©©ntiniilng th«lr pfsp&rationa
for tb© Aisftiilt of th» isl#-«d,

Ac^moriitig te th® G®p»a,n plan

of attach, thr»@ g&n%rul ardes in Or«t@ would rs§«if® th®
hasvitst

coneentratlonst

Etrmklloc In th«

lii th# «0Qt«FS and Sufis. B&y, Qmmm,
in tbe w»st«

Ittis©

tli« tli*fl«ld at

Tb@ saptuf© of t.h# airfield at lal®:®# w«.# to »s

the first Bifejor obj«otl^»,

Tfc« bas« was to

boffiblcg «7i<! ttrsXisg for

l®ii,«t** ©r^s hoia' »ft®r- tfc.» first

waT® of 0®raan plari#® had arrivtd ©¥«r tbe l«l&o6i
it ootjild b® y»«,«eria.bly

esntliiual

By tliat

the Britlah ^#f«a«a®

8.r-diirid tht air hmm irsjwld b® r®n.<S®red: Impotent, T-mmpart
plan®® Md glid®rs i»ttld follow up th« bombing hj cdalrig in
wlt'b. th» firat wairs of assault troop® wfe© wowld.,, &6©©rding to

th® plsn, paraohut® In next to th® ®lr bus#, ©r l«»d Just west
of th® fldld#. Th# a«s««lt groups would than ©staWlsh th®M-.
S®1T«S with tb@ ftld of the I^uftwaff®^ &n6 follow this up

dPjgaid Allianoe, p|>» S7f and BQM,
^'^Ibia., p. 882.
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with a pi-offipt attaek on th© air base.

After tb® bss® was

secured bj the Gersiftn foroe, it could then b© used to bring

is laor® r©inforG«ffl»nt» for an attaek on Cau®a and Suda Bay,
Lmt®r In th® iajg wbsn tfcs British wqu1«3 b® mor# likely
rushing. raiiiforc®ia0nta to M®l©a@, th® tsae pr©o©d«r® would
b« applied to th® air bases at H#rakliotj and R«timo«^'^
Th® d-snaao attack coraaenoed at dawn on Maj 20, 1941,

with •u'iolent Rir beabardmsnt and strafings throughout the
totir® islsndi

Mal®®« was hit tli« hardest, aod ifithtn a few

!iiinut«s after th® initial attacks almost all of her antisirorftft
bs.tterl®s w®r« ©iXtnotd.i®

^ By 8iOO a.m* th©r« s®©K®d to be littl® l«i*t of th©
bas«»

hangars w©r@ all d®®troj#d, fir«s Imd brok^ti ©ut

all o¥«r th« ftirfitld, sBd th® fl#li

to b® rtagsd in

flames. th«ii the first wav® of G#i«an troop trsRsport plana®
hmgm arrlTirjg#

Th@ i®f@n-d®rs, who hafi aoBjentarily ab&adonei

their weapons durltsg th® terrific Luftwaff# rai^s, hj this time
had returned to th^lr station® and began pouring in a B«rd®rous
fir© at th® transport plsnes and glid«r®»

Or® after another

of th® German troop oarri«ra ^lande<i pr ®®®tur «ly oa th« beaehesj
aora® la.ad@d directly on th® flr@-sw@pt fi#ld, irtxile others
crRshad in the scrub.

%® first Gemau parachutists,, who

, p. 879-180, ooiatalni much of th« 0®rrasfi plan
for th® a'l'laok whioh was aequired by th® British aft»r th# w«r.
^^Ibid., p. 241, in Churchill*s words, '*put out of

aotlon practioally tt ono©."
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jiaap^d from altitudes of three Ixtradrad to six 1i«ndr«d f®»t,
w»rs ®lth®r shot in the aot of ooaalng down or wtre engagftd
io hand to hand flghtiag by th© defenders,-

Bteatisa of the

olos® quarters of comlsstj. It was alfficat Impoasslbl® for the
Luftwaff® to glv0 support*

flm result v&m that alsost th®

®iitli?« fli»st f®w w«v®t of troops landing at Male®# were
wiped out»®®

X.i0ut®n&r4t 0®n@r®l Wilh®lm S\»ssm«]3, th®

d®slgn®t»d G®3f«ist3 o&s««nd«r of the ground foross in Cr@%®,
w®8 killed, and Major Central l^igau®

ths

of the G-®rm®.t3 foi*c#» at Mal®E}«, wa® seriously
SttEiingly obllvloiia to these losses^ th# Q®rmm& lc«pt Qoalog
®s th® @z»ftek«-iip of G-«i^ffian plitn®® contina^i. It waa net
until th® lat® aft®rsi®c« of lay 20^ that the Oarmana ir«r«
abl® to tstabllfflh th®ias®lves snd hold p©«|tion8 wm»t of th®
baa®. fh« Bfttlsfe still retained posa#s«lon of th® s.ipfl®ld,
hO'W®T®r«
©uflng th® »sjst aft.«pBoonj ®t»t|a3? Q%rm&n t«stla® wtr©
©ffiploytd at B®ti»o a.n«S Isrsklion with «.l«o#t siailar pesulte,
Bf nlghtfmlljf onlj scatt®r®d Germgin uoits w®r® fthl« to ®st®b~
ll«h th«ms®lif«g in th® vicinity of th® two air basas. In all,
^^Xbld». p» 285-S86J German gaapsigti in the Balkans,
p» ISO,
^^ergsan Sgmpal^n in th® BslMsms, p, 150,
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the G &rma.nB had attarapted to land 7j>000 troops diariug th®
first daj.

It was ©stlmatad that at least 4,COO of those

tiH3op»

o.aiualtl®s»^®

Itia- next aoming, th® British wer© forced to ftbsi^don
Melaraa, beoeuse th.3 Oarsaoa bad cl©ai"cd out nany of tli«
ktter the oaptur®

i«f#n0lv® p«>i-ltl,on8 diiring th« night,

of ti» airfield, th® Gemane only rasd® a gasondary affort

tft larsd troops at l©r«klion and Rttimo^ In oi'd®!' to soasaHtrats at Kal«m# and tb.® Suda Bay «r®a#

ftis

s*«lnfore«-

ra«rjts w@i*® IsTiied dlreatlj on tls.© podtaiarkad airstrip, sine®
th® British kspt w'f «« artillti-y a«d wortor barrage on th®
fl#ld, Til® British fir© eaa»«d otilj wh$n Luftwsff® figlit#r8

and bo®b®rs wsr® flying naar by«

Q®raati transport plaines

oa»« In at t#ii to fifteen raimat® Intervals, landing frsmfortJ to fifty

©aok.®® '&is ptea, along with th® fr®qu®at

Mishaps, on th® l&ndiag field and with only on® aifflila in
G^rm-an haads, oi:Wis«a a, great deal of ooiioftra to th« Q&rm&n
l»®d»rship«

In splto of th® rlaks Invdlved, th® onlj solution

Rppeared to be to try to rsinforcs th@ 0#ra.ftQ» by s@a d?iri»g
^®Thi® way b® a llttl» high but it aiast be 'ilos®,
H«ld®r a®ntions that tfc« assault ragisient of th® 7tii airbonae
suffered n#srly 1,000 d^ad arid lost SO offleers, Haider,
¥-ol»- ¥1, May 28, 1941.
Gr«nd Alllano®, p, 080.
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th® night «s previously planne-d.®^

"Tte.® flrat convoy was s«ut

out by the Germane to Cr©to on th® night of M»y 21, end
promptlj

atruck a« a British fl®®t of thr«& OFuisars

find four d«8tro"/ars aighted the Oerman«*

Iti tb« ensuing

struggl® foi'' survival,, tfce German® lost at laast 500 out of
til© S,3CX? men attaoli©d to this seabopn# fore#,.^®

M©«iswhll®,

that asrs® evening t&z Waleme, the British ootant^&rattaeked, but
the attack mmm promptly repulsed by th« German®,

On Kay 22, with more troops aontinuallj being la.nd#d a#
r'ftin.forcemeats, th@ Qmmmm Bagas their .slow advase# tow&rd
th.® towti of Ca-ae® and ee.arby Suda Bay*

fh© battl# was to

Iftst flv« day®, as th© B3?itigh, oonetantly b@ing ^'liari'aatcdi"
by th@

twaff«, sh®©k®i the Geiwi«.ii ««3¥'»noe at qtucIaI p©5,nts[»

The QermmnS' aaJ.® ge^^ral aora atteapta to r#lafor€#t
Quits by seftj but iu ewmrj stteiipt tli® Gtrsjan's boats w®.i*«

fo.ro«d to twii bao'k.

So »ei»l©ua loas®s w@r& suffered hj

tlw •(r0rmmm in th»»® latfeer teabora® oo?jvoys«
the nlglit of lay 81^ sevmpal b&ttaliens of tb@

Eowtwr,. oij
fani©.!*

dlvlsles w«i*© caugbt by tli® Britisb ss.iling out of t^aty-os
^%lies© w0T>e tb,9 flrat Oerstan plansbut then the h»«ivy
oono®nfcratioi3 of British wsrahips §®9mma to atu®@ th® eompj?©.El8« of the plmtis t®ffipo?srlly in tb@ hop«s th^t th© battle wo«ld
ba s&si®r atad tto® r«lnfor©lng by g@a would not hav® to b@ don«#
^%h«rshill olaiffi® that, **ab©ijt f&uT thousand m®n di»own®fi
that nightg** The Crra.nd Allt»nQ«, p, iS8« B^t Haider ststts
th#ae losses as biiog^'alsout
out of tha S,SOO m@ia in th®
eoHToy, HaW@r, Vol# VI, May 28, 1S41#
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h«ading around, th© PelopoTinesns Cpyasxajsablj to Selonika), fbe
lost 1,328 is«n and most of th« division's light Ri^d

As th® Gaman battl® for Cenea 60«titjici#i3, th# British
wer® sueo»asft2l in landing two battalions of r«Infore«!»«at»

o.n the south coast.

Karahlng overlend, th# toattalions

t.ft« pr»8aur« on ii«rakllon, German dsfcaehments, meanwhll#,
had i8olat®d ths Retlwo garriso» by cutting the road ©ast stid
W9Mt of tli« ai-pflald at roora Q«i»aaa

ox'©®««nts were

dropped ay air into tMa area.
Oil Maj 27, the GaOTana finally suso«ed#d la breaking
tb.i*ougli fcfaits Allied defetisea eovoring Can«a and by so doing
r'0cd«r«d Suda Bay uiit-atsaBla,

Th® Brltiah -now mad® th«lp

d»oi®ion to tfaoiiat© th® ©ntir® islasad aa soon as poaslbl®.
It wms- b.op«d, that this oouli all bit don« In otm aig'bt lii
©rdsi' to @jc©ap« the Ltiftwaff««

Tm JmpBrlml for<if,s in th#

Csin©a sjctft, ©onsisting of th« Aijgtrailaa aud tm l#w Zsalmnd
bplgad08 «.nd tb.« Brlti®fe laarln® and eesmrndo®, taking woat

of tlx«i.r hemvy ®qiilp®i«nt, withdraw acress tk# motmt&inM to
Sphakia th-at iaai® «irenlng.

Cm the ni^t-of Kay 28-12®, Britigh warships evaoiieted
th® H s raklion gerri«on but v^fif.f«i»®d severe damages to »Mp.a
8.nd troops by ttm tuftwsffe.

At th® ®a» tiai® th» evaeuatlon

fro® Sphakla ooKHttnced, with only on© ship damaged, mg th®
®%ald«r, ¥al. VI, May tg, 1941,
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Rojal Air For©® In Sgypt supported the operation,

fhe next

night, the British ships returning only to Sphakia, oompleted

the ©¥aouatlon, with the Luftwaffe sinking ® British cruiser
in the process,

'fti® British e^asuated about 16,000 troops

altogether.The isolated A^gtrallan and Greek garrisons
at Retimo, having received no orders to withdraw, eontinued
fighting until May 31, when they were finally overwhelmed.
The struggle for Crete was expensiv® for all involved*
Out of the approximately 610 trsBSport planes {Ju-52's) the
0®rffiani hed on all fronts,^® 530 were Involved in the inv&iion
©f Grete,

Out of this latter total **^60 oraeked up,* with

130 lifted as a total 1©®«.^® Fiirthenaore, at leaat SO of
the 100 glidert used were beyond repair,Th# number of
bombers, fighter, and r®oonnalss«noe eraft lost was also
very high sine# between ISO and 150 of the®® were either
shot down or crashed.®^ Aooordlng to a study of th® amrm^nr
^"^Yhe 0-ran.d Allifenee, p.» SOI,
®®Figur®d by adding th® losses (130) to the twelve
groups of 40 each remaining, Haider, ¥©1, ?I, June S, 1941,
lay 28, 1941 j Jtine 5, 1941,
^%bid,, May SS, 1941, ffotal losses were 170, ainus
130 Ju-52»s equals 50 gliders,
^%his figure is somewhat debatable, larl Bartm, iw&etik&
in the Air (London J Wlllifrai Klsiber, 1956), p. 88, inplie®
thft'l"""about 120 of these plmnes were lest, but he speaks in
terras of men, not machines, Qerman CmpAtm in, the Balkang.
p, 141, olaims that in all, SSoHpTanes were destroyed, bu€ fixes
the figure of those participating too high# Other so\irees fix
the total planes lost at about 300 ineluding transports and
gliders.

lossss on

th® eonclusion was p«aoh«d that th® Oar^atis

suff®r0Cl 6.,453 oasualtlesj

2,071 killed,, 2,,594 wounded, an4

1 , 7 8 8 ® i s » l n g (fflost p r c a u m a b l y d # a d froai d r o w s i n g ^ 1 »

study of th® losses on Cr«t® did act ooosldsr th© 1,.S28 a®n
of tba td P®ns®r division lost wbstj th«li* ship was sunk on
M»j ^1-08, Moat algnlfleant of all, howevtr, was the ®ff@ot

on the Fu«hr«r of the nearly 4,000 casualties suffered by
th® ©lit® 7th Alrborn® division*

He deelarad to (J©n©r«.l

Stwdtnt that *th® day of the parachute tr&epa Is
th«® ©ndlng for the duration of th® war &aj UM9tula®BM thst
this typ« of division Might r@nd@r#
fh« British losses 'wer® ©tou ®or@ s«v&r««

B@sld«s

losing the «trat®gle Island of Gr«t®, S,000 British 'gallurs
lest thflr llv#i, and nearly @,0©0 Brll4Mh dead w®r® oo«nt@d
on ^th® Islenil it@®lf*®^ fli« 0#Mens ala.o t©©k OT«r 1S,.000
British auifl Clr«®k prisonera im-lng th© Cr«t« eMpalgo#®®
Th® nvab®r of British ships s-unk or dmm&gmd by th© Luftwaff#
was dnorfflous#
i®stroy®r»,

Th® Koyal fiavy lost tlirse orulaart, six

three torp®do boats, five aotor torpedo boafes,

U » 3 » , D e p a r t m e n t o f A m t y , dcraiaiii GaaualtleSy Cr«t® 1941
(Waahlngtont 0*3* Go^smment Prlnt'lng'^^Sffle#, liS'S), p* 3*
'^British fflllltary historians s&em Inolined to accept th® high
est' Gsraan figures (6,453 m&n) as correct."
^%art, p. 160.
^•%art2i, p. 8^,Ifae Grand AHianos. p# 301.
^^Ibld. Barts's flgiares ar® muoh higher, ol&imlng th®
Germans took 14, 511 prisoners.
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two motor boata, and nineteen shore boiita^

Th© G^noan air

fores also ssveraly damaged an aircraft o.arrisr^ three
bgttlftshipi,. tbr®© cruis«rs, and eight d®stroy«rs,S€
l^»n though Rlsjost all of th® 6«r«an plan«« involved
In th« Gr«t« lOTSslon w®r® ©srffiarksd for tfe® ^UBulun. oampaign,
and their losaes ir®ra ©iioraious, the Fu»hr'»r Muat haw f#lt a
d«#p eatlsfaetion over th® plight of th® British, They wowld
not b® In ft position to teat hi# "soft undtrb^llj" for soiae
tin®, 8Rd, moreover^ th® Hwaianleo oil fi«lds w«r« now out
of th« ratigffl of mont British bo»b#ra.

Th« Puahrar was now

fr#0 to fulfill his ''last will and tsstaaent'* and to deprive
th© British of th®lr last hep® ott the eoatlntnt of Swop®*
Two daji after th® oonclusion of th® Gp®t« ©ampalgn (J«b« 1),
th« ^^ii®hr®r i®®u»d his final tlm«tabl®, for ths Q-®rt«a,n Invasion
of ^osgla»

Barbare8.8a would h«gin on Jun® gSj.*' as pr^-^lously

gch®d«i«4,®'^
Thmt th® groat Q^rmmn victory at Sr@t« alght la.t«r
beeom® a faetor In Hltl«r*g losing th« war must have se«s5®d
Inoradibl® to the world st the tlw«, but th®r® Is not a doubt,
without eonsidsrlng oth#r factors, that Hitl®r*s decision to
Invads Or#t@, eaussd a further poatpon@a!@«t in th® B®.rbaro8s&
Grand A1llanoa, p» 30S, Hate six oruia@rs} Bisrtt,
p, 86, lists"" «'igKtJjSurt"' ¥on fipp®isklreh, 0»8M<ifata Das Zweiten
W«ltkri«ffa (Bonn: kth@fia.im ?«rlag, 1956), p#'
a,dd« one
mor® or^«i»«r to th® British loas«», probably th®
wMoh
was reduced to a floating hulk.
Haider, Vol. ¥1, J-une 1, 1941,

tine s0h©dul««

lb# FiJil.terer had deoided to invad® Cr&t& on

April 25, and flva d»ys later 08tablish®d the Invaalori of
Hiiaslft for iun& 22-,

the 0«r®aa Oeasral Staff had allowed

foxar w«®k® for th® r@-deplo^®nt of divisions fros G-rease,
but tfmn after thd Puahrsi' had d®oid0d to lavad® Cr®t©, fi^«d,

Jun® 12 as th© probable dat® for th« coaaaenogffient of th«
Bussian invasion with full knowl«dg« that th® Cpate laveslon
was p®DdiBg and would osuse a
dlvialoiia from Gr®®o#.

In th® x*^--4%'ploynmnt of

flie O&rmmn (}&mre.l Staff wma wndowbt-

ablj un«3©i»esti»atiBg ths taking probltma that the Gf#%®
caapalgQ would ca«®@ and ths tim© rtqwlred by th# Luftwaffe
units to b® r®«fitt®d and r@»d®ploy®d for Bafbaroasft*

cmpfSR V
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Rrlor to th« Italian Invasion of Or««e®, two Q%rmm

strategls surv^sjs for m posslbl© Crerraaia Invasion of Russia
W0r® 0ompl®tsd#

One ®stl»&t®d that tl» CI«*»aaii8 oomM h.m»

mpproximatelj 147 divisions, including alii®t#sn- pmnmr and
twelve ®otori'Ss.®d, avallabl® for an invasion of Husslft lu th®
spring of 1941.^

fh© otiitr aurs5ia#d that th« 0@rBiiins ''«t'^fe#8t**

wottld, b# abla to provid# only 145 divisions for a Rwsai&n
o,p®ratiori during ths following spring.^
In D@Oi»»ib®rs 1941, »ooo after Hltltr had d@oided to

wag® war In (Jr®0o® as w®Xl aa liagsia, tlx© S«rffian CleB«ral
Staff adopted plans ©stabllshing 145 dlvisl©n», including
nlrt@t®«rj pmiz&r and fourteen, ssotorlssed, for tb,@ Invasion of
th® Sovi»t ttoion "toward th« ©nd of Maj, 1941.®®

Th»a# plans,

based on the id®» that 0r©ee© would be ©lirainated aa ® aiilit®ry
fa©tor and Yugoslavia as well as Bulgaria wouli Join tb»
frlpartit® ?aot, acaigned only two ©listing 0®rMaii amy
"Marsha Plan® ooapl«t©d on Aygust 5, 1940, U.S.,
D s partatiit of Army, Qg:ra.aB Qaapalga in Rygja . . . Planning and.

Oper«.tlong.t {1940*1911|'"Tta'aKte'^''t^8 Urnmsn't^ frintlag
Of^ i'ee ' l'^55 ) p','"'^l,''' ' B »r ®«ift #r eited as Qemftii Cm»pai ^n»
^Ibld.. pp. 14-15.
^Ibid.. p. 58.
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divisions and on« i»®glin«nt t© th« entlr® Balkan area during

th» pr©j«©t®a Russian In^Aglen#"*

Ths Qmrm&n G@n®i'al Staff h©ld te hit plari hmmd on 14s
division# l5»lag amilabl® for m Russiaa Invasion up to lareh 17
1941«

fh® Fw#hi'®r tli#n «i®cid»d t©

©ighfe division®,

preirioiislf allotted to Barbmpossm., and assign thea th® s«par«t®
rol®

driving tbm Bi'itlah frma

As previ»ualj awia-

tlom4., this d«©l»ion was nullifitd ©n Mareh 27, wh@n th@

Ftt«lir'©r decidad t© itt-^ad© yugoslavla and t® postpoR® Barbaressa
®up to fetir

¥w th® mxt tw®

plarmlQg anit did net toew

th« Barbaressa
how aaay divisions would

b» a-railabl© f.sr a war agaliaal;
th« Pu®hi*®r had

d«old«d that tlw

oo©upatlon of e.o®ltter®d lira®©® «r«i Yugftsla'«'i® would !)©• lai'galy
tim r#®po»Blbilltj of ©th@p»»

A« Uitlw

«xglalR®d to

MUi»«>liai

all h0 wanted t&r Qerrmnf was th@ protection cf supplj and
o®iwuriiofttloa routed to thm G©rMin air ba«®t fclMit would ba
«stabll«ii©d iR ar®#ee and p©#sibly Grm%%, th® saf©guarding ©f
th@ o©pp®F«pr&dueltig ar«a in northw®st Sartola, th® prlerltj
©f GaPMaiQ alilppiag ©a. th® Daattto#,. and tim tmstmr aeenomie
privil«g#s p»asfc#4 S®i*»«ay hf th® Xug®sla¥ govajpimatst* Iven
th# ©©©upatiott of Attiea and Salonika waa to b« pi»iMarily tli®
^Ttiis i» eb^iaitis frsa th« distfl^utien ehart from Pag
Haar,. ¥©1* II, p. ill, eawpl® with tbe Fw«hr«p»a daeislorj of
April 17, withdrawing" »a¥®ii diylaioas froa Bttlgarla, lbid«.
pp. 84-85 • and Q@rmtu Sampaigin In tha Balkan, p, 89•

diitf ef tb.«

a« first wi®w#4 by

i^lfcbough

ai'feiL vmXd h» li«otiQioAlly undor Joialt. oceupafelon,®
i©# tb® Q#rmmBi»plAi5w»^ ar^as ot iat«r»»fe ia tt»
Biftlkiiw &Mt%4 mt h% mmpimtk "by mlj t»® an4 mt-tblr'-d
iivisiofw*

iRg &t

fh«^«f6r«j. m kpril i5, Httliir &rMr%4 %im drmft-

«dcSitl#mi dtwlsioE® i;» b«

mmm fWff
llatfead

up mialy of

Iw pi«r« or ag®# g«©atts# ©f* %M
ari4 tt» ftvitilAteility

the 0«ptur#<i Mt#-

rial, %l»t« r»w (iivtstom. mmrm fc& b# «^til,pp#d
wtth. w«r beetf*

Ifc w«» fcfe®

fc© o«eiipf s«iPt5t« &e<S

dtviaioos

{}#t»«&R i©ii@ »t'

in

0r©sl-iiftf fwsr ©th«r dtvlsloiyi wmiM I?® isfd fc®
» In fell® mtkrnm^

#«paar« ©iieiipatlsu la tii« wsiit,. l-n

f.l^ ruMiislug ««¥#© aiirl»t©ss mmM hm «»««! %©
diwiMlmm fm

and
fM«

F«»i4lt«# la tl» mwmmn Q#»r*l S%aff ft^iipfctag %b» e©ft®»pfe ©f
a.t l««t IS« iifiaisw b«liig

fei* tl» Intatlftti of

Operafejoni»> p. IS.
g##.|*, V©1» II|, p» 66«

P«
FP* IS?-191.» flMi lftfct#r pag«8
imludm i Sl§ tribytlon ©h&rfc f©r mil tfe# Ci«r»&i3 divislcw «tri4
tlMir «»#igM®6Wfe# m Mm
XMltt Bm thm ®App«8diJK'* «!.«©•

^16

As already istat;»d, th® Puetoer withdrew his f««?c@s very
rapidly fro® Yugoslavia ®o thafe by tto© bogirming of May th©r«
w®i»e ©aly four dlvlslonfi C294th and 185d laf&ntry, 4tli Mounan<i Sro«s SeutelilaiaA SS), a f«w b®%feallons of bei'a«r
gumrdj, and part of fcl» 9th pani.®r left itj tiiat oounti^y^

All

feur of thes® dlYlsions as well as th® units ©f the !$tta f&nzmr
\

b© replaced by ttsm* w-fsak jseourlty divlilons C704fch.,

W0r»
I'Mth,

asid 718fch) &nd re^lntsgrat#^ irit© Barbferessa as

SOOQ a® tlie dlt'ifiions ®oh®dultd for occupation had co»pl®t®d
their erganlKafclou and b«»i© training#^ fh# l«tt®r was
»ei3»dttl@d t0 tak# place cli«»ing early J"ug«#
Whll® fcfee Or&tB Immslon was still In progr®#», Hltl®r
d«ai4ed to k@#p tho §|h MourifeaJa dlTlsi©s in Cr®t«, th« 6tti
dl¥i@iorj for the oeeupat-ion ef ,%th««a, t-lM 16#feli
IiRfant2?'y di^lsloa ia th® Aegean App©ii<i&g®» mn& Sml@Blk», fe»d
thm 124tb r@gl»®at in Sal©Btke»^®

WMltbmr of tli» »o«,ritmin

divisions mr the 124fcti r®giM«nt wat slated to t«k® p&wt in
Opsrafeloia Barbarsssa*

However fchla wa^ not %hs ©«s« with th®

164fch Iisfftfifery divlildn*

C©ns®qia®ntlj, feh® Barbarogga pl«n-

Biiig unit was forced to reduc# th« total dlvlslong e3t|>©«b®i
for th® Ilusslan ©peratlon t® 151,

Th# Ftt®hr@r als© d®oi^d

to det&eh on® armor«d battalion, om mot©reyel«-rif1# battalion

and on© rlfl® regiment fr©s» the 5th f&mer division Tor duty
^Ibid>, p, 86| Hald®r, Vol. VI, May 15, 1941*
lo
Haider, Vol. VI, May 28, 1941,

87

in Athenn for the tim# balng bsceiis© of th® **«fcpi©sph«p®^*

in the sit^ and the failure of th® Itallana to supply oooupation troops

Although tte Italian® goon

furRished

twelf# dlTisioEjs fop thS; ooGupatisa of Sreno®, *ith on® divi
sion available for the pgldpoiin«s# and another

Attica,.

tim Fu®hr«r retained all of these previously raentionsd troops

in
W.hilt Hitl#r was iasisfclng that th© dat« for th« In-srasion
of Mu&siA was aofc fux'thar tcs b# postpeoed, hj
tha

snd of May

still had the f©ll©wlng dirisloas ia aF«#0®

seb«iul«d t© fcRks part ia Barb&r©®®a| th# M aod 5th Pwasr
dlTisi#as, th« 46tli and
Adolph .Eitl®!' .SS«

Infantry difislona., arjcl th.®

la aiditisnj th« iaf&ntrf divltlons hm.&

t)«@n wtAkgrisd by tta,« dttaaimsiit of two laadiiua. iaHtlairci'aft
hatt&lions fer Crst®, whil® eaeh parjaer di^laloa had to
•QMitrihutm OR.® light aofciaircraffe bafetalioii fsi? tli®

csf th® l»land,^®

All fit® of th0«« divisioa# b«ga.n their- h

hfflitward journey during th© first s®T©n dajs of Ju!», But hy
this tim, it geafflid ebvioua t© th<© Geraah {Mtieral Staff thmt
noa® ©f fch «s«. divisions would b« r»sidy for th® launching ©f

Barbaroisft, It wa»

doubtful wh®th®r th® 9th faRser

division would h© ready fer th® Jum 22, invasion «v«n though

^^Xhid., Maj 88, 1941, md May $1, 1941.
^%bid,> May 29, 1941.
•, May 27, 1941. Apparently this included th®
9th f&nz»r Bk9 well as th© 2d and 5th.

1% l»<i.

Qmrmmnj sroiArid f4«f .m*

Tim M .P«nE®r

dtvl8l»r» m i%9 mrvivBl in a«r«Any wat proeptly

to

'fell® 0th .Pan-i®F in g#ctlag %%» 9qul^.erit tt>g»Umr
%im B€ mmm iaa*lfig lm% a g®## stotr# of Its sqiitp*
mM% fehreaite slnktug, «r?d th# 5tte fmamr-f trnvisg l®ft
0®s^©mi»l-s iR M-timm, w«r# rm4umA ts littl# fclia»

wfe»n %t» ifmmim ©f Suasl*

-m Mm 82, ttw

ist di¥l®tsii» ba^J !##» m4tm*4 tft lit
S«rsim iSi¥tsi«i®

IN

lotlading

91M, tf tfes

4ivi.fi©i}# *#f« #%ili

th©

Ms-t4n.g

Ayayj ami alfeiiougb

%bm-f W9m l« fcbt MmiQh. m% th# feia«,| %imf mmtd n«t b® avail*
&hlm

aattl
imt^Sm4 %tm -iStfa.,

4|,

?!»•§«

X8M, a»4 ®94lili Xafaotrf

fttti %li# ii saci itii rinim«.F ilivislo-w#

©fci*r

iiflilto# tifit mmfMbM tm* %im MmBslmm Immim &l%hmgh
w#f« tis# lOitli, aad llifefci
Iiifa.a%rf fchwRft

w«r« i» tis# l!@iob

•irail.abl# ft# BaFfe«rw#« r»»#rir#s until

we&l<l get b#
S§th

iifi»i©n l>o« Iti# mmt mhMh wm%& r#e«it# mmrrm
»%mtm is BsFlj«F®ifaa m iwm tf #.fch# I.6M

2.8» mi.
^S«#
fe'l* ?I, I'ttn# ii, IMi,
liafes lil
mmllftbl# fi»r B»1»iu»os»a la this »iiin®rf
108
divitlo'im, 19 paaiE#!*, 14
(mtmg thmw
4 ml I mwmlwf, m4 B sp9&iml AhtiMivtm, obfiensly tm
&mot»

tlMt Bi And ©th p«oi5«i* in tl» feafcsl,

-Win#I, mxp iiiiumB oormMprnti.

1 do i^®t»

Othsf-

m

preparing to .sail from Forway to FI.Yilandj smd tb-« 9Sd 9rid
Seoth Iwfantrf divisions from the west that would be avallabl® as reseyfas fdr t.h» Husslari front e'l •Tul'j- 4.^®

Gsrtalftly

Hitler's iuelslow to iiw»d« Crete^ which. w,?5ii©ttbt--5Clly 6.5.9Tup%mA
tlie sitxiaiinn pei*.f«riaati0^ trans porta fcien scheclula for
1n
emmnoing on May 2:3,'*'' played & part In wot hating thes®

lgtt«r d'tviBlom avallsbl® Just as it did with tlm six. lat®
arrlTlrig diTltieat fpoa. the E^slkaftf,
Other dlTiBlons trmi th# Balkans fe&<3 a vm'j clifficulfe
time stefeicg tb® tfiiae gS Aefidlln#»

Wm im%@.nc« th^

HitlftP lis sotprist-i almosfc ev^r^ody by twlvlng or tia®,, but
s0s« of itt equipment mm Icift bthltid' in tlw proces#,^®
60th

fbt

also EiSic!« It, utow thengli tfee division mm

badly a-plit up bir fiferly

fh# ©tb

Jcln Si'mld tfo-fi- Kl#ist*8 paiiaer groups ©u. Jiirw
was in fit#d c.f pe.etr

Sont divlfloft# frctm the

wss

to

bat; pp©l>a'bly
alae barelj

mtiAe the c!«adllHt,, meh aa th© Sid Infantrj dlFislon whtcli
g##y. f0l» ii, pp« 18?.191.

f0l» VXj. lay IS, 1,S4X, nofcei ths datit#
^%ot® Hftldtp's coamenti oq this dl^taion m Jans 20,

1041, an4 Jmm 21, 1942..
april

Salddr's c&Basentis ooneerning this division on
1941.
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arrived with ita artllXery and trains on June 21, Just cm®
day bsfor® th® Russian imra.$ l oa was to comm&me
Thm, th« Balkan invasions tout mor® specifically th®
0#r»an inv&sio-n of Gr^t# serieusly hsropsrtd th® Gsraan plans
f©2» Barbarossa, Som® CJ®r»aii dlviaions war© tir^d out froM
trying

tmmt th« deadline of Jun© 22, while other oould wot

m&k® it at all, Sv@n th® drafting of fifteen additional divi
sions did not alt®r the fact that th® 0®riaaM had less divisioiMi
availftbl® for the launohlng of B«rbaro®®a than any of the
pr«viouslj e0risid®r«d m* Adopted plans had «afeialpat®d-.

Mar®*'

8ir@r,, this availabl® &&z*m&n manpower c©uM hsv® b®®!i esll®d
into M&rviG0 without th® Gsnaara» ®v«r ha.¥ing eonduefced &
lalicao oaspaiga. So w@ad@r Haider w»a a littl© dubiftus wh@G
th# Fu#hr®r was insistirjg that Barbaros'sa was n0t t-o b#
further p0Stp0R«d.^^
^%ald«r.| ¥ol. ¥1^ Jun« 12, 1941, not®# th® «xp®et©d
arrival of this division.
^%his dubi©usr3®®» is r«fl«eted iri mmnj of th# sareastlc
&mm®nts hj Hald®r during th® month of Jun«, 1941, right up
t® th« tiMi ©f the invasion.

GMP^PEH VI

fm mimjs ommian on mst^ machiiss
AID iQOiwiT 0311) II mnmnmm

1fi13cts of

It Already lifts h&mn «stablishea that in ttrms of aien,
m&chlmB, sad
oa B«3*b»i»oss&.

th# Balkan oampaigQ bad sora« 9ff®ot
But wm this

oraotal, or ptphaps

on any phasa of tht© German cMpalga^ In lussiat

In

tmvmB -of a#n parti©ipatitsg and oas^alti#® gtiff«r®d In both
«50:fflp«igaa, it would appaar that tlis itiflu#®®® was ilight#
.tsia tban om <|narta2f of t. mllltoo Qermaas p«^tiaipst«d in
tfe« BtlMmu ®a»paig®,^ wMl®. S,,0§0,000 t.roops- of tlie l#iQh
WBTm dirsstlf or soon to

dl^aotly. InTolfad in- tb®

0trisaa iB^asioa of Ryisla. on jrun® St#. 1S41*
appi*©xi«t# li-|,.OO0'

tk®

hj tb® S#ym.ans la th®

Balkaai^ hardly ooiapar®® with, fh® 50,.5.lil §#i*!Bau. aatualti®®
b®• Ba.llc»u 6a®|>«lgn imrm m&&ning feh® In^vAMitm of
Yiigo«l«Tiit|,
ai3:i Cr«t®»
%lgw®s fmsm the t-abl©i in .Ws-&w,. Vol. I*
71
and 7i,» fb® total r®ao.b®a n®s3?lj
bwt
total
dii net Ijielud® th« l^uftwaffe units,, •ngln««ri»g battalions,
ani oth»r ®®all®r units* , ffema nf estimftt®#
^iSSSS £SESMS»
%sti®at@ iiiolu(a-«s th@ l,Bi8 men of tb® 2§ jpauaer lost
b«eaus« of to-rpaioing#
91
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r©0ori«d by Haia«r for th® first fifteen, days of tli® lussian
warg^ or th& 8ii,40S eatualtles Eseumulfttsd by the 0«.r®ans iB
Rusaia durliag 1941#®

Wsn uted an^ lost, how®v@i», esa only

b® OS# area of oomparlsen bttweaa tfe® tw© ogaapalga#*
fb© &®rmaRs iissd ® i x p m n m r ilvlslout tod a total of
owmr too fcaak# lis tb® Belkan ©ftmpaign.,^

411 of th®«« tanks

at OT}® tls®, «jxpaot®d to partiolpatd In th® lultial
attack on th@ 3oirl®t IMl&n,

B«e»us« of ttm Balkan oawpalgn

two of tiMSs |>®as®r dlvislon.g wlih aa

SOO tassk#

w®i?s not UTailabl® for tli# lauaQbljig ©f Barbafossa*

df %tm

foijT diiriilont that w®ro a-rall®^!®, only th^ 9tb ?sris«r was
hsj?a-pr@ss$d in ®@@tlBg til® imm M
a,a«.#rtloi38 to tla® ©ontrary^® all

fon XX«l®t*s
lfsdl@at@s tbat tb©

Qtlmr thre® puBwr aivislem Catk. llth. aad 14tfe5 «g«i i»
til® Balkan •0«wpaigii w@r@ eo®pl@t@ly rtfittei bj »ld-lay 1041,
%!ald@r. Vol* fX, July 6, lt41.
®iy4»# Jaouary 5, lt4t, (Beta, m of l?®@«bey SI.)
figured frow tables in P«® Btear, ?ol«. XI, pp» 106-108.
©matiiig tb# taisk® ullottell
and ©tfetrt, tfe@
total eotild !i®t« b®#i3 more than 1,000 tanks#
®Il®lst told B. «. tlMmll ifert tb&tt
bulk of th®
tanks . • •
overhaul, wMl#
crews aeedsd a r«st.
A larg® tim&er of thia had drlvefi as far south as tb®
P®lopoai3«jsa4*' f» 169#
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filfchough fch© TS'ear and tear on tto rough Balkan reads rdght
have ©©ne^viablj l®ft a few af
Sem® earlier Qerman plans ant-ielpmtsd .hmvitjg as m.nj
as 4,200 t&aka avellnlsle for Bai'b&rosna- in. th.® sprlrig ©f X043.,.
but

needs In I«r«th Afrlea w«r© not a«#»®sfca « part

of this fcot&l#, Plas# finally adopted by th# aerman
Staff «xp©ct«i oal^ tetw#©n S.,600 and 5^,800 tanks fco take part;
in th» opening st&gt® of th® G&smn'^Bm&lmn eooflie

fh#

nmih^r mtmtlf afallabl® ©ii Jmn# Si.^. 1941, wa® far feelew the

m%tamtQM m Indio-afctd la Ti.fel« 1#
»B£8 I®
raMmm m "smm

OM jgsi gt^. i®4.i

Mmrk III

Mmx*k If fmtmX

Mmrk I

Mmrk M

180

itsm

960.

669

5,m2

Totalf S®!**!! Armj
( M m m,.. i m i )
l,m4

l»fll

1^440

847

5,see

•#©t;air Bwiarosaa
( M m 2^0 i m i )

S5i£»3:X.# p» 106» ffcds ©orr^»psii4»
mrmn
GmammisMM. wSsH gives %h& feofeal rtii3ife«r ms i|,»SO». ©»<i®rfaPa
y&ag®!*, p*. liO.-lSl SMJ& feh#r# wef# als©mt
^IHSrs" ©laija fclMr# wor® ©Rly i,.4.34 fi*SBti life# t&Qk®»- fM»
a wild 'h» siioe# pattser
w«i»« wltfeidr&wis fro® th®
paHE»r uftlt# a« r®plae«i®'nt«,
f#l ¥1,.. April 26, 1941*. fh® Imt pammv divlsl0Bs
&x*riw9 in tfes iepl©y»i©nfc
b#sidt||, tb® Sth,- mm
th@ I7m &n4 IStli pa.ns@r <llifl«ioag whi^b mrriw^^ in Wariaw on
Jum 13* U»S* p€p&rtmnt pf AFtty,, 0«r»&a Pytpyftlltin fer
the Attasfe-agaiiiefe Rmgfil®,. CWa®hln#i¥i
»»w^K®5niP^iritIHg cSTTEe'# jSS1T7
oit;«d a« d^Fitaia yrapayatlgng•
10
Qermta c&atpalgn, p. 41,
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Til# »»jw

fftr thl«

©ta Jttn® M2

wm un&mh%mh%t %hm fcwn Mli«ifig paofc«^ diviaion# fr«Mi tl»
Baikasw#

Ifc aiglsfe b# prsisuM^

mmt0M mm
w#®'te

rmpM im a§«-t
Bm»ijm

t0 imm Um

of tli«

p&mmp

first tow®

t*mt It ©Igfet !»•« bma

i'tt-fltt©?! ninS th® en«f» m-m&mhlj mil*

a %im wlwi»

mstm€

simm %im

%ft&ks

wm «»B«»Rfetiis

mlj ©igbfef

ftiis- i# m tmu%%j

ftn

pm.ns@j»
larsi»s «ui

«%« tf fete fjpip^t
,f»©%itlll8 ®f tli# Gmpmthimu Hmai® »&t wrf

slr®of r«sl»%a»^«« i*#a wm ElsJst
.aufflelaitfc mrmm-

htm trnkj-^

sit Mtieii. »r M* ^wmm Ifftug
tumbl® fe@

%imt l» Im^l iu»

fla»# m w«® impm4 %m ^m*pr©*®^^ hli

«M wm

%''m fittlek ssiQlpel«»ofc. &f iiupg# he^imB ©f
frsi'fc.li Mtfm imctmg tlam isaaauiaB

Ittt#,!®.©

m-mpm€ t# fight agmia^
ftiii Ite §«.i?,wi» plmat t® itslFtf. thm. WmBlm mmy «:#»t sf tfe®
Ooi«p«^

®.

«©r#©Tifi?,. fel» gulkan ©a^aifS

ttm iMtib*!" ^

tas^ fttoilaibl# ob %hm Umsimn trmt ia assttor mmf» Wmi^

tb#

imW ef Jai»f

all

lt#ieh w«a »p#Bt m r®-l'itiirjg %h» two
^hirnimr^

TI,

it

i«all pretoiiti#n ef tb®
dlviatsiM C*rhi©ia
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m
wa® Hitler doing with tiw rest of his tanks?

M&nj were

belRg sent t» M»th Afrlea for th® er«atlon of th® Blat
di¥i®i0n#^®
Out of the #stiMat®d 600,000 MDt©r
fitbl# f©i» Barbar®s^«, about 75^000 w«re ut®d in the Balknn
caffipaigai-^*^

Th» w«ar and tear on w«ny of th®»» -vehicles was

probably tr@»®nd©m®»

It is difficult t© aay 'Wiia.t th@ Q«.rmn

losses wer# in motor vehicles, but Ea.l<3@r not#d ft d®fieit for
Barbarossft of 1,430 trtioks- and 1^256 aute«oljil«it- oh lay 8, 1941,
At leaifc SOO trueks and 400 aulJoael3il®« were ottntributtd
toward th# reduetioii of tli« d®fi©it ©at ®f tlm Or««k Aij4
Ml^v booty.Settcitlng th® Adelph Elfel@3? SS, ©ttly tt^r®# a®tor*
Imd divisions pa.rtleipafc®.d in th® osmpalga, fh.# 16tb l-ettrlE©i asi t-b® Ad0lph Hlt-l©r SS wsr# pXa««d its rsssrf© for van
llftist'a ptn».®r s.rmj arii »m a©tioH withlis fch-t first days ©f
111# ©ftMpaigQ#

fb® 60tii M®t0rig«<i^ a.pp&r#RtlL|' b©e«ua« ©f it®

w®ak0a®i #ondlti#n^. was h«ld in rmmrr® "by th® G^rmn High
C®«iaRd»3>9 After

battalion® had b#«ii 4«tA©h®d and

ssnt t© th» pai5x«r arwi®® as r»pl«o#ifi®ntffi, the remala^#!* ijf
dlvisi©« forwd ©ut ef th@ 5th Light dl's^ision eaffle
ittto exi«t0ftc® around the ©arly part ©f Jttly., 1941. Bas I!«®r«
V©1. II, p. m.
'
^^S22EE S£5E£l£fi» P*

17Compiled fr©ffl. th© tabl® in D&ji H®»r. V©1. I, p. 7S.
^%ald«r. Vol, ¥1, May 8^ 1941.
^®2SS.

V»3.. II, p. 190.
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tb« l a t t e r dltriaion ^nlmd tlat Sixth Army mnd X&t&p concluded

Itt war at Stalingrad,
4Itfaowgli th& aa.r®an l©®.s#s of alycraft' wer« '*!'#»* la
at l&mt 100 plmms oi all typm

Tiigsalafia, th# CJerama®

during tha Qerwmn Itwmlm of Qrmm,, &nA Amtimr ISi^lSO
bo»b®rs, figbters atjd reconn&lis&a©® es*aft-, plu« at l««sfc ISO
ti»aMport plaR®s .In Cr®t»« .Alffl©8t all ef th®«« pl«ta®s,
#X0@pt. fchc^» operating Tr&m Sieily and
ma^rktd f©r tbm Eoasiaa sampalgrs#

Afrlea, wmrm #ap«-

C@y6ainl3r fch« plan«# lost

in tia® Balkans w«r# i»tri»0Rtftl Im
afailabl# fsr

nw®b#p

JMriug tb® ®arly istages of plan-

niag f» fell# Sussiaa irjmslorii- aai .after th® @©Gtld®r*tioEi of •.
th® l©si#« t© til© liiiftwmff# la %lm b^kfsl® et

tii«

Q-«rs«ag »gt-i2imt-ed tfea.t tlasy wsiild hftT® ^wymhm^m fTtm t^*?0-0
t© -S^iOO alror&ft partlaip&tlng 1ft tb«' iasltlal it»s«ult tm
So
Ittitia#
ffc» Osraan® oia Jaa#
w&m far fe®lew thts't

®8tlM»t®s as fablt. II p* 97^. Indieat#®*
Ev«& ttose- flgiii»#s ar» tomWofet d©ei»l¥lEig^. for though
Fttehr®y wanted as tmnj pla.m& is th® &lw m pmBlhXn ©a
Mnm 22, aaaf ef Bi0hthof«a»§ and to®br*# flgbtors atwl ba«to®rs
w#ro still in til# prmmu of being

%nd tr»nsf«rr»<a

to their respective air groups wh.®n the inir&sleh b»g«n*
^%®r«aa Sami^al^n.^ PP«

«-Dd W^IS#
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Several OerBao authors, awong them Tlpplesklreh and Baumbaeh,
maintain that enly R,300 ei»bat plaia«® wers used against
Busaia m -Mm
mBIM II®

OTlBll OF AIBCMFT

OM mm 22, 1041

PlaTOt

Unit
T©tal

Fighfe®r
k mv@

a,380 1,160

Total

S®s©a. Tram*'
p©rt

?20

120

mo^

•Stuth, 4tli A.,F«

600

360

210

SO

untoowia

<3®Rt®r, 2d k,F,

910

490

mo

30

unkn&vn

Icirfch, l»fc A»F.

430

g?0

110

50

iipkrsown

60

40

10

10

ualcQdwn

Plni&fid, Sfclj A*f*
^2t£Sfi

p. 41»
¥©1, ¥1, JttU® 5, 1941.

piM»lag fcb® tarly stages of tti« war with Russia, feh® laek
©f G«r®&a plaa®® dii mt smm tts hav® an

Owr 800
g#
Russian aircraft w«r® destroyed th« first day of th© war,
and aluost everywher# along th© darmri-^lussian frtrat tl^
^^fippleskirsh,, p» 203| W«f»Ei@r Bauabash, ^gpat« ^
{MnniQht
ftlmm, 1049)
175, Haraafter eit«d m gu Spate*
^%aldar, ¥ol. VI, Jun® 22, 1941.

99

superlfMP skill of th^lr alraan and tlwlr b«tt®r &irurmf%
%.ti® i«ra«i» t® gala air luperi^pifey#
fetot a«»*nii d»sfer»3'«^ t&n
first tws giii

S,ODO aireraffe d;urlsg %hm

sontlit 6t th«r

wm tt®tiag tlmt %im

But, ttoiigh

bj ^ulj If, al.4#r

bad r#sis.lf*«d air superiority its

v©B l)##fe*s n»rUi«rEi a«et02», aiid irea El®i#fc *&» lafe^r t© ce«»nt
fcbmi liia taiilc® Imk*^ proprnx' air etwjp#®"* Ttm Qermm
f^uadrerm mmm «» 0¥®:i»«&rk»d by S@pt#^b«r that *iiy of th®
figliter pil®%e 1*4 4@ bt -wltMrawn ari4 gl»R & short r#stj|
tfeettgli thmrm wsi-t no fc^iiperftry r&plm^mnts
fl» Belkao ®ftap%lgo ©maasfe ti®

hlmm4 for %hm.

©f Umx-m&n mirm&tt la S«aai«g tewewr*
iia,i ©f«i»

pl«»s «t

bsgiaslog of %li» imsiaii

«i» Oflly s iitiii# owr oBt lialf ©f
mm&%mk opsrafcliSB#^®

UuMBlmm

fli® toffewmff#

Jilsa %t!» %mB

w«r« itS®lgri©4 t© %b^
air fto fcht

smwm.%. Btmgm is tl» §#ra«ii siwaa©# *«# nos. dum

B& mmnkfc# tti® Imk »f sireraf fe bat m# «tb#r« mmM hjfclas

Osnaan 9kif tm>m ©p^r&felag frw hmmfc©# far in t.^ rtar.^^
f.h® fe®

tlumgh^ feMt fehs 0®rj»n» »©iili hmir«

bad ii©2^ pl«o«e la Hteiain It timrm

CQl«ii©i^» tllms

«•#% b««ii a

eaupalgfi.

Ffei! fir@iI7TWSJ7p7#»f^

pp..
SSjuiiier
«a4 Br©%fe®rt,

a«.i^gt 4ir f,yg® C»«w Ifwki li«ri>»r
p, tiff llsptS, p» 1?6»

pt i"^.
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Duriijg th© wlnt#p or 1041., tli« Q^rvmrn
#\3pf>Xy mscif of th® mw*

fci»«ia»p-@rt plftOs^s
haf«#.**

on tlie

flss$»@- i# m isubfe that la tmnf cas#s 6}]^.

mmm iMi#ci»a€fe#

%tm t»M%. aad ^rasa llir#* mm %mt

ef

yi»a is

li&fcttlt ef stfiiXiasp*aig tl^

p|jk»# Imt m% Sr®t« more miss^i, p»rb«p»
fmitm'* Sixth

h-j vm

4ft«r %im rixig iiai btao oloaed ».TmrA

%bi Sist'ti kmf *Bir'

Imtu^ing

fmnlmg

%o

hm »'<appl:l%4 iwm tbs atr* '®sixfeii krmj mill. b« ia pmtttpn at

All fm fftpi# h&f# t® d# 1« aap'p'li- Ifc
faiiltis* SM.#r »f Staff, Hftjer S«i»r«l

.Setelit,

wlyg-a mm.ml MrMh rm
tfeat %lm Sixfe'tt Ar»^

« br®»l£«tit«.

«s$ag fttt^r

ffc.# r«pr».«®«3tstl»

s«ra«R» wam ij#t **i-ti

a potltlnii t© pr#du©« eauliin®® mat ®f s
tb« Mlai««

SSO tern af

mww tht

li dfelly,, rm^MlPlue. *M

fi» #«n*ns wr®

ttoMn tigfefcf

t@

©r fclit $ix-%h kxmf mn

ImA t©

MM

Iti

at aaf ^B^m

wt®tbsi» prtir#tit#i mmay ef tt»

«l3l» fe©
!»«fllgbt®#

(mm Ymkr^m^t^mTWrnTT^lTlTm*
P*

p»
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Tb@ r®at Is history, Th® Sixth Arwy held mxt mlj until
tbi» ©ad of Jsriuary^ and from that point »n, feh® &®rmana
W9r« fighting ®ainl.;j a fief^naive war In Rxiisla.#
X30

W®ul4 th#

lost fit CFata hav® mad# amy dlff®r@ne®f

It i®

<llffioult to say, but th®j«« i« a elianc® that t i m j might imv®#
Th»

of ths lata arrival and nona.'^ttilabilltf of

t-h« Irtfantry dlrisiotsji on Bartoar&sta is saasewhafc dlffieult
t©

But th#r# can b@

d©ubt that th®y t#nd©d t©

disrupt tli® aeywftn tmnspo-rtatlon soh«i3ul«,, aad its oa^
inataoa# at; least a n©tta,imllabl« itvlstDn wm
Russia^ op®i^fttlon»

in th®

Wliett Field Marshal Walter v#a leichsnau

ars-d (J®aepa.l E&i'l-H&lnrieh. vm St««lpnag®I w®r« u#ing th^lr
9.rmlm t& protect the fXaak® of von ll©ist»» tlira.tti^ th«

gSth lafanfcrj diis^itloti was ciulcklf aetimtfed int© larbarossa
on 3^m 27, aad 8#r3t to the «#efcor fr®ai

In a

80RS®, however, th® iiftsi&tii- ih Cl®riaii«j m^x-m in rm»&rm and
c©ttXd fcg o»s»iitfc©d fc© tli« fray wliea

b,\i% bf h&uling

divisions mer long distaRs^a th« aeti¥®ly @«gag©a
&F'ial#s w«r« dspriwd ©f tran®pm''t«tlo?'i thitfc c^uld have hmmn
as®d oth«i*wliB® fer th® ©wrjlng of ©uppllea,
WhiXw it cmiacot b© QonoluBlv^ly prsired that th» Balkan
(jampaign and its «rf»cfc mi imrXg aa«hln©»# and equipmsnt
assigned t© BaFbarimsa saujiiid th® iltfeat af Hitler in Russia,
it aust h® ceneluded tlmt it h#lp#(3, Tru®., th© number of
Placed together frmn Pag H#®r. p. I88j Clark, p. 53|
and Hart, p» 177,
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Germans participating and oasualtle® suffered w©r« not Iftpg®
when eompared to the German-Russian campaign, but the Qerwiin
0®«ftlta«nit of maohines «nd ®<iulpm«afc in the Balkans e©nstltut®fi
a siEftbl® p«ro«nfcstge of the forces ®®sigr3.«d to
lot only did theae force-s have to be mo¥6d out of the Balkans
aad be r®fltt«d fas' th« Russian eaaipslgri but in s«e oases
w©r® missing entirely freaa th» Huasian ©peration,
.Freffl all indieation#, ia©#t of th® l0ss®a in th® Balkans
©f ma0h.in®® and
fh® tm aix#d tank

w@i»©

raplae®^ for Barbaross^.

»®tst to th® omtern fr©nt eaa®

slaosfc ©xelusivelf fro®

as did th® tanks of tb#

HmaniftR and HMng«.rian «r«or»d divisions appearlag ©r the
B&Btmpn frant i'n 1041 and 1948.

Ttai®, t.h« British did oreat© a s@eond front in tb@
Balkans «v®n b®f©r@ th» Qmrm&n Immlon of Ruiisla... And
tbeugti ehMrehill bss te#®n orltlolsed tm «©ndlftg tmmm -n^t
.allowed H©HW®1 t© ovsrrun aiueh of lorth Afriea, hi® dmt&lm
h«® t© b« eonaidtrad m a Cmt&r in aming
I
pesaibl® Amfmt,

from a

CMPTBH TIZ
fWBiBiM.

OF mrbarcssa nm fo IIATHIR

Ths ar®a of 0$L»t«rn Pol&nl and adjololag t®rrltwl#8 in
w#st«rn Sttssla i®

«p mainly of woodlaad and meadows wi^h

©ceasioaal l©«r»i'©illng hills leldM ®xc«@cliag two httWrfafed
tmt in height. Small armrnks and streams f@«d tb# tributaries

wiiich graduallj d.©i©®nd t© fera tfa® larger vtwm^ syst:#®®. ®f
thM area, sueh at feh,® Vistula, fcl-i® li«»®a, and Dol®p«3r»«
tb» spring of ®«Gfe j®&r, tla® ©otljp#

During

a.r«« 1m offc^a inua-

dati@4 and filled with wid®spr®ad traets of »mh, ©speoiall^r
i» th® 3r@gton» tuppljiag teb® larger 2*lv®r« fl®wlftg .riopth, ®ueh
as i;h@ tributaries of lib# fiatula, tb# Il«rman^ aoi th« Bvifta,
1® cmttsei hf tii© unmtlfeed

Til# flooding in th® upper

i®e usually pj>«val#nt in th» wmln riT0,r fftrtfadr mx*th, m w#ll
as t-hs p&pi<i thawing of t.h# saw int#r8p®rs0€ with, th® annual
heavy spring i*.alnia»i fh« ?i#tul&, f®r instam®^ in the vieinity
»f its tritoufeary, fcb® Bug, h»s hmn ktsownt too spr»«d its wattrs
^©r a ^eBdrlptlm of tb® 9^®& »®®i W, 0* i:«adr«w,
Climftte 0f th® gontitiftntt (Ossf&rAt aiaraQfi#!! frmu, 1963),.
p»
EneTo'lfekt^Ia Bjpl¥».aiaiea.« ith ©d., ¥©1 XIX, p, 30*?.
lOS
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m fur m mm

fltty mll^g #«efc mnd

thrn

Under #h«»#

ti» Vlstttla «tr« oftftu

t# «ilslln|^ish fi»« tim hs&dw&tmm of tim
.Dttrlog « amriml

m cimnt# of ooaslttl©B mmttj

tan#® pl»e« t»f til# wm&M a®* fcblrd w#«k In K«f»
r&la« mmm mM tl»

flu® tmmj

»uj0fs « pl®«®»rifc

T-mmim m&t% wsS

h%3.% by

iscr®

tb® ®gre«»<i ii»- iiirmllfl drj

Th» g^mmA

will

whi©l«» &t all

typ#«
Ife «.«'a,
m»mkl

tbm.fc «¥#a
%lm wmh^m weoli' imwm

0:i^^!is# lit# ttsw®l®.is, .©.f 8«fsf4i «s
Jtr« «ll

a#

»«s tiot a

wis© wtnlfi ©^»ai

hirt pr««»«4 I0

li, tMl»

fii«3P«

l#iRS

pati«®-i* m:wi»%mm in tl»

Rii.i&«i4fi iwmtimai, ^%».im4 tim% *%!» tprlag #f l.$4i
w#t,. sni w#ll. into
wi»« tt fl'004

But

#J6®«!p»

th# Bug «R.i lt«
vl#ir .|« tiipp»^4 fef

mmiml BlmmntPlt%0. wea

Obl#f ef Staffs mh&

fcMt.,, ^1941 W2t#, mu 0Mmp%imail ^m*m^ lM%9 io May,
^agy(ilesa«4i«.
%«iillp®w,, f« Si|
1# ob%«ii»d fre» til®-

Sfcb.

ZMg p» ^7#

Fr«(p<triktl0««,, p# S. Ti^soutr«»«

pm Mi* H# add®, ttml li®, »•§ la ft potitisn to
p®rs©Qaily eb##i»w fc|j« w«t memttmr €ttti*lii:g hi# in#p@ot.loai feotirt
ia P&l»n4,
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"hug# floeda covered th®

and '*af; tha bsglrining of

Juno J th® Bug « » .:• was overflowing its banks 4**®

T\m esmmn^er

of %hm Luftwaffe in Feland, Albr«@b.t K«s0«lring^ O0fflpl«in#<j
that th«

rala duriag th# latter part of May mm slewing

ceriatruefcioQ ©f his cl»pX»yffi®nt base whieh. "^oouXd laofc b@
oeaplatad to@for« th# btgionlng of Jans*®®
Furfcli«r pr©iif ©f abRomal weather condifelona. Is supplied
hj %h® pr0oipitati&ti tables reeord^d in ss"¥©r«.l oitlea of th®
la«etila|;e Invaaiors area antl its p«rl®®ti«r«

ia?'fiftlo-a, Pol&nd,

fer iB*l;an0d,j .aot#i|. aoye pr-delpitafciori during Aprils 1941^, thfto
ws« rtdorfi#^ hy fell# oity for aa^ ctwparabl® April through 1950•
&yijlom als© messttr#4 more preelpitatioc dariog
fhan ftfiy ©%h©r Mmi- noath. tlir-etigii

Witmj,,.

abaeraai pr'eelBife«ti»B clurlag April and

trhll®

194%,
alls©
1S}41|®

IF«S*S*l.p alfcheiigh owfcilds of th® initial iwaalan

ar«a> elaiii@d, mop® pr«olpltatl©n -diu-iag

1941,, th»e aay

eo»parabla M&j Hi-tttth siae« 1938

^^Blumentritt, p#
6
A3.br»6lit fetstlriftg^ SstaeXrlrig. k. SoMl#r »s Bteord
(lew l»pks William Morrew &Dil''''l3'®r7'W§4T,']p.
%*S., I>®parfea®at of S^s®ro®^ Weather Bur«au^ World
w#ftfcli«r Rt®erda 1941-1.05O (Waehirjgton}
0©vernKft'nt;"'''l'r'iating
T 8 1 W J 7 " ' S « r e t t f t « r c i t e d m WarX^i Weathor R»eords»
^Itoid.. p.. 7SS.
^ItsId., p. 7i5.
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Th© fact that much of th© rain f«ll In th« latter part
of Ma-y in the area uM@r diecusslon Is agftio supported by
Kesi®1.i'lng< Tbs I^uftwaffe coamandar r®turned to his dftplofm@nt "b&s© on May SO#; I!« spok® of the h«a.irf "torrsntlaX mlns**
both prior to aad after the <i&t® of his arrivalftmt fchia
wa» pi»ob6bly th® case oan be subs tafttlsted fus^ther by a Q®2»main
report of ald-Jmn#!. 1941, whleh atated that '*d#pr®ssioni» in
th« ground aod guXtimw. w®r® partially muddy and awampj
iapa#fmbl« for m&tm irehlelas#

low plalRs near the Bug

riftr w#F« partlallf omer-ed with lerg® marsh®®

This Is

aoimter to tii® normal «x,p0ofcatioiis of the area for that dat«»
f#lmt aotual d®l«j would haTe b€®R oau®®^ hj the w»ath®r
if fcfe#r@ had btea m Balkan iRfasi©^ 1® diff leult ^ tip
lleitsa audeariftn doubted •hether HitlerBalkan ImmSm
Bft;rba:r©s®a,. "a.® »u@h m aix
of tl»

if at all*.**^®

Q«n®ral Buttle,

that th® int&aioa of Rmw%& wrmXa

h&m b«#B ispes-sibl® bafor# inid-^UQ®^ 1941.^^ And Hald«r ola|.a©€
that

weather eoadltloni w@r® not a«lt«bl® before th« tlm#
^^®®s»elrlng,, p* 95.
^%«rffliati preparation#, p» 3*

Q* ?'«ller, A Military liiaterj of the f/eatera
Werld, ?® i I I I , - C M e w Y o r k T F u i S : a? W a g n a l l a 5 © , 7 ^ 9 5 6 ) p 4 i O *
•^^Frelherr von Buttlar,'Ehrtisbuek d#r Deutsche^ Wehraasht
( S t u t t g a r tI D r . Hftn» R®Igler,'
" ' " " "' *

1C7

wl»a

twmstoii wae actuall.;^

»»

Oth®!* ftuthern aofe

to t f m i m m i m ©f mmsiik tmm 9Kprm»M

%im%T epiui&m m

Mm% &r« io4«fi£»lt« m tfa#

%1» %bM% settM t»vii b#»8 Imb dum fe# w«&tbeF tod t^rm
fe@®ti nn galte&n ictvmiieis*

B&m mm mm&

©lsl8»d th&t

& df>ul5t^

w®ftfeb»r weuld

til# iiffiy»i0s into th# mmth 9t

fXiitly that ^%im •mmm.thmr mm unfaircrabl»

Cl»st#.r »ilii#t

ftp 9timmim ©•p«.rstS.©«§ irm ftlsai

l#«®t uafeli fcto® ®#®aa4

*###k if
ite mpp&mm safe t© aatiwt^

Is tfcai fss# ef this
'fctet ililler ##ali fc,@.-w

l»uaefeedi him ImmBim dtiflng Mmj,

wltli asf s^mt feup® tm* « smmMuIul

plm$m 'fim

«f fein

« #il#fe sferite by Ma dtp«ft4abi«

basftd ©a iarf# »%rst«gi,0 BO¥#a#iit» ftii^i tl» d«f«afc ef
ttifsifti &mim& *»»8fc ef tii® Pol#p#i»«*
ii^r#fe«blp
la ttm

Ifc smm hlgtil^

g9.mhtm m getting hi* taute ^&%mU
i.®

Wh$%hmr

in th« g«sj8«t,
Rut»l«ii ©i&i^ftlgii ^mM h«¥®

K&rlltr la Mm o«n mly b« ®sjiJ»«%yF#4#

Althengfa

pl&an

r«poi*t

170.,

p# 86,
tm Wmmm {I«w ferki ll®rp®r

Wilasfe»
& B3P®^li®f*8, l,8SS5j|.
«r«
a«rmn

%9 ^mrthm th« oersfiitlon of
in July«
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of mid-June spok® of

oils'* and **gullies*' being

impassAbl® by motor v#hiol«s, it can probably b® asauaad
that ayoh of th® r»»ainirjg area wm pasaabl@«

fh@ preolpi-

tatlon reoordlngs of th« oiti#8 in feh® area w@r« nsriaal
during th« month of Juq® and ia som« instana®® below th»
r#eord#d on ium 20, 1941, fchat th«

&v®rag«
w#atiMr

favorabl® and tiM **riv®ra partly b®low msrsial,^^®

taiie»ting a rapl<l dsdlin© of wafeer froia tb® «ijd ©f -May.
FttFt;h.«r®®,r«, Oud®rian, in appftpeat sontradietlori to an, ®arli®r
Qu&t® 0©ntribut®d by hla^ aainfcalridd '•th&t th«r# w&® a <l«flnlt-«
d#lay la the op^niag ©f ©wr Hussiaft campaign** ea«s®d by th®
Balkan Inwaioss#^^ This ifflpli®s that h® thought th® invasion
could hav® taken plao® ©arlior in Jun® (for h® obviously
dlse©unt;®d Mayl #
Within th® 2»ang© ©f probabillfcl#® and @ltffiln«ti,a.g th«
Fw®te'«i'*s

til# Most l»gi©al conclusion s®®rat to b«

ttist th® iKtvasioia of Russia eould not b&v® o&mi«m@d Ir May,
1941#

It is alao ®xti*®BS»ly doubtful thst it could hmr® tak@R
0|*.ld l«at.fa®r SSSSESE.#' P* '?46*
2.%ald®r, ?ol. ¥1, Jun« go, 1941,
^^uderi&n, p* 145*
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ptmm dtariog

tlrvt vemU la JiiWst#

sf %\m: Balkan
l»f-« fcki®
tS.»® in tm

1t3#r«fot»®, %b#
mme lllmXf &mM aott

Fiato»©r«i arai«a iie^« tbao tw© w«(iMs» &p®rm%lnu
Qtilott ftt tim at®*, iftr®»¥«!•,. thl#

<©©ali iw# b««a &rski%mblm t© tli» Qmm^n afaf mXf if thm
Wm-imer b*«S

«¥ld.«o©#

ugaiwfc thm Qrmtm tmmmim &s pr#vi©tt»
.

omnm fui
T H E m a W A T I O S OF SRllGl AMD T0<}O8MfU U941-1942)
AID Ifi wmof 01 BASBAMm^A

Qnlf

g«n»ral arftss in eonqu«p@d fug©fiX«"via w«i*«

®f thm utaest l«fe«r®st to th« p-u»hr«i'i

Serbia pr©p®r, oou*

talwing th® rieh sspper^produelng Min«a d®

aad a long

str@%©la ©f ttoi# sti'stsgi© DaiJttb® Rlv®r|^ fcfa® Banafc,. b®@«us# of
l.fcs rlehi s#li an# tli© lapg® auober of ilteie 0®r»ans rir®ldin.g
ill

are-ai® .atad feh®

part ©f Slov^raia ti®eaus® ©f its

histwioftl relationship with '*©W Austria" and It® Rwaerous
Tti« Fu®hr®3f a^d® it sleai* #v®u b®f©r# th®
fUgesla^ swrr#iidojr» that 3«rbia s»ci th@ Banat w@rm t© b®
0©Mld«.r®d iB th» G«r«aii sph®r« of intt«r«sfc aad, th®r@fore,,
wettli b« oooupidid bj feh® fcr»®pii of fell® ]R@i©k»

afli#r

dlseuffi«i®sis with Mustslini, Rortli®ra Sl®v®oiai, alfchoagh not
Fu©hF®r fflenti©ns fch« imp©rfc»»0@ of th«8« mrem In
*Dlr«®t;iif« 2 8 * 4 , S@®s 1 , 1 . Tr®¥»r»l®p«i' ( ® g * s a d t r & m * } ,
Blitffa*i#K t® B®f«at. Sitl#r»» War Dir®6fciv® (l«w Terkj Helt.
tio.Eirt; asa HmIOJ.
Futhr®!' w«® Q«>niid#rlEig giving this tflrritupj fco
Hungary m lat# iii Mmreb. 2f, 1941, but obviously eh&nged hie
min<S» mzi Q&mpirai&i m& AmrmBion. Vol. IV, p. 277,
XIO

Ill

formfi-lly anaexed, m&m placed under Xiim jurisdiction of tha
grul.git#r of the Austrian ppoYinc® of S%p?iais^
Oth®,rwli.®j XugoslaTl®. had

of ^aXu® that %«mpted

th© fmkm&r, «speoialiy with Bajr-bar^ssa p®fidlng»

Montenegro

wfti »©ttntaiR©tiit ftftd eould so&reely f©«d Its own p©p«lation|
this was deelared an Italian protacterat®. fh« more desirable
ar«as &i Balsfttia, a fsw districts and isX&nds atar Fiu»®, and
tim sotttfaern part of Slsvenia w@r« als© granttd to
Horn®*"' With tbm ©xetpfcioa of southern Bl©v#aiii whieh pr0dtt®®d
8. «»all fsod surpltts# Meat of fchas® n«w Italian t«rrlt:©ries
war® fo©d dtfifiit" &?«»» and preduossd v#ry llfctl® ©f strategio
Momnt&iiieu# la©«doni&,. tbm ®i»®lting p©t® #f th® Ballcans,
©»ttl:d a®t mmn sttpport th® ooettpatlsa tr@©ps it wowld tak® t©
ttftli®# it.I th# t-arritury was gir&n ts Bulgaria f©3» ©ssupstiorsal
ptti^pes^a, 5'fa« V^l'Ttdina, ©entftiaing fcii® fwtil® B«©hk«, ia
©ontrrngt probably t®apt®d th® Ptt®i-irer, butt 1% was gra.nt®d t©
Httwgmrj for hi^torieal r®«ts0Qg»

A swall slle® of ©astarn

Sl©¥®«la wa® also giv®n to Huogarj ia r@er»gnlti»ri of li«r Halted
war efftrt on b#hftld of tbe Axis»
fh® r®ffi«lnd#r of TugeslaTla wms »stablish®d as th®
ind#p«nd®tit lingdem'* &t Croatia#. Ttm mw country contained th©
®Earl Brandt, Ma.aag;«a»Rt of Agrteu.Xtur« grnd Food in tta®
garaiLt^*'scomplad &a:d
^ of FcrIre«s' l\trem7'"""fR
eoljLaSoratioia"i'll:!il^^ '"'ISf'ito' ^©Slltr
Prmnz'" Aq^IM®. CBt&nft^rds
St«nf©rd lloiv»raitj Pr«sa, 19SS), p, 1S3,

Hi

fertile Sfi^ala

between th« Drau and Sava rivera, but

it was ®ls© granted the ©coRoaieallj po©r and. f ©od doficlfc
®r#as »f B«ai®-H®i*zg»vinai

In or-ci@r t© inmrs that th® gtat«

operated in, the b@st Interest® of the R®i©h,:

carved out

a saall s@Gtilorj la th« north, including th€j Symi®., tto.t w®uli
b« ,ooeu .s>l #d t®ntiatlv©ly hf Garmn, troops,

fhe rest of eroatlA

was pla.esd *lteh,lii tfe© Ifcallsin sph@i'® ®f

and as a

tUTtlmT o®ii<5®s@ion th« '*ln(i«pend#iit^ ©ountrj was r@oognlz®d
m an Ital5.an

S-rete# had ®ir®n

lm&

to

ofter

eeonoMlQaXlj

th&n

Xugo-

Tl» stafc® had no Important soufo®# ©f paw amt#rials,,
nor did @b@ teT® aay highly d«'®-«l0p«d h®avy luctus teits, Mor#-

mer pi»lor to th» Ifealian InmsiDU, %h# QrmkB had, b«®ii linp®rfelag
b#twe#n iSO^OOO &ad SM.OOO tons ®f Wli«afc a y®ftr t® f@@d th#ti»
hiiagf^f |^#p«Xatioa#®

ft*

ef th® tebso©.©, raisins,

and oMt® oil ©Rlj asd# up part ©f this defioife*

0-#«eart ©bjeetif#® Ir

fhua, the

ware alaisst #iatir«l|^ strafcagie,.

But «v®ri »o,. ©Qly tfe« iwportaRfe rj&v&l bae® of Saloaika aiid th®
surretiading ar«a was ex^liiti-reXy mmpl^A by %h»
fh# Ottmans statiooed fcreops

in th® Ath^oa-Pireaus ar«», a few

ialanda in tim P®lop©aa«»», and Cr «t#,. as did th® Italian®,
SjESapting ThrftO® and aroa® of Eaetsm Ma«edonia, which were
%ii© new Stat® oa»® iuto ©xistene© ©a May S,. 1941^ in
a Joint ci®<©re® bj Italy aad Q®rmanj, Ibid.
^Ibid,, p. gS5.
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or

o©eupi«ia by BulgftS'lft, tb» rcist &t ar©®«»

Xtmlfg Italy's

wm» mnmxod

Alb«tit«, @.r iie©upl«<l

by tim
lv#n bmf »m Mm &ommrm4 B&lk&m mr» e*rv<id ttp mn4

(l^rwfens imd isufferad mWomim

for fcl^ Aat®
of

properti©n« In S«rbl»»

fl3» Q@i*is»os had

b#»» <S®pi*lwd »f fcl» full u®# at thm Dmrnifc# f ei* smmrMl wmim
da# %t fell®

mn4. »fcl»r 0btt«aX®« pl8®®fi in tbe asln

ffol®

affsotr#!! tb» tmmtmr ei 41wi»i&m

«oi supplies ffti*- tt» Qr*### «»i

emmpmigmg. mn€ plmsmS m

««wr« :8tr«lfi m Fi#M

by tli® $mmt-

ittaaiiia, a*
iupplf
«ap«#I»

liiilMwp to

tb#

«er«.#f#j?,. feint B®r

#sefe*«tl««|, hj fefm

pmt m% #f

plii#»d m febts

0fag.h0 ft ft^

-w*!**

bf %M Bag^laws mt tmmt ttttlil A«gti«fc,

1.i4l» f^^r# In i3» 4mh% m t& ttm "w&lm ©f

*lne«

f h®. ®iii®» p.r©4««.#4 m»%f

©«p.p»-i* m ymm mM mm
pr«#.lo«is

%»i» ©f

©iipplltr »f
%# r«ly m

fbt 0«rs«a#
May

tb®

l»41*
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^rlfosaiA af

m-ia®® mmrm »t oi»s

but s.fl»«r tti»

f#®fitsi*sll,«d hy th» B«iag.y»

*«Ffi S^Sa t©

«s» uiid®r feto e®iifer©I <af tfa« frrnmmlm&h Staafea**

1®^*
® Cl«ot»
i««.i lur®p®
WarId Trmdm* k»§i»%m4.
hj Jeto G. MoCl«UaR<n—CWlsRHgtWt ffci* Bftdklfig Irjttlfcutloij,
1841), p, 87.
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atookpll®3 which would laat anly s. r«w

atlliEo ittab--

An'A/&r mk® arrangements with frmma*^ Sp&la fsr

tlM ®s|^y>rfe sjf iBai'« oopper hy tb®fe omintrf to a©riaanf|>^^
By tkm tia® %tm masteus p^rfsrtmna©
f&r Urn itasfe^ini front w®uti ln%&

w&a r««%0A'»#d t© full
sf sl» Sei^blam

ttm

At tjb» »mm tl»®, fctyi i*®»©rg&ni*
t»«o@flt; of %im

fet' tls»

Qevsmu mm mmemy mm baliis «iirri«4 out* fli®

towns

w«r« pl*o0d iiaci«r tli« ©©rjtrol »f' l®@ml Cl®r»aw ftGd
isftftl pelicMi fm^ms

@#sfcr©Xl#i by

t# balp k««|j ord«r seel llgb.^a fel:#- Qm^m^n

SS wmm »rga.Qis®d
ia tli©

A. bar-dsr gii»4 ueife -«m4# up f# 8j|SX)0 iapblnttt
fco S,0i3C| arrf eo«ftaiiiifs.g m ea^ir#
tim serfi©^i'5 ^ITmis»8 sf tia©
Wvmz. 'BmAmm9Pt_

Pia.a«^^

«pii.ri?i#<l

iOO Qtraaiss wm
In t!i© Issdfe ut

ptmnp^tmuMM^if im tii« Fc^-ni*
hf

with

mM ef mm^ sf- tfet

ef ttijs B«i? &lmm
%tm ^wvmm w«r
effort t«,ii set to# w®r-«spliMi8#A,, Itj* wifefci laglar^d mud 'fcbt
rtiultlog bl®0te«l« sliiit @fjf all li6^«*ftis friw mWmA^ War mi%h
MmBM cl««4 ibat gmrm
tfei i»t«3. «l8®» S@#i Wmmttm
III
IM1| amM» ¥#!• •¥!, lui" IS^ l@4l|
pp, &S mM
smximm p#j*f»mn8t ®©h#dtil« mmn% infc© ©ffeet ©is
««y sa, I.M1. $®« *0|jmptt-r IXI#** p* 6S.

Q^.rmn fmmWmttm
^ ewpartt. lipldlnZ. ia SSKiiS, (Pl^Lloa AffstiS SnfowialKn
QuMm$ W««blugt(^t 10»S. Htmmrmmnt f^lnfeiag
1944)|^
i*
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released Yugoslav prisoners, a number of the former Yugoslair
war littdusfcylas w«,re ©onv«rted fees &»rffian sp«elfIcationa and
wei-^® procittcing war m*t«rlsil for the Helob.*^'^

M»anwhil®, th«

rio'tt agricaltisraX ®r«a of th® Banut was §iv#n a special status
in Qefma.n plana b«ttau«@ of th« larg® nwKbar of iRhabitanfcs of
0@raan deseoafc#

ftoa Volkadue fe-sohe a, with fch« aid of tli» SS,

w®r« allowed to fopia their own local sd*inl»fcFafcions «,iid largelj
conti'©! tbeii* owa l&eal affairs as long as- tli@j operfttad In
th« bast Intsrssts ©f the oceupylng powsF*!-®
I!ow«ir©ry th« majority of th@ inhabitants of Serbia aisd
tb« Baast w®r® Sl&vs aad,

or®.,, look«i upon m being ©to®

Biltope, «sp#oiallj hf IliiiiBiler*3 SS who oft-eri o»:v®i»st®<J iiad©«»
mud seiwtiau.e in deftftno# ftf,. ths ailltapy oosmmAm *

M©rs©f'#rj fch«i sssmpyiKg pssirsrs rsra **llflng ©ff t-fee larsd® B.nAg
in tli® fetginalftg at feh®

©? t imaftoer ©f

Ses-fes Im# to m«#t tli# deaaiicls

agerioiw,. such, ai th® eoa«and#r

of Ml# ioutlwesft t-h®at.r®, th® i®3.Xlt&ry gmmpn^r of tim Soufch«s«t, th« tilgh®r @cli«lo-tt» ©f the SS «»d

of p&llse, as

w®ll m th.% ^©ffiaocls ef feh« F#«j' Y.0»t Plaa,^^ fhis l@d t©
©v®p-i»®qtt,lsItlowing of a nwabti' of S®yb fanlll®® wh© wei^® e®®ii®qii©Cifclj l«ft to stmrvm*

to, fer tim firit two aonth®

^%ueh as subsidiaries ©f tl» Haraaia 0#«rlng Si®©l Works
at Gefca, and f!ei*« apd Son C^pstiy &fe eai*l«dorf«
p. ISS.
P*
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at lessty the Geman® got what they wanted, with th» ©xeeptlojn
of Goppt®r,. tiao# all ®oen&mlc plans for- the ar«a wer©
fttlfilUd*^'^
la eoBtrast t© Serbia, ths Germans, mnupjlng theti*
aj»«as of intei'itat in 0r«®c»| wer® quit® l©nl«ht»

In ©j»d©r to

aa^ fez»«ign r>ul© mor# aceept&bl# to tim {ir@«ks, a pr©»ln«nt
®r#«k persenality, 0®Rtral G@orge fsolakogleu, wt# s#l®et@d
as the p«p|>@t premier. In turn, in ori®r t© win support
at least fci?l«r.atiott by th« 0r«@k p«opl®, f^olak^gloti eonduetad
a vigor©ui osmpaiga based oits anti-Slavism md anti-CoaEURiiM,
l¥®n though this was aiwed partially at Q«rs&ny*a ally,
Bulgaria, th® aeraans diduaet S@®IH to ®lnd ninm th® propftganda i«pli®d that th® W^hm&oht wa» pr«®®«t to prot#et th«
esuKfcry frsm fchsss dual Mfiom»g®s-^8
fhe ®aj©r probleiu faced by th# 0®r»ans and th®lr Xtaliaft
allies in Gre«e@ was th® hungry population#

Bv@n b«f©r@ th#

war, th« 0r®@k® had to impert larg® quantities of grain, an#
in 1940' th« British blaokad® and the ©©?»«» h@g®»ony in th«
Balkaas had out off iaports. This probl®ai was aompoundtd by
th® Italian invatioa. During th® winter of 1940-1941, theu-aands of Gr©®k refuge«i had poured into Athens, Sftlonlka, and
Piraeus, Stark tragedy struck these wnfortunate hordes as
d«ath snd disease rates ©hot skyward
^'^Ibid*
i%t&vri&nos, p, 785•
^%randt, p. 835•
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Aeeerdlngljif th® a@rman and Italian troops ««re forbidden
by ar«f oi»d«r to clalai any food pro^lilooa from th® Gr@©k
popttlafcioi3s»^®

Afc th® s«m© tla«j H®r«aati l#ubmeb»r,, Gesring'®

rtpretaritafclv# iti £lr@®0@| tri®-d to fiad »om« solution that
algbt m«k« cir®®o@ a«r# «»lf«-su»t«iaSag, but th# t«®k was
pr©v® imp©#®!!)!#Meanwhile, fcia® IrKH-ridual 0®pi9an s©Idler
»«rks for «v»rything thm (ire@ks

was »p»iaiirjg Ma

iiiid t© offtr. Tbls later hrmsht forth tti« follswirig c^^aiMnt
fi*«j Couttt 0ianof
•fli.® 0©s»imn® hav« taken tx'>m. the Si'seks ®v«ntiasir slioelaets,; and eow Ihaj pr«t«nd t© plae#
thm- tela®® tm tfa© eeonoaie situation on us,- W#
ean tak® tb® responsibility but ©ftlj ©a ooriditien
that tht©|-^ol@ar ©at ©f Atbea® a«ci th« «ntip#
©©untfj.#®®
Jllrsaif during Juri® and I'alj, 1941,. th# Qmrwrnm and fch®
It«lia»a ir®r® forced to i®n«J vih»m% to Ort#®#, this wm® only
tlia h&ginnlng.*
la th© a®w eounti»f of Creatia, %hm thx'&m was off«r®a

to feh# 'Duk® of 3g»«let©, a •mmhm.r of th# Itallatj Hous® of
Savoy, The Diik# aca®pte<l fell# position, bwt f»«nd th« pleasui»®-i of Roa® Imrd to r©®l«t aod fch#r«for® ri®v®r assused fcfa®
i*0j«l

Ante® fav«llteJ3., arriving In Croafcia with

^%iaRO, Sowmbsr 4, 1941.
^%tavrian0s, p. 771.
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f«w®r than 100 ®f his Usta»olmj was installed
PORl&TQlk Cpri«« minist#!*) pf

the Fuehrer,
Mueh ©f th®

eapturtd IfugtsliiT ®qulpm«Bti was mad® aTaila^tol® t© hiSj and b®
quiokly £»rgaoig®d a polltioal ai*»y of fiffc®®n batfealionij a
Witaaeba Sumrd of &m Infantry regiaent, «nd a cavalry
H® also m&dm a prG-rlst&n for a natloml draft
but wfts e®r3fi*®!at®d with a jsatipo^#!* «h0rt«tg®*

The- Oermmns

slph0«»®i ©ff 150,000 Croat worlE®,r» to b® used f©i* industry in
%bm R«ieh«26

fii®, ©^rmaris w®r» Moreover, busj r^eruitifig

for#ign l»gioo uftits within th® countrys®''' fb.® .CJeraian® in both
Q^tmg0ri»B only aoo»pl®4 the youftg «.rjd h®sltby,
Tb® iil®g&rs of fch® n®w F«v®liteh rsglae wm ^R®adf for
th®

«hle?h m#ant litefally tha.t feher# mm n©

a^ooM for Sayfelttos In the CFoat-laa st-al«»

fh® Uafeascha accord-

Ingly s@t ©ut; to #xt®rmin&t® one portion of fehe Serbian
p&§mXB.tlm aad triad fc© twr&m th« other t© b®©om# Croafeiaa.#

Th« resulting e&rnagii mm s® iiorribl# that «¥®n fch# Gentians
ARtiga^ri'tlXft Operateloni, p, 18•
^Hhm»

2%«ld@r, ?ol, VI, Sum 7, 1941.
rasaa Anti.gu#rrilla Opera fcioag., p, 19*
p« 772.
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pj*ot®st®d to teh® laer@dlbX® ©ru®lti©s perpetrated by the
Cro«ts#^®

kt the saae tim®, although the Hungarians in fcb.®

fio-vodiasi and th« BuXgars in Mae^donia did not shea qwlfc® so
m^ach bl,®od, fch®y aged ^very cone«iv&bl« pressure to oonfinc©
and somptX the population In ®aoh ©f tlm respective areas t©
i»eg«rd th«»®«lv0g as Hungarlaa or Bulgarian.
The Sarba and their

(uaually Orthodox

Jew)

r©tall«fced with « llttl® bl^od-letting of their ©wn«. This was
«a«a® at- X^atfc parfelmlly posslbl® btcaut# of th# short duratlfsia.
of ths T«.go»l«v oarapaiga sod. t'a® rapid rt-.i«pX9fa®»fc ©f S®raaci
dl-rliloas tm* u®« irs Bsrbarofi»«.. laRiy ef th® «or@ Mountaii30us
ar#as of southern XugoslaTla wms*m by^pae.sed bj th® infailng
«ral#.ti,- with th# r#sttlt that w®-ll-ara®fl bwt ilsorganized units
of th© forifti-r Yugoslav aray vm*m l@ffc In tti@ Konntains t©
e©m# cSowia later to .sarrtmdtr er f^nd for

Manj-

tttPfi#d te fch® XAtt®r osuri® and hmgun ©ptraling as fu®!!
bandit bfttid®, Tmrnrd %im en^ of Jum, 1941, th»8« baiids wer«
b«ln.g 0©H«etiv®ly tmrnetd iisto tw© s«pmrat« eohesivs armie®
©f lrr®gulars s a Sarblmn nationalist organisation (Cl^tniks)
uttder th® l«ad«r®hip of Colonsl Draaa llhalloviteh, and a
C©BMitinl»t organisatlen (Partisan®) led by Josip Bros {fito)«
^%lals®«*HersteRatt tp th# Croatian aaarshai Pavallo
K¥at®ralk, said, **that in lat© years (h«) had lived through a
gretat a&ny things ©f this kind, but a&thlBg that oould oompar®
with tht ala<i«#ds of ttm Croats,** Quoted fromi Haskell,
August 2, 1941.
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On July 13,-.

Montenegrin mixtur® of Parfelsan and Ch®tai»laa

swar»sd down on th® Itftllan garrisons scatted throughout
their Bowafcaln stafc@»^0 fak®» by surprise#, th« Italian® »®&n
affe«r o0unt;«rattAok®s4 with strong ground,, naval, and air f^re©
units but

alaiost a year to p»t down th© uprisings aod

amaagftd to aoooapllsh it only bj #£ilistiiig th® aid of th»
CiMtaik®,

in tb@ maantia®, bad ti*ria®d into bitter ®rs®fflies

©f the Partisant. itipulatloas in th# agr®#m«at with th»
Ohttolks required the It®liaa» t® restrict th«i^#lir©s t© th«
garrlsoa town anci aaia trass p ortation and csjmunicatloQ livmB *
In retara th®. Ch©t»lk# proffilsscl to k®#p thfe oTOHtryiilcl© fr®@

©f Partisaos^ with th© gam and a«suRitio.n profid#^ for fch«
taak bj thm Itmll&m

TIas Ifcalian^s

**a«v@ral thou

sand® ©asttaltias in this little war &nd ia r®turn, saptured
10,000 partisan® who w«r® shipped t^ foro® labor caapg*®^
Other oe©iiipi@d &r®as of Yugaslavia w«r« *ls© f#®liRg

tht vengeance of fth® rapidly ®Kp®n41og gu»rrilla

Bj

©arXj August,. 1941, vim Cr®at» war# praetieally forced &ut of
Bosnia, largw areas in Mao«d©iiia w®re prating uns&f® for the
Bulgars, aad tb® Italians w@r@ fa©«d with ati.©tii«r possibl®
^Q##r«ma Aatiguarrllla Op«rfetloni8 > p» El.
p, 2S» fh« Gb#tnitai alt®
fer arms, auoh to th® dism&j of Pavelifceh.

®. new souro#
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Sub»ld.larf

in souttsao Slw«Rla#

In 9m%rm%f

wsr® tko%

hiiriis#©^

ttm gmTrlllm durlns th« fiF»to shmt aonfch« ot' %tmlr o©cup««
tiian Iw S«rfeia mnA €r©«6i», mm %hm$h. ttm imjr Q#ma«i

AivtMlum mppmrm^ t© Isvife© tFetitjl.#

&i timi^

Iritft#aia, 1« tl:»«« wmm tls» gwwillit®

G-mtmfit feo urgf^nizm dwriog thl»

and w&lfc t© tak© |jo»ifei¥«

aotlstis. mlj when tb»lr wnits w#r<9 larg# ©aongli %& imm-'M «
mmm'm of #«o©##»«

Final,!j, wm^lj la Augunfe, 1941^ fi%&

Mm«d i^m B#lgr«:#«i m VmlS^v^& t-® tak# pmm&ml enmmMd of
ti}#

ia til#

fM.® &|?p«arrrd t& W fch# sigmS.

fm* %lm hmginrnlng ^ mjer v^mr%.ntam m^^trnt tim

fb«

vft thm^ «t%«sto hy

**irr«gitlai»'t® is iri^l-

by tha rep«*t» »mtt tn FimtA Mmmtml

SF TIL# 3MTHM»%
A«gtt».%

IWRLNG ATTGUTTI, IS41|

mil trmffl© £'x>m tmlgrmdn to

hMlUtd hmmn:m of « hlmn up brt4gt|
plasttlni

S«r»a-tt

»«.« t®i5ip0i*®*»il,f
S, m •fema-fi is

fal|»¥tt ©a th® ftig-lifc odC Atigti»t 5 fc® i,

^ tl» f®ll@wlag »igM| 4ugu0t 7j| Bsgiiti©,

ilsferiofc eaplMl.

dliteplat offl®# w«» Fftiiftgtd bf 0oiwitttiiiits| kugmt f3, ©as®#
©I" CoMwiijltt ®&fefsti®g« «ftii raid# m*m iTOr««siftg| August 9,
tmirs mming iwom Oa@«te fe#

mm

^ Witr Crimiasils ^ fpX, 11:^ p# 036* Qiily « f«w
ii#oiMil»l» gT
ssf gs#0llB« hurl®^ afe
*@r9 3E*«0M'd®d liwrltlg
1941•
p# 77i| Q#i*fli(ia Antigto#rrilX»
p« 21*

1S2

luijust 15, railway station afcfcaek^d, fcrairj derailed; August 18
twBntf miles of track blown, upj August i2^ Loznioa flmlf

hsld by 0£swBunl®t8
fh« di»^\irb®d

m ttm rocormoadatloa of Pi«ld

llarahal Llat, In aa apparent att-sfflofc to iplit th© '^irregulars'^
of 'Plto and lteh&il0vltoh, now oo««ented to iQe«t, ®b l«&at
pfirttally., tfee desmnds of a number of Ohstoik®.

On August 31,

'm allowed General Milan H®aifcoh to form a ^Qoirerniaftnt of
Batsional Salvatlsa** #¥«I3 fchoiiglj t.he Serbl&n general waiofealfted
that h® was th® earetakar of fch® .goTOrrasdnt until the king c
o0tiM be reafcoi'@d»®^* At t.fe® sains-

tb» Fuehrsir rm4& It

el#ar tliat Gomtirsism was to be fought In tii© area tlrrough
the help ©f the aafeiotjellj mindwci €iw%aiks and that ^^p&sphlefcs
orlgimtiog fp&m the Chetolka warm riofc t.o b® pr»ir©ritsci^' frsaa
b®ing distributedAt. Blm&Mt
lilat dispafcohsd

smm» tim, FieM ifftrfllml

dlir® boisl>©r»# fros Qrmcs to be ugtd

Bg&imt tia® Partliaos
^%rl&lg 0f W&i* QriainaliA fol. II, pp. 9B9-944,
^%.tftvri«!s©s, p.
»£ Way C.rl«lasli, ¥ol# XI,. p. @4§.
Antlg^isprilla Opermtlcaa» p, 28, isipXi«s that
th# Stti^nSir®
ia&®r ia S#Pimi?, but t&i» £8 ©bviously
wr©tig
th@j *8r# bslng used as early as S«pt@aber Sj^ 1041
i®@i Tri&la of Wmr Originals. V&l., XI, p. 953,
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In apite of taoae 'J@rr.iaK aottaup«», th« glaorey reports

0otit.ia"a#d»

WQ£' installs#, oa 3®pt®-8^®r B, fch# rQllowiag

«'.#i>aag«« w®p# r®a«iv«4 afe ilsfc*® ii««d;quart»rt i jfeur additloiml
Xlm»

dsMtroyad mml mxmmd baod»

pro¥®ating

i'»pilr#l i'lglitlag osftr L-mMlm

wsttfe

latet? «ofe.loa #»v«ral tiis«g, KrupanJ appears

stMiE® ®tfc&eke

w#F« abl« lo fr«# p&rtj af th# utiife# safe nff fct S p«p «rJs

Immm fi»«

^«fc known

fbsi sam® dnj^-

las fell toi'mtrj' f*<sg,l»is'6 %li«a
tw S«lgr«i«

ofd®!*#!! sbi

is fc®

^ritMla

A% tii® aa«© t;iE», li©

%•» t'hm Fa#lir«r'

tb® ina.cl»%m®|' of' fcii® o©#ypatier«l fcrsspt

utti#!' ill# fc«

•faais-ol# febis

ft» r«po};*t; twom List, @mspl««l wttfa
6,|j^ Issfeali^feiotis ©f i;h« Btsr
would tifr®

h&4

IM^'erm-fctoa tlmt
ci®#.t2^©fsd «Rm t,im

hm ©lessd tmmp-W'&^wXlf tm

I j»s%

mSt^m tkm Q/mmmm imA fel»» aia»» predttsiag pspp*!*
%}»

into mtim*

8« i8®u@d

«hargiiss iaysiml. %%»% with .»upr#»»iiig

,

dlF«©lii*®

its tl» STOfeti?*,

Te *e«s«pli«fe fchla. List wai fc© pX.*®® Q«mral
i»

sl»rc« «f

i« S«rfeift ita4 ili# adJ@.Q®nfe

wh«rr« tl» liip#gul®p» h&d ««fc«toXisi3®<S th»ffi»®Xir®s«

7km

4f«f High 0«Mika4 wa# &r4mr«d fc» rwlofferc® tl» tepeups in i®rbi» .•
g-%yi»ls ^^gr|«iWlig.M ¥©!• Xi» p* 9m,
^pQ^rmia. At3itiga».frlll» Qiat^rmfcicna... pp. 22»-gS«

1S4

by

infantry divlaion, fcraitta,

fwth©f 8«eurlty foroeaj

s«.pt!ttr#<! fcanks, «nd

othn&r eantured t.ank« smd »e©ur5ty

foro®8s w«re to b« a^snt to Cro«.tl«.*

Another irifantry ilvisiort

freia, fcfe© EmBtmrn tvmt mm to hm trmmfmmA wb#o 3t
Bwlgftrlfln tnr&mm wsr®

Th« Riiagsf-isn, FuBiaBlift^

to b® ©«lla4 &£i ti} mml»t In ttm ef>«rafti»fs» wifcb tte# pwmis*
si Oft of tto Prised P«*«r#s Hloh C^asRmrid, At t.he »s»i» fil^i
vsm of Cro#fcl&r^ formmB irs thm f^si^Rian

lnt»r€!»%

tfafi' $«2*bisn h^r4mr t*»0 gppx*Bw»i.,
fh® e.a;rrfir.g mt #f this

fptlrfv=»$

yijs^@0 dfiys lefcsr- {fl.»pti#iTib«r W)^ feb# mmr^tmin
Q«&®ral

as0tate^

week IfttSF
tffift

tlwo o»

MSi XiiftJifcry tflwltlon,,. Jaiir««:flne trmn th#

t.|» EfeeCern

mm

fill# r®»iiltf8i ill tilt
a.tel# for tfe#
&t

lit f-i©lgr«.di».

$fit§ feite

liftvifig m9

©a iets-np COfsftratlori f^-.piii»©ri| #

Bj tfm m.»

rst-tli»i®j fcb« mM ol" ftlW eriefet*r i^«ri%.ry diiritioo

CllSlili} tFan»f».rr«d fyais liiwania^^^

ma tim #|wi-n wftrfam

fclM ori«tiiites asd thm fw^lmmg, mmrml Bmfam e©uM
r@p©pt hj fchml
Bmlm$

th» wpmn

iHi s«i»bla m» mmr*

^mmi»rr»^ hi# fsr®t« t& fealj teewsrd

tih#

®na af Jitattftry, t;l» g©a»3*El, stl©»g mlth ttm llSfsh ©fi^. ?i42i
*^0>ia.. p. as.

•Slbld.. p. 84.
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Infantry divisions, was transferred to the lastern front,
Th® gu&rrlllas still hald large areas in Bosrsift,, M©iit«n«gr&
MftoedonlAj, and Italian Slownls, but for the tls« being feh@f
«0r# aot §p6r8ting m & lerg® seal# in Serbia*

Bo#lua®»ii

forces had kili«si ao ©siimtod 50^000 lrr«sular» from tb©
beginning of th®lr ©p#ratlonj8#

priaenors w#r« talcsn, or

at, l#a®t none, war© recorded
To m«ke up for tli® departure of tim German cli^islotts
froa Serfelfti tli® dariians «llow«s<l the Balgarians to ooowpy
south s@rbla, «nd atr®agth«Q.®«i tiielr own fmnm® hj reeruifelntg
an §S Mountain di^isiBrj (7th) made up ©f ^toio Oariaan® frm
th© oesupisd ar®ai,*^S

gx«®pt for ajioor flart-iips, gwrrilla

Qp&r&biom in Serbia w®r® relatively auppr«s#«d until &ft@r
Stalingrad
Unlik® th&B& In Yugoslavia, th® Greek guerrillas under
took no operations ©f inportane® in 1941, a.n4 ®ntf a f®w that
oould b® ci«@aed important in 1942,^® F^r their part, th®
Qerwans w«r® mor® s©nesrned with fortifjing Cr«te, pursuing
the war effort against th® Bi'ltieh. ia the @aat®rn M®^lt®rrati®®its
fr&m Gr©®k bas®s, aad getting all G®r»a» ecBBbat "units that
c©uld b© spared to th® more active theatres of war*

In Augutfe

^^Gaiman Antifflieryilla Operatiana, p. f27*
^^Ibid•^ pp* 26 and 30. On ffovoab©r S5, 1942^ the 0r®®k
gu#rrillii %'l®w" up the Q&rgopot&mo$ Bridg®, f ea*oiiig th® G«rMni
t& r®plao® tba Italian divisions in the pf5ltGlt5g of this stretch
of transportatioQ.
p. 28,
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1941, thiS 6th. Mountalrs diTigflon, \«ras sent to the Russian front#
The dlTision wa© replaced in Greece hj the weak 7iSth Infantry
diviclow. brought, in frora (}errmnjA^

In 3«te October, 1941,

th« 5th MouRttalR divisioR W0s siso transferred for use in
Ba9sla»

?b.® cllvition wta replaced on Cr^fcc by the 164th and

th« ?13th iJif&nfcry diirisloja# from the ktimm and S-alealka
ar@as, Thej w®r@ lia turn, r&pla,0«d in thm kthem ar®a by
ItaXi»O0
l®Terth«l#8.», til® Qre^k ©©©upattsm wa® oeatly for the
C-eriaaas asd, th#!.!" Italian

In »pita &f HeraaEiK

remark timt tb# Sarm&ns sheuld Ret prsttocupy th@»i»lT»B witeh
th# Gr»®]tes

p®0pl« ar« dtstl&ed to b«

thm &rm'k» h&d t® b® f®d#

,

Tb® 0#rMnSj in the beglEifilrsg,

ttt@®pt®d to balad »v®r this pr«>bl#M to thm Itallaas«

fb#

Italians, alrtady existing en bl«©fc bread mnd brown p&sta and
l0flng half their shipg beurtd f®r P:ir ^«us mud ialoniks, tmnA
th© tftsk iHp-©®®lbl®, Consequently, in Iovt®b#r, 1941, ttoa
G®r»®n# b®gitn stnding l®rg® fuantlti@s ©f grain to ar®®s®.
B j t h ® tiffi# t l m t e r r i b l ® w i n t e r ©J" 1 § 4 1 ' » 4 2 , w « ® © f e r , t f m
Q«ria«ns bad shipped iw@r 4S,000 ten# @f wheat to tb@ country
and tb© Italians w@ll ov«r B0,,©OO tons,^^
P*

in gpit© of tbss®

t.ukac®,, p, 447»

^Qgsrgan Antis^uerrilla Operatlcaa^ p. IS.
^%..ukaQi, p, 458.
^%r&ndt, p, 847.
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Axia cantjrlbution®, the Greek population mlaat '.;©11 havo
been neaj'ly dociiaated tjxcept foi-' the Iiitcrtiatlonal lied Cross#
Through its efforts, & total oT 40^000 toria oi food wfta

outs id® kxia Eurepo into

iciovwd

Bu» to .latea'-natianal agr«®-

:«nt» G^mao and Isalian expoi^te to

to b» decreased

durlag th© f©Hewing j©ar. lv#n so, from Stsptemfesr, 1942, to
Ettgust, 1943, fch© aerfiisns rfc-qultition«<! mly 24 thousand tons
of food from- §r««c® and in tur-n eoapan®&t6<l the Qre©ks with
45»9 thousarid t0os»

fli® Italian®, during tfe® sa» period,

g&iri#d 9,8 Billion tons of

f.rofi Oraeo© and sent to th#

Qpmmk$ IS,2 million
Di^i' to th® Xtaliao dlaaffectlon and fch® guerrilla
warfar® ie bofcli Qr«®o® and Yugoslavia, th® Geraaas w&r®
r®re®d to Inore&a© their eee«petion fsre®© up to fourtasn
difiiisas hj S©pttffibfer, 1943^ and to twenty dl^lsioM by th«
®Bd Of th® sari®

fh-is, liow^vep, was after Stalingrad

ft'fid wh«R Q«i<m.&nj*s olmrie®* for a
rwo%9*

over Huasia ff©r« -rery

Bttt. without eonaid®ring th® possibl© strategic v&lu#

of 0r#t® and th® G"®riR.an aiirfitlds in ar®®©#, th@.rs ean toa no,
doubt that th« aerwan oooupafeion in the Balkan® during 1941
and 1942, hsd an «dv ®r®« effect on th.® 0©r«an war effort in
Russia,

Til® s#rlous drain on th® f©ed resouress of th-© R«ich

^^B-randt, p, 233. Fro.ii the syaasaei* of 1941 to th©
sttMia«r of 194S»
^%bid.. p, 243.
^^0®rmftn 4ntigti<srrlllft Operationg, p, 70,
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ftar the f«®aing of the Greek peopl® without any gust c^npensatloia 1» one large r«&aon«

Th®re are others.

Haider had maintained, a© early as 1940, th&t Yugtslftvia

*'was 100^ at th® disposal of th« Q®raan war ©cenoay,®^* y#t,
b®eawi® of tb« Yugoslav invasion th® Bor mlhes w®r® lest to
th# Serman war «ffort for a good part ®f 1941, and th« Danube
Siv «r was of littl# us# during a erueial stag® in th© pr®pa«
rmtion® for th® RU88ia.rj

Although th® 0®r«&tis in S«rbia

and th® Banat filled all their r©qulsiti©n <iuotft« durihg th©
first thra® months of th© ooeupatlon, th® '''subsidiary war**
during th# latter part of the JB&T M&D® eollectl»hs- In ®®ny
cmm$ impossible. To b# sure, during 1940 all German eoonomie
plahs w#r# largely fulfilled in Serbia and th® Banat, but It
li Interasting t» not® that th« 181,000 tohs of gr«ih Mhlpped
t® the R#i6h from these ar«as in th# grain year 1941-1942,
w®re l«ss than the 189,000 ton® s®nt fc® Geraafiy from th® sam®
ar®as lis th® graia y«ftr 1939-1940.®®
In a

Croatia &ppe»r©d to b® a valu&bl® German

ally sine© she eontributed a numbar of badly n«@d@d worksrs
for th« iQdu®tri®s ©f fch® Roich.

Moreeirer, she allowed th®

Oerwans to reoruit Foreign L«gie»n units within the n©w stat®,
®%al(a®r. Vol.. VI, Sept®®b«r 3, 1941.
56B®cause of th® transfer of divlai^tis from th« Balkans.
SSBrandt, p. 183,

109

8U®h as the 369th., 37Si, and S92d Infsntrj r«giM©nt®, two
SS r«gi»«nt», and the 13th and 23d Mountain regiments, m

well as a miiaber of b&tfealion# and brigaaes^S?

possibly th«

Croat workars aidtd th# Q#raan war effort^ but th® ov»r-all
«ff@ct of th« Foreign l,.®gion unite, «» far as th« Russian war
was oonc02'n®d, was llaiitsd#

Th® Geraans only us®d on® Groat

r«glm«nt in 1941 and less than a dl'^iaion of Croat regulars In
1942 m tim luagian f.roat#S8

of th® rest of th© Groat

UBits w@r© u»®d to eiBabat th@ guerrillas in th® Balkans*
Although Croatia oontrltouted t« th« Qerman war eooneaj by
exporting siaall quaatltles of lumb«r, tanning bark* and
bauxite, thefi« ®xport» Amounted to 1«8S th«n befor# th©
Yugml&v

M©r«6T©r, th« 'bitter internealn® eeabat

within th® itat® iW0hilig®d a good slmr® of th® r«®t ©f li®r
®ommy*

Th# result was that th® Ion© ©redit it«w in th»

Croatian f©&d-tr&d@ l#dg»r with O^rBiany oonitist«d of a »»«11
oils«®d export.#
f.h@ Fushr®r had hop®d that th® G®risan invasion of
and Yugoslairi® w©uld fr®» Italian troop® for dutj «ls«wh®r©,
preferably North Afrlea, but th®®© desires wer® only pat»tially
realized. Prior t© th© German invasion, tbis Italian® had
®'^22£KB ^tittguerrilla Operations-« pp« 18-19•
^®S££ M£E» P*
®®BrfeEidt, pt 160»

elairk, p* S58*
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divisions in Albania, Or©®©®, and sfcationsd along
th® Yugoslav frontier*

As late as the wvmmmr of 1942, they

still h«Ed fchirtj*two divisions in Gr»«c« &»d th® conqu«r«d
areas of Xugo0lavla«
ooeupyitig Graec®*®®

Orsly twslv# of th®s« division® w#r®
H®d th®r© not b«®n & iTugoslsv invasion,

it aoeaa doubtful that fch^ Italians would hav» ne®d«{i twenty
dlfiaions to guard the frontier oppoaifc® Yugoslavia.
It eoxild fe© 0©nfe«i3ded that Hungary might »©t h&v# Joined
in th» war with Russia m a 0erman ally had Yugoslavia not

b®&n lnvad«d, Hungarj's qu&rr®!# wer# with Yugosl«vl« ov®r
th# Saelika, Bararjja, and th® Bmnat, oot with Bus*la. kn ®arly
a®- 0®cefflb«r 5, 1940, Hlfcl®r had dlse#uoted Huogary as »
poasitol© ally in th.« lussiaa war for thi» v«rf r@a:8on*®^
l©wsv«r. th« HuRgartans had slgaad, a nenaggrsssioo,. p®«st with
th# Twgo®lsvs on BtesMbar IS, 1940,®® mnd aoreofsr tb® ®tat«
«as ft -mmhrnr of th« Anti-€ttalnt#rh Paot mad the liJlls Tripartit# Past*

fh® German# had already «8tabll®h®d ooasani posts

at Himgary'a prinolpal railroad stations, alrperts, and other
stratftglc points gj.ving her a meiasur© of control withih the
csoumtry loag b^fjor# the Yugoslav invation. It is quit®
doubtful that th® Yugoslav invasion oh&ng®d th© Hungerian
^Qq#riB»h Antiaugypjlift Oper«ttoR»« pp. 14-15.
^^Brandt, p, 160»
^%ald9r, ¥ol« VI, D«oemher 5, 1941.
®3i,uk»c8, p. 371.
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attifcud# toward th® Russians. Ifc is mor® prob«bl® that
Hungry would ha-^# ©ontributsd th® two token divisions at th«

bsginsaing of Bas*bar#s#tt anyway, and would hav# b@#n foreed to
©ontrlbttfe# »©!»« lat «r, Juftt as h&pp^atd during th« winter of
lt41-1942,

f o b® sur®g th» &«rman coHJmit»nfe of troepi in th«
Balkans was very small wh®n eoaparad with th@ foroes us®d in
BarbaroBS®, Th& 0®r»R» n ®v ®r had mer® ttmn ®ight and one-

third division® o<?eupyi,ag Q-r##©® and Yugoslsvia* Feur, and
latftr fiv@^ of fches® divisions were m&k seeiarity division®
«ad@ up of ®®n ov®i* fehirty^flv® ming eaptursi ®q.ulpsent»
litfc thla {i©®g not t®!! t:h« oowplet® ®t0py»

Counting tli®

unatfeaelisd iinits,^ tiier# w@pe 116,078 (kmrm&m ©n &®ettpat;l©n

duty in

and Yugoslavia# and thiB did not inelud# units

of %he l^uftwaff# ©r G®r»»n n®v»l p^rscnn^l utationsd in

gal®nita pir#au-s,, and
.3^

Thi® meat tangibl® prmt that t-li® Balkan menp&bl&n had

«n

©n Barbartasit is tti« faat that giieirilla warfar#

brok« ©ut soon aft®i* fcb® CJ«r»«n divieloas had d«parfc®d fm*
r®»d®pl©yM«nt: iu B&Phmrma&»

By b«ing pr#©©cupi»d with th©

appr&aohitig eaapaign against th« S©vl«t XInien,, larg® areas of
lugeslavia w®r® obviously l«ft ttnpaoified# This l»ea th«
Q»ramm to coiMit two divisions ©aj'mi'ked for th« Russian

campaign stukfts, artillery trains, ^eaptured fcmoks, aaaunition.
6^Q#raftQ Anteiguerrilla Qper&tieng^ p« 16*

isg

atjd fu«X at a tis© wh.«n aerraanj ecjuld l&mt afford th@m»

To

b® BVtTBf th# expendltur® in th« BaXloans was vsrj sjaitlX wh®n
to th® {Jerraan needs tn Russia#
mmnj Qmrtmn Infantrj dlvlalont
tlmir atrftngth and thsr®

wss

B«% at a ti®« wh®n

roduoecl t© l»s® than baXf

a shortmi# of 800^-000 ^mn in

Husfim,®® tven oa« fr«#h division oa the ®a«t®rn front would
imr® b«®n ftppreoiat@4# Th# iaporfcarjo® of one diiri®lon ean b®
iiidioated by fch« tmphm^ls Haldol' pX«ie«d ©n trying to g®t thm
X04tti Infantry division t&r BAFtjarossa*®®
ftitti, tk# G-®F»a!i po3,icy is. th® eoriqii®r®d arsas of fc!x#

Balkans wa® fco divid# aad pul®, wMl« sss^ing -th« ohelc®®t
pertion# ©f «©BB0ale v&lum £m odeupatida bj th# ti»o©ps of
fch© Beleh*

fhl» was- supposed to.fr®® deraaa t;r©»p« for eiaplQy-

mmnt in Barbar©ssft and gtill allow Senaaay %& r»«p iJbe
eammilc bai^tst, Ir th# mnA it 4id a«itb#r*
®§t*his aliortag® was Qot«d hf BaMtr 1« sild-S»pt®«b®r,

1©41.

S%aW«p, VoX^ VI'^ Jim® gl, 1941,
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mmm cAumim

as a

mmEBmw

Tim Geraan opsratlon in th« Balksans in th® spring of

1941 appeared to be auee^ssful In dlv®rting world 6.tt«nttoR
fr»a th© German buildup in Polarid.

Colnoldiog a® it did with

G#n«r«l Krwin Bo«ii®l*s advane® In tli@ lorth African fSeaert,.
th® G«maR ©ttmpaign in th# Balkans

to indieate Hitler*®

plana of axpaTisioo w#r# directed toward the ®a3t«m
I!@(3iterran® en* 'Pha airl^orn® is@lsure of Creta »9«iaed to
eonfirrn tli« opinion tlmt Hitler wm beiot on taking the Su®s
GaBal by a eoabinsd air, a®a, «nd gro'aad o|>®r@tloB*

'fliQ

So¥i®t Union did nofc appear to bs an dxeeption to tliis ^itw,
in spit® of th® clo.ffl® proximity of Geraiaii troops along li®r
border##

Qn th« ooatrery, th.® ©otlr® Balkan ©aaipftigij fro®

th« m<mmnt of it» inetptiou, in mmj respects appeared a®
an aid to tb.« Pmahrer in reaching his military ^©oislon with

•J%»si&»
A.lr®adj,. hj early fepteaber, 1940, Hitler had initlstsd
the transfer of larg® bodies of German troops from w®8t®rn
S«r©p« to th» eastern frontier. fh» 0®i*raan »raiy was reoordiEig
at th« s«sa tlia© that

r«grouping® Biust not or®®t@ tb,«

impreaaiom in Rutsia that ws ar» preparing «n offensiv® in the
133
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Thus

maintained tMt the fe*o®p® w«p« balng

transferrad m^vBly for tb.© prot^otion of Gtraerjy's vital
Rumanian oil. supplf and -oth^r Bslkao raw a5at«rlal aoyre©3t®

fh« Vienna Award and tli-a Axis gn&fante.s for tb» t«rrl.toi?lal
Integrity of UvMBnl& tended to atibatantlat®- this vlmm*

I#at«r,

wh«» Oerraan troops .©nfeered Ryaj&Rla early in O«.tob«i», 1941,

witli secret orders to "prepare th® Rtffianian mrmj for a poaaibl®
wai* with Ruasla,.** Stalin wa« informt'd tliat Qar»an troops wmrm
t r a i n i n g t h e S'Jsinanians t o tiak© thoEi m o r m a s l f W | i # n
Stalin, at tlsa saiae ti»», c.eaplalr«®d of tb#

of

Qej*B5an troops In other areas along tlae- i^iisso-Clsim&n frontiti*,
Hltlsp had th# vl©w sifted baote t© Moscow ttist th®se tpoops
were a- dellberat® attsrapt "to

British att«ntiors frou

an issflBanit Ifsvaaion. of feglan^,!Haider ffl«anwlill@

oeted

that tbis latter iri®w ^-'could not be maintained indef
Th$r&fors i tb® inapt Italiaa invafilen of Oreee® amvtd
G®raany from what /aight hmm hmmn an «ffiba3?3»a«slng' sit-uation in
light of Stfili«'# yefuaal to aeetpt the Fuahr-e-r^s dsaauds of
1940, Th® British pr#«»no€j in Ci»®te and tfeelr
offer of aid to tb® 6i»®®ks prsisdnted Hitl«r with th.® ©xeiis® he

%«kftca, p. 3S0*
Vol. VI, August SI, 1940.
%n.t«Ftia tlonal itil tarj frlbunal, p, 53-a, and l?l-o.
%#man Campaign, p. 15| Hald®i*, Vol. VI, Oetober 4, 1940.
balder, Vol. VI, Oetobor 4, 1940.
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needad to ecxstltiu# hXn buildup In tha ®ast. fhm, Stalin
was inform®d bj the Fuehrer that Geimanj was

in a

"life ftod daath atruggls with Great Britain^ and that the
pr&B»n8& of the lett®r in th« Balkana would not b# tolej?at®d,®
Tha Puehrar addsd "That this should alao be in th« best
intar^sfca of th# tlSSlU®*^

Hitler did not wait ro.f Stalin's

reply, sinc0 fchousands of Oertnfin troops w©r« already
ooiiv«rgia.g on Buraaala#®
Thdti wtiil# Brlfcaiti was dstnoiia tratlng that a!ie w«a not
beaten and wb.3 moTBOTBr praatically on 3tt,lirs»« iooi'stdp, th#
Odi'fflan 'buildtj.p «long

•northern froHtlars tould loglQttlly

he gxplalnt^, *he troops in tlifts# ar^as w©r« a nmee 3s&.rj

pT0&mutlmi «,gaiBst possible Soviet IntsrveintloR or aggr^ssiofi
#iil« Q-t-raian lallitarj urjits aoved througli- B'ttlg«.ri® snd/or

Yti^oala-rla to ariu-® the British fro« G-roee©*

Already in

iovember, 1940, Stalin had iasiat«d tlmt Bulgaria was In
tlm Soviet

of Infltieno#, sailed Yugeslavia a

clo8« frlmidj'* and hinted at a possibls H-asaiaQ annexation
of Flrjian<3.®

Hltl»r» gasong other items, mad© it ol@ar at
lov®fflto®r 16, 1940,.
p, 35S.

the groiandas that th@ ^'fi^ioh^a oil swpply was bei-ond
diaeus&ion," P©r an ©xcallent 4i»««sslon of this p-erio^i of
0#maii-3oTi®t r®l&tloios, sees G«staT !lilg»r and Alfred
pp» 310'"3S4»
®Hal<!«r, Vol. VI, Hovember- 26, 1940| Lukaes, p. 3S6»
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the tlae that

"would not atand for a i»*»0®wal of tbe

Husao-Flnnleh War.*^®
Thus J, while the British WBT& oalling for an AngloSoirlat alliance and tb® Bx'itish pyeaeno© ins th® Balksns
appeared to laak© Stalin's daasnd® even boldar, for Cremany •
Hot to b«v0 large bodies of troops in th« noyth©«st whll«

dngaglng the British iB th® aoutli^ftat would b« ooniSidered
gross foolislmtaa even by tha momt nalva of statsBiean*
Stalin and Holotov did not appaar to fit the latter definition.
Bene© th© Sermaiis

abl® to »ask th»ir tru®. Int^ritions In

the #ast b«oau8e of th© British pr«««noe in the Balkana and
by so doing s«»nd almost 100 diyi.iions to th® ©agtesTi ,fi'onti«ra
without oonsid#a^ably shooklng th®
Tm Biilkau oaapaigna sontlnu®d to. niaak Hitlertfti®
ititdKtioB. In apita of t?-.© licpgii ausher- of Gerpiaa tvoopM
statiorv9d along the fito*vi«t fpontl#r, Stalin and Moloto'W
applied 2'«l«ntlass military prtssur® oo th<s 0#r'ias.nB rl.ght

up to the tim of the di a Integration of Yxigoalavla,

Hussian

troop movawents towar-d the frontier area iN»re very freqyent

and, Jsidging from Haider's diary, oaii»lng a great deal of
©oneem sitiong the Oeraan General Staff.

In other areas

of harassiBsnt th® Hussians had found it neoessary to out
l^Halder, Vol. ¥1, Nowiabsr 16, 1940,
'^^Tippelsklroh, p. 809«
^%ald®r, ?ol, ¥1, April 4, 5, and 7.

IS
down on th«s shipwent of food and raw materials to Germany at
eottvenient times during the oriaie}^^ had signed a treaty of

friendship and nonaggreigsion with th® si@w Yugoslav gov®rrasi»iit
after th® "0Qup*| had also signed « treatj of nonaggression
with Turkey

and, it was rtworsd, hftd aided the 0r©©k© with

food and raw siaterisls.^®

In the faee of this '"obvious

belligerent attitude,** the Reich infomed the Soviets that
the Osraan troopa on the J^wssian frontier ®wer© a neoessary
pr®ea«tion.»"

Hitler remsined vagu® on how the Russians

eould remedy th® situation*'^®
An additional means of diverting world attention was
caused by the itimens® possibilities oraated by tb® CJ©r»An
eoaquest in the, Balkans*

The reperetisiions of the vietory

app®,ared to be revtrberatlng throughotjt the Middle, Bast#.
Iraq was in .revolt, Paleatin® was. in a state of unrest, and
even the Fascists in Abyssinia were reported gtirring,^'^
loreoirer, 0®fj«,ral Srwln Rowel wm on the offensive In Igypt,
The eueeessful Q-eriaan Invasion of Crete furthersjor© stirred
the imagination*

Possibly the Q-erraen® would use the eoabinad

air, sea, and lend operatione against the Suea Canal,
'^%iUkaes, p. 348*
were more prompt,

Howefer, efter April 4, the deliverleB

^%bid.
^^Ibld,
^^The GraBd Allianee, pp» S06-307,
^''"aH this la contained in Haider, Vol. VI, May IS, 1941,
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Gibralter, and raayba

England herself,

Patjl Joseph Oo#bb®l»,

tha Nasi propaganda ehl«f, hlnt«d at all of thas® poiaiblllttus

In an artiole 111 th® Bgutaoh® B»QbaQht«r T»3d®r th® titl«
l:Katnple of

fb# entire edition eontainiijg tb® artiol®

was coinfisc®t«d on security groundf, whieh t@nd®d to aak© th®
notions presented ©fsn mors autbentio.^®

Th& affect of th«

latter divarsiGn on the l®ad«r« in tbe Kramliu ean only fo«
«gtimattd, btat at l«®st on® author ha® suggested that *th«
peatant logi© of Stalin's mind® ©oMld not iaagin® how Hitlsr
eould dsfeat Britain by attseking ftussia.^®
MsanirMla Hitler eontinued his ®ast®rn buildup*

JJuritsg

lay and Juat, 1941, r«p®®t®d waraings w©!"® sent to th®
Isaderi by offloiala in LoBdon and W-asMagton waraing Stalin
of th® iapendi-Rg SerBian invaaion. Gn® British offieial in
Mosoow ©Yan fix#<3 th« oorrsQt diat©.®®

Stalin disaiss©d th@8@

warnings by appsratitly insisting that th® 0®r®aQ troop
oono«Btrfttio«s w®r# nothing laor® than "a war of serves'' by
whieh th© R«lcb hop#d to win morm aconcmie eonsesslons from
the

^3., stalin had alraady Qo»®ne®d his app«as®ii@Bit

Russian®,

policy toward th® Fiitfarar.

On May 6-^ h® dismissed Molotov

as his pratHier and asstmed th© Job hiwsalf on th® grotands
^®Walt«r, Qosrlitg, History of tha Qa^an Qagaral Staff
(Naw York! Fradierie A, praagar, Ino., l'§o¥T,""p"*'' ^94'."
^®LaksoS|| p« 318.
®®ABdars, p. 31i Shirer, p. 844.

^^Andars, p. 31.
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that MolotOT w®i th® main cans® for bad relations b®tw®@n
Oerwany and Russia.^

Ttm shlp!s»nt of food and r«w matarials

fro® the Soviet Iftsion b«oa«® alsoat unb«ll«vably proiapt.

At

th® sam® tlK® h® dropptd hints tbsit th® Hutaiaaa alght b®
tet@r-®st®d i n ©.xpanding t h ® s t t f a d © a g r e e m e n t s H l t l ® i »
r««aln®d strangalj quiet, Th® G«rMi.n troops ir»i*« still
arriving at th«lr front!©? atations#

Stalin, now possibly

thlnklKig that th© peaition of th© Bmiet troop® wa« th®
oaua# of th® Oeraan attltud®., ordered his troops ten
kilometsrs hmk from th® So'yiet boi^ders in th® w«st and
forbad® hi® planes to fly within tw«ntj kllo®®t#rs of th®
SoTlst-aeraan frontl®r.^* Still no .r®spona« fr©» th@
laui dictator. Flnallj, ©n Jian# 14,, lii what spp®ared to b®
a last winut® att®«pt to di%f#rt #ls®8t®r, »ft#r pwblloally
r^padiatirsg th® warnings from I^ondon ®nd Waihingtsn^ Stelin
hint®i at a, possible loeating to dlsouss Sovi®t-Q«r»«.iJ
ilffersnees*

For th® next f®w dsy® rtmcsrs w®r« «pr®a«!ing

in Q®rm,my of a poasibl® iriait of Stalin to l®rlin»^®

fhen

on Juua 2t, 1941, th® lightning struck.
Th«r« la littl® doubt about th@ ©capiat® siarprls®
8®hi«v®<3 by th® G®rmaii foro«s. A r«port of th® Q-®riaa« Mftv&l
®^3hir«r, p# 841.
^^Ibid,« p. 840.
^%8irthoff, p. 434-435,
®%oerlitg, p, 394.
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High CoBgs!Miad stftt«d on Jim® 81 that '^Reoonnalssane® of th®
BaltiQ ar®« show no Russian readiness, qo s-ymptoma that the

Husfflians ar@ tet for imminent

operations,**®®

H&l.d#!'

.y«portea on th® daj of th® Inirasion that tha ^Swsaian® w#r®
not In tactical positions for defense,

Ths troops in th®

border son® w@m widolj scattered in their qwartars, Ths
ffontiar itsolf was for the most p»rt lightly guard®
Wh«th«r Hitl#r ooulf! haw moved 141 diflaion® and still
®0hi«v®<3 surprise withoxit th© Bftlksu oa®p®igrj acting m a shield
fot* his sotivltles can only b« eonj0Cttir®«S»
Thl,» stti^prise aeaieved fey th« Pu®hr®r b&s sii interesting
sequel iiowvar,

Hltlsp, .In all hi# plans for an inxrasloia-

of Hwssiai, i»slst«d that the 8n8®i«i. sireiias auit be d®»trof®d
TOst of th® Dni®p«!r*

It wa» ftirthtp- antiolpated Mimt th©

H«8sisn» would comeit mlmost mil ©f tti®lr troops along th®
mstem b6?d@r -of lussia®, In. regard to thta pdfhapg w® ©houli
»©%e th© word# of S?ie iron H&ssel, ©u

15, 8#wn days

hafore th# grusial invasioni

Biis0l®n,s s®®iB to rsalis® what is up and
ar® beginning to withdraw th«lr poorlj pla@«i
0ordoi58 of troopB nnd &&iie9ntrmt0 thmm iu th« r@ar»
The p3?o®p«Qti of m GmrmAn vietory
still tiaiv«ly
by th® G-®rBisB soldi«r» as bright#^®
In light of th® lessons l®ftna«d in YwgoslaTia, one wond.®ri if th® Bussian b#ar wa® sleeping so soundlj after allU
SSLiakscs, p» 410,

S^Hftlder, Vol* ¥l, Juti© 22, 1941.
^®Hasa0l, June 15^ 1941,

CmPTER X
aOHCMION

In light 0f the ©vl<3«ne« present®^, n«lth®r th© Invasion

continental Greaee ner Tugoslavla esuaed a dsXity in th®
lauaehlng of Barbsr»sa^ Although the Fuslsr#?? hitd p0stport@d
tli« Rufflsian in^asloa ''up to feur we«k®^ to allow th© iwa«ir>n
of Tttgoslavla/ Oerm&n operatlen® against th« Soviet UnioR
oottM not bav® 60M.«Qe«d b#f6r© at l«a«fc th# s®e-&ad w«-#lc ia
ij«n« fe«eatis# of th® w#ftfclser eonditioos io ©ast@rn
iuring th« spring af 1941. All ©videno® lo41eftt©s tMt th®
dl¥i-si©na ustd i« b©fcti of tim p.r«vio«#ly ®#atl©««d

o&mpaigna ceuli kav# betn F®-d®pl»j©d by this tiw# toi th#!'#
aot b«#n an immlm ©f er@t« or If th« Fueto^r la«d n©t
deel4««i agatrist tb«lF ©arlini' psraeval,*' Oftly toy act uader*'
t-akiag thm Immion of Gr®t@ oould tb® G^rnan &r«i®®

o©a«@lirablj have gawd operating tiia® in th« S©vi«t Ufiioh
b@f©r® tb» A<|ir«nt of th® Busaiftn wintej', 1941.

Urtn so,, luss©li&l*s threat, of Ms .blunt ®word aQi'»t«
th@ Albanian fr^nti®!* iuto Qr#«G® mmt to® e©n«ld«x*«d a faet^
in Hitler*® d©f®®,t in Russia, Aetuall'j Hitler had littl#
©hole® in tii« aatt«r »f l&unehing e campaign in the Balkans,
141
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One® th® Buce had oiOiiiEslttsd Ma blunder and had: axiTfei'ed

8«T©r« reverse#,
ln«arms.*

felt obliged to r«seu& hit brother-.-

Aalde from r®a«ons of pre»tlg«,. tha Fuehrer*«

deelsiou was foreed by feh# British oosupafcion of tti® Islands
off th» ooasfc of Or®®ee aad their pelltleal aofel^lties In
til® Balkans#' In ©ffeot, Qr»&t Brlfcian had ©rifeafced a ssoend
frowt «v®R before %h» first fr&nt lo lussla aat«ri«lls«<i»
Tb« Fu#hr«r realised that th.® Balkans Imd to b® «t*biiiEed
qaiekly^ or tlier© oomld not l)« an. Invasion of
aaci 1942 migb-t b® too Ia:fc.®«

in 1941,

T f m Uiriit*:d Sfcetitt would probably

@nt«r the wur bj thea and Riissiii wmM be a mueh atrotagor
epponent, m lndl©at«€l hj her growing srial@® and produotion
figures 4
IQ the beginning tba ptj«hrer oon'tlfier^d sending thr®«
.O0r*,raa,n diviiios® t© AlbaRia#
potential British Bal.k.an

fhes© w®,r® to «®unfc«r tho
aad bolster th# Italian aralea

in tba ar@a4 .But aor© llk®ly th# British w@uld l»v« ®®iint«r®d
thlB ®trat@gla mov® with, foross ©f th^ir ©wn joitiltig thm
Greeks 4

Th.# Italo'-^ro^lc war might haT© remained ffcale®«t«d

•whil© feh® 0«rBiLn ftree® w®r® preparing to l«¥ad@ ius#la#
Later tto Fuehrer <3®ei<J@<S to d#taah ®ight Q«ra «in dlvlsio-M
from Barbftr &®«R to b® U8®d in a Greek campaign#

Hsw#v@r, with

©•th@r Oarman divisions moving to their con«#ntrati»» «r®a®
opp @«it® th .0 lusslan frontier this ©oul<a hav# h#'#r;dti«gtpisass
eoas®qu«nc9s If the German invasion were ljs,lted in Grr®®fi®»
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Jugoslavia, still an urioor-t^in f&otor, might h&va allied itself
with, th.® Ctt'«@ks md tb® British^ and B^r-baroaia would imv®.
had t© be postponed, pft^sibly iodefinltely»

Th® aolutlort of

invading Yugoslavia jSta sell as Greec© had %h& advantage that
it probably w®wld

b®

quiok, would #llmln»t® all unknewn quan*-

titl^s on Qmrm^nj^a flank, and would allow & o^riaao invaslow
©f Russia in 1941.
lv«a before the Xugoala^ '^ooup,® th® FuehF®!* had s®nt
five pmn««i' and ov©r twelv® other divisions Int© Bulgaria with

Brltistri threat
1b fcMs project

the aajor aaslgnaieRfc ©f driving fch®
BaXkatis.-

Thgy a«pa to he aasisttd

fvm the

by §00

Gsmaa ali-araft in Ruaaala aad Bulgaria, Tton foll6wlag th®
FwhT'ar's d#el»i©n to imlum Yuge^la-ria in his aarola. of
soaqu«8t, aaetlitr nip,:® divlalsrsgj,. Inaladliig t^e paaser, ®ll
§f wMeh w©re on tn.®ip way tis th® oone^ntration ai-'sas for
Barbaraisa or wh©a« deparfcur® was

i?er« ciiv«rt®d t&

th# frontier i>pp©»lte lugo®la¥ia*

Other foro®s w®r« sent te

tlia Suaaniatt-Xu-gotlav border, while Qmrlng had ant additional
600 planet Mad® ®'«'&ilabl® for th® axpmnded Balkan operation.
In peroentsges, thlg amouiited to a ewMitmeat of ©v «r am
third of th® QermAG aircraft and a little less than on® third
of the tanlce ttgiigned to Barbar &ssa.
Fortunately for possibly unffirtunately) fer th® aerwan®,
th® Yugoslav and Greek operations ran aoaordirsg to or ah^ad
of schedule.

The Jugoslav campaign ended quickly, and besides
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w#ar and t®«r on «Quip?n®nt,

log sot w«r© alisost

Regltglbl®, Soon Rfter the oonclusion of the oa.mpftigtj tha
panK©!^ dlvlaietis w«r# withdrawn ffir r-©-fIttlng#
cafapaign in Gp©#o© sitt atiffer opposifclou*

Th® Q&rm&.n

Th# Qerm&m

deprived of thirlsy to tortj tanlc® arid 100 pisn®® Intended ter
u«s in Barbai'-wBSft b«f»re it w.8 ooftolujied#
were dlapl®as®d with •feh© Fuelirer's

lany Qerwi»r!
fitolaion

Invade gret®. Bec&ua® of the Impending Invasion

of itiissla, the J- felt that tto Oo3w»rai ehould not extend their
fere^is nor-#, than vm ft.b.sf5liifc®ly odmasar-jr to s®cur© tk® Balkan
fls-nk#

Th# Gret® Immlm they ar-guftd,.

net neesise^ry fc®

fetmt sod.., Th« Br'ltish €«&uld not. us® %he Islasfi ®.s a spring
board fc.© th® ©ontintntj »it3,e« th«lr la-Rd
too Bm&%% arwl would rsMsln so for s-©a©

w«r« .a.t pr®s«rit
iMlder a,f»gti«ti

.agalsafc the Or®t© Invasicm bj sajing, **oiir dsngeF is timt me
win all t.h® battl#g feiit th@ Xa«t on®** f.^ leair® fcb© ®*lsdife®2'i'a~
rseai), to the ItaliaM,'* iMply.ing perhap# tl3a.t fell® last gr#at
battl© W8S not o»i^g to be fcmght «.t ertt©^ Glbrmlt», ar the
Bm%, but p©#«ibly In Russia, Again ths .Irltiih Intei'vened
by d#8t.rsying a larg® part of th« Ifcftllan jpieet a.t llatapan,
then

h,lii»@ll' to b® persuaded bj Soaring, through

Student,, to invade Oreta, In oraer to sarry out this asslgnia«nt, 520 trainsport plan©»

flown in, and th« 7th Airborne

dl's/ltion was brought Into Qr®#a® fro® l^imnia by truok.
lEart, p, 158»

145

Divislone scheduled for Barbarossa were left Isitnobllised In
Gr®«e® b»eaus@ of th® eong«ifc®d tran#port*tioti fa©lXltl®s,
B®for@ th.® battle of Cr«t« ended, tb® a«r®«ia® lost 150 transpert planes, &n ©stlaiat^d 185-150 other aircraft, and muoh rf
the 7tb Airborne di-^-ision.

Moreover, besides possibly oauslag

& d®lay in Barbarassa, tb® Cret® fl®t0ry gave th® Qertmm
th© add@d responsibility of fortlf.ying and ®aaning th.® d@f®ns«.®
of th© islawd,
fh® b&ttl® of Grett was followed by a soraaftsl® ®f mmn
and

t© m««t the Jwa® £2 B&rbaro-ssft deadlln®,^

Onf ortunately, ther® was no hop® that th# M and 5th famer
divisions could »ak® It ©n ti»®, but this »i®tt«r®d llttl®
sihce the Sd ?ana«r liad lo®t a good share of its man aod
®tiuip»#i3t to British torp«d®®s- and both division® had to
l««v» tank# and units for th® def®Ds® ©f C^©®®® and Gr®t®,
A riu»b@r of divisions fro» th® Balkan® aad® the d@adlin®,
but four, besides th© two panzer previottsly in«ntiori©d did not#
Six ©th®r ditFisions, M&ialy fro» the wtst, esuld not laak® it
®lth9r b@®auao of the transp or tation tl®-«p-. The over a
th«saod aircraft

for th® Cret® eampaign, nine® their

ground or®ws had previously been seat to th® Barbaro®®a
eone#htratlon areas, #ith«r had to b© r®-fitt®d in Q@rm&nj,
or m arrival at th®lr n&v base#.

Many of th#®® er&ft w©r®

not available for th® beginning of Barbarossa,
After the British position in the Mediterranean was
weakened, the Italians and the meager Oernian foroes under
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lessMil b«gan registering victoria®, whll® the Geriaan people
ch©«r®d them ©n»

Obviously, if only for r«a»0Jis of prestige,

this dashing Ocrman general had to b« reinforoad, fhus, for
nearly two sonfchs the tank production of th® Reich was ^written
off** for ui0 In Barbarosta.
Barbaroasa wsa launohsd. All along th® lin® th« Qeraans
aohi@v®d surpris®. Over 800 «n0my aircraft war© d®gtroy®d on
th# first day alon®#

fh® Geriaan panzer thrusts in most eases

w®r® rapid and de«p. iiow®v#r, von Sleist'a paM@r army waa
brought to a virtual halt aft«r th® first ttire# days# Toward
aid-July, Hal«S#p waa recording that ^larg# bodies^ ©f Hussiana
w@r® ©soaping to th» rear, and *in ©wry instanc® . , , if
not all"' th« Huisi&n armor was breaking out ©f ®noirol®»ents
•fh© Qsrman 0bJ«etlT® of dtstroylng th® Enasl&n aral®a w«i,t of
tli# Dtti«p@r fail®d. By Septsmber, th® Q«r«ans had lost air
®up#rioritj in th© north to ta® Bussisns and Kesselrlng
soiasented that th© Luftwaff® was

imply overtaxed** and ®at

th« end of their t®th®r,**®
It hag oftan b®®n asserted that th® &®r»an off«n»iv® in
Hu®sia collapsed b«caus® of th© conflict o^er th« strategic
<s©nQ«pt» that brok® out b»tw®®.n Hitler, th® Garman High
Cooaand, and th® German generals, and that that oontroYerty
had cost th© German army precloua w®®ka. Additional tin©
%ald®r, ?ol. VI, July 11, 1941.
^Ke39

» XOX^XO^ »
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and manpower' were wasted on Hitler'a insist^noe on making
L#fllngrad scd th« UkfaiR© his principal obJ«-otiv®s• fh«
long supply lifi-es and wet weather also held up the OerMan
advaoo# at cfiicial tiaea»

Th« validity of

©armofe b® d®ni©fi^ tout tbs faot fchat
1941, the ff«rM»as
th® Russians

argussota
Iw th® lat® fall

standing at the gates of iMsaow, and

already aoraped the bottoa of tim toarr#!
X,

for th® d®fens0 of th« sitj.#

All®a Clark si«®orib®s th®

•Russian situatioaj
Th®.i»® e©uld b» no mors standing fast
psgaril#®® ©f th© cona@«|u©r4C«s,, no aer© tr-ading
liv#i for tiM Willi® th# T^BmrvBS aeemuXated.,
B^e^aus# ther® ir©y® no mor® r^BWvm
If® om osn «sy positivsly,, but

i® «

peast-

biliti" that |u#t a ftw aor® a®o, tai^ks, and aircraft at
erucial points durlag th« Q@m«n aclvane# in Russia aight
hftire tipped th© ®oal®» in I!itl«2'*® favoi* in ®pit# of all
ether factors.*
A tm assum® that th« fiemarja and fcheir alliss gained

from th«lr iwasi&n of th® Balkans not only beoaur© of th#
strategic value of m^uj of th@ area® uadsr oeeupation, but
b@eau»@ th» ©ntir® scotioffli®® of th« G&o^u@r©d lands war©
antir#ly at th«ir disposal. This aasuaptlon is only par
tially truf, f-h® gains (with the possible exception of
Hungary) froa an ®G©n«lo standpoint of th® con«iue.®t and
oeaupation of th® Balkans were almost n«gliglbl« for the
^Olark, p# 160,
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In tho final analjsla fch® Balkan sampaign affeet©d the
pending invasion of Russia in two sph«r®s—eeonswioallj atici
milltmx'lljt,

In %lm «©ortomlc »pli®..r©, th® immion of Russia

0.mu®«(i th« QeTm.m to Im® th^ir only reliabl® soux^oe of
Gopp®r for six BiotttbJ-#

In Crr#®e« the neada of th@ people

pj'oduoe^i a f©o4 d«fioit for Gsraans-y to trj to rmmmdj,
H»ir«v®r, th» ®conoaic lGflu«nee® would not iiave aff®ct«d the
Russian eaeipalgn to any appr«oiabX®
Barbatrotta wa® ir««k00®d in

fiufc militarily

wajs hj tb« Balkaia oampalgn.

First it or®at«<3 a a^oond frooti prior to the tlmt fi»ont In
tiiatla andj ®.a alrtady .shown the lm&B& to tii« Cl«matas in tli®
oiit®g©rl«a «.f men mud ©speeially tanks ami planes, etjuld
baY® liaa «n effeot on th® fltman effort; in Bu.g.8ls.»

TI10

Glistniks. and Parfcisans operatin.g obieflj in Tugoslavia w®r#
a sflooo.d faotsjp* fh@ Q^rsmm w«r-® forced to u.00 aeo and
e<lialpa«ut alloc&fced to tht eastern fro,nt to oontaln tb,«ir
•%Qtivitl®s »*''

Ami third wan th« »ligli.t d«lay im tli#

deploys#ot 0f ia$tt and »q.«lpffl«nfc to tii® staging ap®as o&ui®^
oli.l#fly by bh® 3«rman Invasion of Crete«
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Bormaon, Martin, Tim Bemann Letters;
l^lvat« Qorra*.
spqnd#nQ® fertio
Boraann &nS'h'l's' Wi'l*'#" fyoa
Jaousyry» 1'&¥S to''ASgi't.
Idlled W 'H. S,
¥r®vo'r»i©p@r» "IKosaonJ WMeiofeld and Ile©ls«i3, i954,
Martin Boraann is the so«oftll#d "©yII geoius*^
bsMnd Hitl#r» fhs l«t-fc®rs, howevsi*,
his as
slmplit, t3Tie©in|)llcat©d and o,ft»n nal¥«, H® r#fflaliied
faithful to his FtJ®hr®r to th® r^rf ©ad. B®8ld®s
pporlDg that thla mm was aoffl»what Iwasan,. th® eorr®sponi@no® contains oo s®ot«ti©Qai r«v«l®tlcns sutf is
useful mly in giiri«g th® ramder an idea of day to day
lift 111 wartl®# Q®mmj,
6ilb@pt, F®lix
)» HitX«r Mr&'&tB Ets Wr, i«w lorkt
C^fofd ^ni-^eraity
A primAry soi^e® •mmwlng th® fiMhysr's 0onf®:i«att©@s
on th® ©v@r-all militsry sitmtion from 1 D«e@ffitoay,, 1941,
throiagh S3 larchj 1945# Mor® att^ntioa ii f8sas®if ©n
Hitltr'a .apppoaeh t® th« probl@iBs aoi his g«iQei*a.l
pelitleal philosophy than to g®a«pal military a©adu®t»Th« hook is vBVf us«fwl In gaining an insight into th®
!B«iatality of tb® CJ«i»»An war l#ad«ra« ilow@v@r th® book
only Qovmra e©nf@r@n©®s €«#a0d impo-ytant by tij® muth&r,
Alae many of tb@ reoords of th®3® eonf®r«ne®s war®
totally or partlstlly destipoyed.
Hitler, Adolf. Hitler*i Se.orst Co.ay®r®ation.§. 194i*»1944,
franslat® d"'ani' ellt#'d'''hy'''Berman"''6ka#roii''
'H"» H.'3t«v»ns
M«w York! Farrar^ Straws, and Youog., 19S3.
A stenographic
of Hitler's nightly "tabl®
talks#" Th® bosk is of ®xtr®®® r&lm in gaining an
insight and \m(3«rstandlng of th© Fui«ferer, Th® book
proved that Hitler was v®ry «i3#pt «t gauging his
sonir«rsation to hia atidi«ao®, rogardlsss of his
sinoerlty*
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Hubatsoh, Walter,
)•
fur dig Si1m£JS^22S£
I939-*1945.
f'mtJkS'OT^-aaPEfni '
'& Sra®^® '¥»Ffag fur
W«hrw«s#nj, 1962,
A 4oll#«ttoii of Hlfelsr's dli»®otlv«» for the war.
HsinMi'dt,
gttllgfttion of Oaptur'®^ Material bj
g®-naaRy la Worl?^»""yT7 'dFfle® ©f' th@"'"3Si#f "^f Mili
tary History-, ]D0partm®nt; of th# Amy. W&thlagtorii
tlalt#4 at«t«s a.mepnmBnt ?y^inti$g Qtilm, 195§»
Disomsssa th0 axtensiv® Cr0-^«n us® of captured
war aaltriftl#
Tr«vor»Rop«r, B. S* (td# and trass#), Blltakri^.% to
Hitlfr*s Iftr .Pir»8tit®8,.
SIw f©rST ""fedlT^'
ilnSsftrl:, m4' W&Btm], liS'4«
Ao &ttn©t»,t«d translfttloim of th# majority -of
Httbmts-oh*s Hltltr*® W»lisiiai?@n fur ^i« lri«g'fukrmg,
1959-1948.

0,3., Adjutant G-«n®riil's D®parta«Qt* Yriala ©f War Criginftla
ts«fo.r@ tl» Iw#®bi3rg Military frlbiiSXe ii»d:#r Sofitro'l'"'"
ColEsn~iiw'
WaaESgton I
§©v®rria«af 'feirating S-ffie®,
imi^WSS, 1-Xf..
ffe,# p«bli0fttion eontains v-®ry -rsiliimbl#. d©€5tj®#iit0
pr®g«nt®d in ericMnae^ Vo'%mmB tm and «lev«n, oft®n
r®f^rr@d to ia the *'Higfe S«Kand Cfts®." &r« dsvotsd to
th® trials of tha ranking Qsrmm eommmd and staff
offioers»
U.S., 1>®|smrti8-«nt of kwmj^ &frmmn
O^rati.QBa in
tfa® Balkana C1941*lMS"n fasM'ligton i"" "lijl'i®!'"
G«3iY«rn»®-nt Printing
1954*
A study ©f Qmrmmn ®nd Italian
la ©0»b®ting
th® giisrriliaa in th® Balkans Rud th«lr 8tio©«s»-«s and
failure®• How®ir@r, it 4®ali ndth g®n«ral o|>eratloiia
tad laekt d®t»il a® far as th# sp^eifis op#ratlons of
th® gu®rrillas'«r« eono«rii©4»
0#S,, &gparteent of tb© Ar®y.
g«ggaa gaapaigo in RMai&»«
FlftQulng a;nd Opsratlotta crggOTfT.-TOEfagtont
tJnii@i State a'Gowrraaett t 'Print'ln-g Offic®, 1955.
Th« book i^iTOS @j:e«ll®nt insight iut© tb« problews
fa©®d by tb® ffiilitary prior to sad dttring th® German
invasion of ttwasia* How®T®r, It iRoks tberoiagli dootm#!!tatioa and w«a wrltt«B primarily for th® us« by the
ailltary.
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©f t.h« Amy. fh® Qeimm Caapaiga In ths
Balkang C5B£IBE
and''''^e""si'i'EurW "or €?r«t.#»
WEsSngtoEs^mllted States G-overament ?i»l!it4ng Office,
1953.
fills 1« a» mtmllmt eouro© for troop movomsntaj
ffillitari probl«ffiis^, and military strat@gy durisg tiaa
Balkan iiiTaalosis*' The dootim«r4t.atioii Is p©or«
U»S», D@p»a»t»;Biit of th® Amy, 0«ya&n Ca8Uftlti#s« Cr®t»-«>1941>
Offlo® of th® Ghisf of MiTTEHry SisisryT'^partaieBt of
the Ar»y» Washington!
St«t«a Governsarit
Printing
fic#, 1954.»
This itudy trita to
tb» eofitx»ov«r«lal
qusstioti of tla» number of Gsnaan oagualtias suff^rsd iia
th® Battl# of CpttCj but it fmil# to offer .eo3clusl¥»
evid#ne#«
U,S#, D#'pRFtffi«nt of thf ArmJ. G®rai&B fyspayat3.6^8 for th®
Atta®k agaloife 8af
oT?Ts¥~oy"'"''IS'''"8KI®F"''oF^ilXfaPf
Sistop/7 l)«pa?fem®n t of th@ Awj, Wsshingteai TJiilt#^d
Statts 0©v«raa»Bt Frinting Offi®®, lti4,
A ®hoi?t psffiphlat on tilt transfer of foro^a to th«
Huasl&n frotitl®!" mn4 th# planned m#tliod@ of attattk ©nSairlstIt Is witt#a chiefly f®r sllitarj
e©ns«ptl0n,
U.S,, Dspartfflsnt of Oean-ti'S®,
Bur#»ta» WerM W^stb.®^
If4X*>1950, WasMBgtons 'Ofeit^d lMleg"Wovepn»»WWli3¥Ing~5?Frse ^ 1tS9.
U t S t , F o r e i g n M & m m i c A i m S . m l s t x ' m t l m i ^ C m r m a n f » « t » t i o n ©f
gdppor&t# HoMlpg la Serbia, 01vl!T~$7?sTrs'*'lQFmS'tl©ri
IST^^ States £l©v«i*Tnaent J^y^lating
Offlo«, 1944.

U»3», D©|>«^tBi«nt of Stat®# SMl-Sovl^t 5§l£Si2E£*
I>ooira,®r5ta from the ApoETwi^of""i'SenS^'raSTToi'® ign Offie©.
Washington s ltoit«d Ststta Q&r^rnmnt Frintina Offlea,
1948..
JL collection of 3iost of th© impeptant do&umenta ©f
tha G«r»«n Forsign Office dealing with jftMaian relations
b«tw»®n 1939 and 1941•
0#S*, Wmr 0«ipft.i*t5!i«iit» la^i Compirmj md Aggre#sion,
Washington t !IniteF^tileso¥wriimefit' Sinting 'Offi©@,
1946-1948. 10 vol®.
Thi» publieatiotj contains th® t«stiai©iiy ©f d@f0Bd"»
anta and witRftsses, &a well «« arg«®Bti of tb®

161
p2*o»«(Cutlon and defense at the
trials.
Although 8c.rfio of the oral aviieno# amst b© iri®w@d with
caution> the niraerous daoufflarats presented in th®iy
entirety are of «xtr®w® ^alue. Swpple«®i5ts A and B
eontain written stat®®enta bj thm dsfetidarits aiid rins.l
srgisa^rits hj the rt®f«n«i© dowioll.
U.S., War 1^parta®nt» l&gi Congplgaej and
Oplaloa and Jiaagei£@at» W^shlagtsn: Offie©""oF~Ifcitsd
stil®8''• b# CotiDssl for ?i»osooution of Axis
Cpiisltialitj, WashiogtoHi United States Gov#riM«nt
PrintiBg Offlee, 1947,
Contains th@ final opinions, Jy<!g®@at, and sentenoss
of the International Tpibiunal at Niareraber'g*

Mea©ii»3 and Diariss

Bauabaah.
Ttm hit® fend
©f. the Ltiftweff#»
l#w Yox'ki C©wwd-lfe'darin,, THe77 TSilT"
Wmnmr Bauabaah was Hitlai*'®
of the homb^ra,
fhm beol: «.rg«®s that
was t2*app®d hy his d@ei«i©R
£m a culek wsr &oc!, tfetia,. Cr^mmmj seuXd nmvmr adjust
to idlaya In ttm tlM«tabl« and cMngiag n««dM.. fb®
&pp«ot3.ix ©oatains t&bl«i on tto« «ti*®r5gtb of thm Luftwaff®
inring thm m&r f«ar§*
tu gp&t, Miinidlii

Pfla'a®, 1949*

Biattlar, Frelherr ^e-n# felir»»bijok -d#a Deiatseh#n. W«lipmaoht.
Stuttgart I Dr# Bsoi'"!!®'!.gTSr'7 "1@K¥»
In acQOwit of th« derm&n Infaotry hj oa® of tb#ir
g€ner&l« duriisg tfc® Second 'W^rM War* It draws « vlvl4
ooiatraat to th« ©ften-glerlfi®i p«nE«3» dlvisiong. fh.«
lntr©duoti©» is by Field larihal
RaiiJ«t«dt.
GiaaOj Clal«&s«0«

fh® Olaao Piaylas 19Si-wi0451 Th« Goitpltta
Dlyl'as gf Soant"
Bi^lat®y
AWal'yg'r
Idland
traBi* 'b7'''l«gh"'C*'lbson.' ' Mew'' Yorkfcoubl#day & Co.,
loe,, 1946•
Thin is a day by day aocount by the Itallftis foreign
fflinlst^i? mio was coniid«i*«id by many a» bslng th® Due®*a
right lmna» It la -mrj valusibl® in etaluatlng th«

im

Italian state of raind during their partnership with th®
Third Reish. But th® work ia somewhat eol©red by th©
author's persoTiftl prid®.
Dirks#n. Herbert iron» Moaeow, f©kyo, London, fwenty Ye&ra of
GtrfflAB Foreign PoXISj7~ lorman, 6fela« s tEIwerslWof
toa&sft K#ss; iSsi;
Dirkatn was tli® 0@na«n ambassaior to Moscow from
1928 to 1933, T®ky© fro® 19S3 t© lt38, and aiabftssador
to t-ondon fro® lt38 to 1939, A®©©rding t© the author,
Hitler rtnd®r«d his position ira#ff#otiv@. fh@ work
eontaias no doetaa®nts and it® worth is dsgtrof«d hj th®
s«lf-glorifieation of th® author*
Dotnitg, Earl.* Mtaeirs. f»n Ym&rB smA fwent.y SSZS* Translated
by
Stevens# radBHT^WsHenfMl
and lieolson,
19S@.
Th« book, by Hltl«r*® IJ-b©at CcMjandsr and head of
th© Third Itioh aft®r Hitl«r*s death, deals ehiefly with
subfflftrln® warfar®, and «fp®eially th® »ff©otiT®n«aa of
th® "wolf paek." H® also t®k®g pet shoti at th© M&zl
high brass for their iaeffsstiv® stratsgy. Aoeorilog
to D©«nita, if hii idems had b®@a followed, ddrMaMf
would hav© woB th# battl# .of th# Atlsntic and th»r®for®
posaibly th® war*
Q-oebb®!®, J©,®«ph. fh® Q-ogbbels Piariss. ldit®d and translated
hj h&uls P# "LoiSiiftris'"''S«w ?brti"'"l5o«bl®daT & 0Oi»pany.
Ino., 1S484
Qud«rian, .H^iaa, Paaser I««ad#r> frauslated by eo.a«t.antia0
Fit^gibbon. ' KW Tork? S* P. Dutton & So., lue*, 19§i.,
Th® author of this book is on.# of th® so.r# brililantGemsan silitarj l^adtrs who thought of th® panstr divi.Biom as being an ir3dep«nd®at arm of th® Weiaraasht*
ItoorthodoaE thinking often left hi® at odds wltSHitl@r
and othsr generals* 2li® book gir@s th® read®r mn
exQ®ll#nt insight into th® strategy of th« pans@r
Otiderian bl«M«s Hitler for Gerraany's d®f«.at in f^ttssia
b®eaus® h@ didn*t allow th# pang«r l@ad#r to dri^® on
Moaeow whsn he had th® oppo-rtisnity* Aceording to
G-ud«rian, Von Klug©, hia i»m@diat® sup«ri^'i?j,, ia only
a little less to bl®a®*
H««s®l, Ulrieh von, Tha ¥&n Hass#!! Diariss., 19S-8-lt44»
Tranalatad by Hugl HWBsmt"Gard« City,
Maw Torkt Doiibl®d«y &
Ino*, 1947,
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This if tha 41ftrj of a aosspir&tor in various
plots Rglinst Hitlsr. As a covbt, h® was a aftMb®!* of
ttews 0«otrill European EGonofflia C0nf#r«ise©« As oii« who
©pp©«»<3 Hitlsp, h» offers many rtv#ali!3g «xp®ri®no@8
bfthind tb® sc®n@s of Hitier's wartim® l«l©h, Bs l»
MBtut0 Rt giving th® r«al rsssons bthind so®® of th®
wi»r# tofathoMfttol® moves of th® H«ieh,
Hitler^ .jlifolph* Mela E&mpf, fraiislat«<3 by Ralph Manli«im«
Bostons HoupiFolT'HiFflln Go,, 1945»
^iia Kaapf is Hitl«r*« sataiiie Bibla fill«<S with
hatr®d S'dbtood« That sueh a nan eould go so far in
raaliiing his awbitions with tfo® h@lp of million® of
willing tools i® alffioat b®j©ni hiaasan e0»pr»h»asis£s»
fh® book" la poorlj writttn and laeks so»pl«t»ly in
•. doeuBsotfttion* Its only wstfulnts# Is in gaining an
iasight into th® mind of a m&n Ao at o«# tia®
6ontroi|®d almost all of Iwropa,
K@ss@lriag, Albr#oht. E»§8®lring,. A Solgiar'< n l#eori*
franslattd by ttMsoru
"lew-Yomr mrmrn
Korrow ®M Co.„ 19S4»
fh® autobiography of on® of Hitl@r*s Luftwaff®
ooi«sand®ri and' latar comwandsr of th® Italian front.
It is a seemingly sitiosr® book by a man who plaosd th®
task of fighting th# bsttla higfear than hi# own moral
ooiivictioBS»
fim book,gives ioelghts into problema
f&cad by tb® ailitary daring tb® various &mpmlms»
K@0S!elriiig'3 r«flaQtions, not always backed by ividaao#,
t«n,d to <3®tr»st fro® th® book^s ©v®r-all valti®.
Manstela, SriGb von«. Lest Vigtori®®# Iditsd and translated
by Anthony
Powi'II• ^fi©agot H«n.ry R®g»®ry Gowany,
1968.
Cmm of Hltl«r*a brilliant young tattk Itadtrs baa
produosd ©IS# of th® batter aaaoirs by th® 0#i»»aa
g®n®ral8. It ralatta so®« of th® CJsrman adatskss in
thm war that aigbt bava b®®n ©ouvartad ioto vtetorlaa.
lanstain u®«a tound jiidgisent and tri®® to b# objeetlva,
Papan, Praise von. Memoirs> Twmslatad by Brian Gorraall*
N«w York J 1, f „ ' Ikttton & Oo*, 1953,
Maatoira appaar to hava good balane® aud ara
of valwa. feay are writtara by tha Oarman Mationalist
Laadar who halpad engtnelir Hitlar't aa««rapti©n ®f powar
and was lattr appointed amb&fssdor t o Vianna and Ankara,
Ht was vary ©ffaotive in kaaping Turkey nawtral wbil©
at Ankara#
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fia@d#3?, EPleb von. ^ Lit®* franslat«d by H®m*j W« Dr®x®l,
Amiapolisi ualla^' States Waval iRStltute, 1960.
Th® autobiogpapby of Iiitl®r»s Grand Afimiral
advitss against attacking ^glanA aad against attempting to lavai® Saglant aft®!* tb« fall of Fyano#» f|@
wm also opp©®®i to tli# invasion of Rm»i&» Th® ho0k
Is ir@.ry Pt-^ealiag in hit ©fearacttp, la^d^r's booksets forth Momm T#2»y stroag ©oncapt®
tbe impox»taaG@
of @@a pow®:r»
Sebaebt, Hjalwar Horace CJr««l®y, 0onfitf»ioai of
old
Awtobie^i'apbi' iT~WpE!SaF~Hera®e oreeley
EiHaiSt* friis«Tlf®1'
S'iaaa p^iT'"'''Bo®f&ii ' Hoiigiiton
KffHS Compsajy, lt§6#
Kltl©r»s Miaist®r of Seenomies from 1934 to 19ST
is tb© author of this book. H» i» glv@a muob of th»
op®dit for G«p»any«i aconomie r©eof«ry diuring this
p@rlod, «ia«3 was instr»m@ntal in bjplngiag the Danubl&a
oountri®® iato a elos^r @@oa©aio rtl&tloasbip with thd
l@ioh#
W&rliaont, lalt©r.
Hitler's H«&dc|ttagt.@ra, 19g§'^194S»
fr.aa.fflls.t«d hf i» H.
¥«F"¥irW**'~Wii@fT£STT~"
pra»g»p^ 19S4*
fh# author wm& Ctpttti- Ctil«f of tb# Ara«d PoFe«s
Staff uH.dsi' Q&amiml Jedl# fli® work is an ®3E6^11#r4t
study of the r®latloafflhlps b«tw#@n Ilitl#^, tfe« subofdlaat# eowaaadi# «ad t'a® r®l.atioiishlp of O.E.W* to
Wtiislskar, Srnst voa, Mtaoip® of l.ra®t toB. W®i2slok0r,
®paaslat®d. by iTote Andrews* Ghitagoi ll«o^y B#ga@,r,j
OmmpmjM 1961.
A Itadiag aaisber ©f Hitl#F*s dlploBatle eorp®,
oftea at ©Ms witb Hitl®r, whites about th@ R^loh*®
Q^^r^all iiploaatie strat^gj (or la®k of It), ftie
m#a0li*# are quit® vftltt&bl® in gaiaing inaigbte Iato
irajplou® ®@gm®nt« of HltJ«p*g fblri R#leh, but In
e#rtaia in®tano®« W®i®^ak@r glorifl«s his om ''crystal
ball gating,"
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impubllsbed Material

HaMer, Gdaeraloberat Praas« **fh® PriT®t@ War Journal of
S#n®ralob#r©t Frma Haldsr (Chief of th® 0«n«ral staff
©f th® Suprea® CoMaand of th® G®rmn Army, 19S9->1942)»**
R#l«ag®d by th® offl©« of thm Chi®f Historiao, Headquart^ra lurop«a» Coimgudj tjBlted States Armj, 1950,
¥ol»* I-VIII* {Mim^©gr&ph®d*)
tttis journal is th# ehl®f primary soure® for the
HaMsr raoords th« military &ir®nts as th»y
h&ppars In a <i®j by day account. fti« work also contains
p®r8oa.al opirilen#' ©n grmnd strategy and the of®r*'all
eoRiuet of tlie war as added f©atarea«

Q«n«ral Works

Anders, fl&<ly»lawi Hitlgir*® D®.f«at to Ragei&« Cbieagoi
H@ary l#ga»ry Wkmpmmj, XfSST"
Hitler*s sti»«t®gy# or laek of l%,j Anders eoiitm^s,
l@d to th® €#f«at of tht
im. th# St®pp«i of
?b,@ betk aili© ilseuss®® training, tactical
l#ad®rship qu&litl@s, aiause of air flteis, aii4 aapply
difficultiss. fbi® Is a good book for m. Inalght into
th# German eaitpalgn tri lussla* •
Bartij larl* swastika in tb® Air# 'toadorif fllllam liab®r,
19S6,.
A highly r#^®»llng book &n tli» ci®rmaii Air Foroe
and its probltas, ®aay ©f wfaicli w«r@ eaused by poor
l®«€ersfciip.
book oo-^ers & vidm range of ussful
matsrial but it lacks doeumsntation*
Blaek, C* !•, «n<i Helarsioli# S* C* fwgo.ti@tb. Caotury giarop#»
I®w Torki Alfred, A* Inopf, IdSCT"'
is a good gea«ral h.l»tory for baekgrouiid
material*
Bliasentritt, Suentbsr# Voa Rundstedt, The 3oldl#r and the
M«m» Tran.«lat«d by'"TuW^®ri""II,®aviHCy#'
lioMdons odh«»s Pr«as l,ialt®d, 10§S«.
An appraisal of vem Eimdstsdt by bis Ohisf of
Staff which gi¥©» insights into th© hna«n »id« of tb©
g®n©ral aa w»ll as an aecouat of tb® part played by bi®
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In tb.® ciwpalgix® af th@ Sceond W&rld Wai** fb® of®r»all
Yaltt® ©f the b0©k is parti&lly ^«itr©y@4 by th® "hftro
worship" tb® author diaplayai throughout th® hook^
Brandt# Karl* Maimg«ai>rat of Agi'iettitug# miA WmA io th®
0@m&B*»Qe'©5M#3™s31 WhiirlreaF'^ W?triss» Krop®*
iT'imiiorsmn'^tHr^tw^bmerHrwHs "
Aalgrlw,* Stanford, 0slif#.i staafori Tjtelv#r»tty Pr®as,
19i3#
fhls publieatloa go®s Isto tii# ,®aa«g9B@nt of agpi©ttltu^e awd food la
ioalriet^d lurop# in
Meticulous 4«tail, It 1« Bot w«ll wrlttaa and io
difficult to r®«^» but
it« iiit#n#«i purpos®,
Pijlloak, All«o.» Hitler# A Stw^ la %raBP-y«.- l@w yoi»fci
H«2»p«F & BrofSSrff,
This
hoofe ©» Adolpli Hitl«j? was wrltt«a
sarli^F «nd I® not m eoapl®t@ a® 3hlr«p»» but it Is a
auat f&T all historians ©f th® partedn
Churcblllj Wiaston S. fh« drandi Alllm&m, B©itoni Houghton
Mifflin C©, ItSOT"""' —™- ——~
fhis ia pajpt ®f & a#s*l«s. by th® Bi'ltlsh prl»#
jslnistar ©a th« S©©.©ttd W»2*l^ Wai** fh« hmk glv»s
insight® into British
sti*at»gy froa J&nuai*ys
lt41 throtigh D#e»sib«ri,. 1S41, wh®a B3Ptt®ia«-s basic was,
S0 t© sp«ak, «g«la»t tha wall, Sis b©©k is well
wvittm mi d#Rfcata:i «a ®xt«a®i*e appm^lx coTerlsg th®
pi»lM« *ialat«ri pfersoaal ainut®®,
«ad.
p@ra©»a.l
imfing th# p®fi©il»
Gl«*k, llaa» Barb^essft, fhe laa®la.a-0»g®m Ceafliot 1941"
1®4S* l®w '•^oi«'&T~''llX'H'w'"So5F©w''"ial'"^©*p^^r'"^®^ST
AS a g®n®j?'al ref®r@n©0 om this phai# of Iferld
II this book it masarpass®i»
Craig, Gordon A»
yolitisi# of th# Prasaligi AFmj 1640"Xg4§»^
03dr©Mr Oxford UaiT«f»ity Fr#ss, IfSS#
Di#trl©ht Otto^ H.itlyg# Chicmgoi H#nry l®ga#ry Co#, 1955.
Di®tj?ich,""''€fi® B®i0h»8 pr«»s cbl®f, ftrgu#® that
Hltl®i»ism was not
th® ersttloa of a
pollti©si situation, but wm& th« f®fl®otloii of a ao3P«l
tad ipirltuml ®®ptiii»@s. H® tends to ©©nelwd® that
Uitlmr ielibsrattly t.i*aapl#<l ©n -th® feeHngs of
httmaaltj aad this was th@ chief reason for hi® downfall.
!rti« book is u«».ful for aa Insight into Hltl®r but it la
not a good r»f«ren^® work.
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Artrloana Cerporatlcsin,

®th «4«, Chimg^i

EmymlmprnMrn

SReirelepa«iia Brite&ani^m BmU jf felat 1mmm |g48»

OM«ftg&i

FttXl#!*. im f* Qm A Military Hisfcftry of th#
wiw f^kt wmi
"wm: "gfr^
Fuller eev«r® fch© pri»<l frraa tfa# &mmn Bmpst WmUMm,
IBQBg. to fch® b«fctl« of L#ft« Qiilfjf 1944, la vplmm
t;lii*#«.» It i» an ®*e«ll.»nt h&uM #n sill fear y smmmmm^
galins aod lois«Sj, nntf ftlao eomris th# dlplftMtl® #ld««
light! briefly.
a«rtii©ff, la©yfflowl !.• s fry let KtliMr?# Oftfeglojig
fti@'F»« ?-r«ss, Itl^*
fh§ hmk Im «l«»r mu& coeel®#, hut
fs©t» u0.#d tfs ^iifsatiewibl® »

sl«.o«©t^ IM.#s
ef tlwi-

OMrllt*. ®«lti.r. BMW M_Ma SSmsB aggrt SM«.
»#w Twrki fr«lrIcA7 K%«gei»7l5e», iroSlT
4 bi«terf fcraeittf %k* mrmm.
m&it sni.
f»r«
mwmm mmrnlBhip bmsk t@ th« tim®
»f tim mm$,m t»t th® Qrmm%
eu# MS'
ef tbt ti©®fc i»«l® with fcisi S#ft»a4 Perld «?«r «i ifcs
pF®la«#« ft» hw^k is T«i*f »»ll,. wfitt#® MICI i« * iiw»fc
tm fill, ^*wm%%rn* allimry bi#torl&Bt, MX^mgk tm%»
m&%m ar« liokiag,
mmk gb@tt»«la In undmrljXng
tmt»•
tlmrtf B* Bit .L144®11« flat: g#r««a Q»p»i*»X» yiiilc* l#w ¥»rks
Willt» MmTm k ^sTsTST'
k #%uif of
§©»«« g#i»3r«l.s iMludl-ng ttieiF
«,o«®«nfc» mn4 ^pinimw s£ »W*%9gi9 ®ilsS«k»» «i3d
io*l «rF»r» wbleli prm»» .g#a«p«l4i. bftd litfcln
mi»r ttm *ifar
mmn Mimngh tfaef km4 ttm iinf irtttoafc®
9tt9Qt at pm%pmiuQ tils
In most ©a««s %hm
imdivMmX Bm«m» %g b« rmtbar oiij«etli?» Itj hi* *ngw«r»,
whi^U eentrlbut#iS gr^atlf t» tlj® h&mk*m
wlw##

Ii«ok8t«ll-Sisith^ apd
^rmk fr-ifcE»4y %mi*
Mm y«»ki W. *» Murtwm k 0®*,. Iite^y lill?
Tfa» l»0©te es»e«rn« ifesslf ehl«fiy with ©tseaiigle
matfe«r8 and elaitai tbat Or®®©# »•*» « vlatlai osf world
elj*euM(itJiirie«« and had to pay %im prle«»
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0«p»tci»BOTi®t r?irl®lil©i»- X&l<®-lwlX. Ww Yorki fST
llii®iiiXl«Rt
iPSi#
llilgsi* »«.«• tb«
tsusfielor t?f
St-s^an
la Mm&m «Rd w«« mrj Qtm« t» ttew mg&%lmtlum
tl» %mG pmmmt H« <S«»^rlfe®« tli® S.ii®r«a«ing
fe#Mi©o b«(tw««« tb» two o©uritFi#« «f%«F fefct rl«# «f
Hifelmr m» »#11 «t th» Qhnttgltig
and trror»
$u4^mn% m h9%h
t
it- mrf ittfenmsfclng
mtti Is ft s»e^ a,ttfclioriti¥« astottut of feh© p@riotS
W, i. B, &«y»a S^SliS »«9^«
Iwrkt
?M1©«
f.te fe»&k feri«« %© ^«w
»«¥e?i
©©fJt»@#ts #r M»©'P5sr. While the
ftufehs* Mites
y#ii%y %liisk,,
#©«# ojft«.!s t© b«!i4
hi# faets te fit feii
Wt O# gi:|j»at» sf tl» ESSSISBM*
I'r»«t, ISiS# ' " ' " '

Qsifords 0lfereoi»ti

£#0, A»liAr# $M SS^B iM EESS*
&
li€®»
I## g:lfs« «r» appr»ai«€l ®Jf
hm.f%vmtim duriait
t&i UmmA Wm'%4 *ay», fb# fa®% fch®.t 1% wa« pub*
li«h#4 rnmn &ft#r tfa« «&r «n4»ci
aaah ,ff*M
l^lit bt#k«
i«fcsii 1# «l#i»
l!w«¥#f^
it glwm
ixA& th« gett*?*! pvw^lm» fey
tis«
aiKiti ms
And sfefafcigte »©¥«•
a»at« ®f piaii«-s «ai p®,rf ©ttnel,»
outm, »gi teaga »a|.E2EM l^ai'
J ©tin
I- fW &»0«lliS1gS
I-sf61tiifeltnj %94%i,
Tim toe»k wmm- «r£t.t®a at fch#
tlmm to M of
2»«.!ei -wmlm^ timmimm It w«f
mly

Lutae®, ^ohu *. 1^ tosM |ossa.&,fiMiS3S MS.m.' »"
Til# b«o% 1» m
soispanfe ©f
Harep# b#lii^«#rs %l» wiifa
nkortly fcteireaft#!*.
It ©ttttaitM mi&h mmtul !itei«2»iAl but tim «©i*k ftpp«®r»
ta b« bia»#d #xp0©la1.l|» in
of lajogajpy Aistf »ulg«ri»»
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Mu«ller»Hlllebra»d, Pas Heor X955'»'lg4S». Dmpmstadtt
1, S#.Mittler
iWiT
growth of tij® Q«m«i mraj und.#F Hitler up
througb Jiift® gS, 1941, is th® msLln content of th« book.
Cbapts aak« up
good ibftr@ of tb® book*- &#• charts
inelud,® th© drafting of divisloa®, th® str#ngtfe of ®aoh
type of fiivifion, arid tli© deployment of th# filvislonB
for «aefe of th.® campaigria.
R&uQb, (l«ei'g von, A Hlatogy of Sc>iri®t 5B£5A5.*'
'S'^rkl
Fr«d#riek A« Tjcatg®!*,, lH??.
H&ueb pftsaat® a g©©d cbroaoloalcal outlin.6 of
Hu8sl&»s historj sine® 1917, Tfe® autbor takes th#
pofflitiea that Russia»a bistorj is by no m#ans pr«d#t@mined. Si® boek; 1® written with good ©bj©etlvity»
Diplomacy ot the •S.&fldt Unloa b^tufdsn I^IT and 1952
is eo-r#fsi, but g®n.@pal.
E®itllag©r,
The Hons® Built on SaMj fee Oonfllcts
of C3®m&a F©lierTn"miflari:f«'iW7 ~
—
frkisrw@ii7tt«r; ——
Tblt work o-Xai»s tb® eften brut«l ©««smpatiori ot
w®st«rQ Ittsaia fcj the Qermns was not really th# eaus®
of th,« partisan warfai*»
tfe« liaet* It w«8 th«
f®stiXt of th® ^sc&l« of tb,@ battl©fifildji'* and th©
^^Eusislaa atat® of ffiin,d" wli,lcii te#w that it wa« onlj a,
matter of tiae before tbey b«eam« a pa?t of Buasia
agfiia. Raitlioger gi^@s gcoi ©ftderioe to support his
cent«ati©i3,,
4. Tbt^ Buyo*0®riaaQ Alliaiig^y l¥g9*1.941« Lmdont
Chmpaao & lali,'TfSU*
ai,« authoi' ©oatends Bu«#ia
dalag «¥ei*ftbiag
in tier' pQwrnt t® avsii wa? witla 6@maQf fr^m. X9&9 to
1941, ftfid only th® G-©pra&a inv&aioa feresd
to .J©in
th® w@8t®ra d@eoejpael«s» Iti# faete ai*# ©ftsn twisted
t© fit th® authojrs peiat of ^i#w#
Shirttr, lilliimi L« fb® Rts© and F&ll ef tb# ffaifd Hflob,
M®w Y®rki SiB0B anl^0HustiF7~lWO,
book coir^rs all
of tb@ Hitlsrim
period inclttilBg th© fattfml deeisione «®ej?#tly
tb® intrigues, th# tx»'«acberj-, tb® aatlT^s wbiob. l@d up
to tbe®^ th® princip&l actors b#blo.di th.« a©@n®s aii<S th«
9xtmt of tb® t«rr0P tb®y «.xea»0lseci and their tsolmiqu»g
of organiaing it# as w^ll as tb# bare, ©xoitiog.and
r®¥oltlag
faailiar to most oo.«t#«poi*ary hietorlaae,. In addition, tbe book h,a« excellent docujaentation.
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Stmvrimos, L. S» ©le Balkans Since 1455* M»w Yorkf
mnrnhrnrt & C©,, In®,,
^
Ibis is « good gen®i»al history of tb« Balkans,
how9'^9T at tlia«» it is possibly too g«a«pftl.
•Taylor, T^Xfcri#. Ife® Ma2*eb of CoaQia®«t» M®® Yorki Slaon
aad S®liu»ti®y7~T®^57~~'
laBtability, th® gtneral®' laek of yieion
iind ©rueial flmws la tb® baslo strttctur# ©f th® Third
R#ieb stalled ttm Q&Tm&n silltsry maelitii© at the paak
of its pow®f and prestlg®,, s© aajs th® aathop* He
thmx <i©®» m axcell^afc Job of
it« Hosrever, on®
hms tb® f®«ling at ti»».s that lit® argumants ar© too
p®t»
bo©k le w«ll d®cuEi#nt@<l ftnd ymrj ©asy to
It ©oatifelRS '^©I'man Billtai'y 2'asiks aad rank lists
Ie tb# appendix,
_

, iwofd aad Swaatlka. lew Yerlci Siaoii and Schuster,
Ts§iT ^
"
fh» book ©overs tins alll«i©@ of %h® 0#rm&n military
l9»Mmv@ with tbose of the lasl tetalitarianiaau flil®,
so til# author contends, isalei tb© fat® ©f QmwmBiij aad
e&at th» it« fo.r war*.
bosk tncia with "tfe© eoaqu«gt
of p©lftnd»—wb®a e»llab®i*ttioa f«r the ©©afliet w«s
fii*st satabli»h«d batweon- tb® &3?efcialc pi»of@is4oatl
warriors tad tiae ataristto deatageguas, adi^^iiturops, aisflt»-# mnA ttogs. Taylor ©ff#rs good inslgiit.s into tb®
offistF oorps aM tbe
growth y^ar-s ©f th® fhlrd
H®ieb«

fipp®l»ki^0b, Etti't T©n-» C}@scbl©ht« l>®i Zw®lt@a itltkrlegi,
Bomii Atb.@sft-tt» fex-ISgT^SlT ™
fbis is a good gsnttfal bi»to-x*y ©f l^rM War II
fr^a tbs
poiafc of vlaw. fh® author ts»les to b#
at obJ#etiv® as possible &:a4 ia »ost «as®s suce»©ds,
bwfc as ia tb# oas® of ot.b@r Q-«i»saji gaa^rals, be tuMs
to blam® tb® Fusbrer for Geraany*s defeat In the war«
l®rtb, Al«J!ad@r, Suiaia at Ww ie4l'>lt45» Nsw Yex'ki
s. P. muon r-fii;
^—•
Mm
geaea**! r®f®rain.«® ooatainlng parts
of imnj u8#ful deciHsents psrt&iaing to diplomacy end
tb« pi*®pfj?«tioo® for b&ttl© during, tb© p®piod, Whil#
tb« h&ok 1® mde jsop® imt#r«stiag by el©#@-»up8 of tb©
p®rs©ii«liti#i involves, tbli aigbt bs slightly o\'«r-

vri
, Jobn W, Tfe.® UmmmlB of Pisw#r, Tfea 0«rBia»
Amy In Polltlca
''W«w~Toi»l't sTT^SaFFIEST
Wfe®»l»r*B#an®tt off#p» an ©xplanatton of how the
8®mftn M.pmj
th®
of i9ii., and how it
tbeo proc«»cl«d to dosinat© tli® p«litl€sai iif@ of th®
R^publlo# R® also attempts to ©xplaln the
r«.®,ponalbiMty of the mx-mf for bringing th® lasie to
p0wer and, «ftef toi@r&tiag th# infaisi®a of th« regin®,
hteoalftg th® nemeslm of this acstloxi. H» ©iid® with a
wmfning for the future# His arguments are powerful*
fh# book is w«ll wjpltteo and w«Xl docuia®iitfi4»
Wilaot, Ch«#t®r. ffaa Stpuggl# for Sm^pe, lew Y^rki Ha.rp®r
k Bi»0th0.r»,, lM2*
At^-Qg with mr^ring th# wmr, tb« bos^k atteiapts to
paiat oQt h©* riilltary victory was turned into politi
cal 4©f®at f^i? th« »®st«?'n Allies. Wlli»©t cl&iias Yalta
was Stalin »t gr«£t®st vletory# fh# b&ek: io#s not ||0
b@j©ij4 th# war,, bmt It gifts fo^i for thought*

